
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Foundations of Christian Belief

Psychology of Religious Experience

Studies in the Psychological Interpretation of Religious Faith

BY

FRANCIS L. STRICKLAND

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IN GRATEFUL AND AFFECTIONATE MEMORY
OF MY MOTHER, WHO THROUGH MANY
EXPERIENCES HARD TO BEAR KEPT HER
FAITH IN GOD AND GAVE TO HER SON
HIS FIRST LESSONS IN FAITH

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PREFACE

THE purpose of these studies is to use the principles of psychology in the analysis and interpretation of religious experience. The results will at times necessarily seem incomplete, but it will be the aim to use psychological principles as far as they will go. Religious experience will be taken generally to mean normal experience as it is found in Christianity. This is not for the purpose of setting up any barriers between religious experience in Christianity and in other religious systems. Religious experience is much the same wherever it is found. When analyzed psychologically Christian experience is found to include many forms of the expression of the one religious consciousness of men. There are, of course, many other forms in the religions of mankind at the different levels of culture. Admitting this, there are, however, distinctive ideals in Christianity, and consequently there may be distinctly Christian forms or aspects of the common religious consciousness. To impose this limitation may be thought by some to impair the breadth and completeness of the discussion. But no effort is made to offer complete analyses or interpretations. This essay is not a treatise but a series of studies whose main purpose is practical implication, not theoretical exposition. But this practical purpose to draft psychology into the service, not of anthropology nor of sociology, but of religion on its subjective or experience side,

and to offer certain interpretations of the meaning and value of the normal aspects of religious experience, especially as found among Christian people, ought to be possible without becoming unscientific. The reproach of having some critics pronounce you "unscientific" has, I fear, carried undue weight. Indeed, some of the brethren have been disturbed, not to say intimidated by it. But there surely is some ground between the popular exponents of religious psychology whose "principles" are in many cases original formulations, and whose methods know no limitation of approved scientific procedure, and the strict analysts who reject introspection and insist upon the objective method as the only one fit to be called scientific. It is under the conviction that there is not only room but need for a treatment of religious experience from the standpoint of a psychology of persons, that these studies are offered for what they may be found to be worth. No one can be more fully aware of their incompleteness than their author. But they may make it easier for others to attempt to analyze and interpret the life of religious faith from the point of view of the personal self without being false to any law or principle which the science of psychology has won.

Like every worker in the field, I am much indebted to those who have contributed to our growing knowledge in psychology of religion. Where the indebtedness is specific, I have acknowledged it; where it is more general, the general acknowledgement will suffice. Among the more recently published works, probably Coe's *Psychology of Religion* and Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness* have been most

illuminating and stimulating to thought. McDougall's *Outline of Psychology* should also be mentioned in this connection as a convincing exposition of the inadequacy of the "mosaic" and mechanistic psychology of organisms, and a vindication of purpose as a necessary principle of interpretation of human experience. I feel confident, however, that enough of individuality both in standpoint and treatment characterizes these studies to justify their appearance.

It remains for me to express thanks to my esteemed colleagues, Dr. Edgar S. Brightman, professor of philosophy, and Dean Walter S. Athearn of the Boston University School of Religious Education, who have read parts of the manuscript and made valuable suggestions.

F. L. S.

INTRODUCTION

CONCERNING FUNDAMENTAL STANDPOINTS AND METHOD IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

When one surveys the literature which has grown up in the field of psychology of religion, he comes away with the impression that the great majority of the authors have conceived their task to be the analysis into its component mental states of those forms of human behavior which are named religious. That this is as an important undertaking is not to be denied. But even in its best estate such analysis is a rather varied procedure and depends upon the psychological predilections and favorite emphasis of the analyst. With some it has meant an exposition of the reflex elements in terms of neurology and of the emotional complexes involved in terms of gland activity and nerve tensions. With others, some well-elaborated theory of the subconscious or the unconscious is expounded and applied, and usually in proportion to the elaborateness of the analysis into structural or organic parts the outcome is barren of insight into the real meaning of the experience. Much has been offered of a purely physiological nature as psychological analysis and explanation. Fortunately, we are arriving at a better understanding of the differences between biology and psychology these days, with the result that much ex-

planation which has been offered in the field of psychology of religion will receive a fresh appraisal and be taken for what it is really worth.

After all, the real purpose of a psychological investigation of a particular type of religious experience is to enable us better to understand the experience. This involves both analysis and explanation. Now, scientific explanation is for the most part essentially classification. We assign some particular fact or set of facts to a group of facts already well established and associated with a universal formula of action called a law or principle. Of course this is not explanation in any complete or ultimate sense. To explain a fact by referring the fact to a law is really only to say that the fact belongs to that group of facts which always take place that way. (A law of nature is but a formulation of uniform procedure and has been gained by generalization from particular facts.) Referring a fact to a law is explanation only in the sense that the fact is not left hanging unrelated but is grouped, and the mind rests more contented. We are satisfied when we can thus classify our facts, and dissatisfied when we cannot. But classification of this sort affords but little insight. We really do not understand the nature of the experience, and even scientific description ought to do better than to recite component parts and then assign an experience to some group.

And scientific description insists upon doing better. In seeking an insight into the nature of the forces of the natural universe the modern physicist, for example, insists upon going far beyond data from observation. He constructs his scientific concepts—the

atom, the electron, the ion. He talks of inherent forces of attraction and repulsion, and resolves "matter into the eternal invisible energy." And he is justified in so doing. In like manner when the psychologist finds himself dealing with the facts of human experience on its higher levels, he too may insist upon striving for those insights which will enable him not only to describe the experience by enumerating its component parts, but also to understand the experience in terms of meaning. Now, the very nature of *religious* experience is found in the attitudes of men to an invisible Being conceived as very powerful, friendly, and available. In other words, the essential nature of religious experience consists in those very elements which are not apparent to a bystander who may wish to observe in order to secure data for description and explanation. It would look as though the subject who has the experience would have to be depended upon for the most important facts. These facts are, of course, facts of the inner life and for the most part not observable by the bystander at all.

But after letting the subject of the experience furnish the facts, shall we turn over the interpretation of the facts to the observing bystander? When the interpretation means psychological description this will generally have to be done since the observer is usually the one who has the technical knowledge and training necessary to make the description accurate and to bring it within the approved formulations of the science. But if interpretation is to refer primarily to the meaning of the experience and its value for the one who has it, then the observer may not be

competent. Surely, for a person to interpret in terms of meaning an experience which he had never himself had would be a procedure of doubtful value at best.

This suggests two things necessary to a valid and valuable interpretation of religious experience. First, that it be recognized that a trained observer who has himself had certain forms of religious experience is far better fitted to make the interpretation than an observer who has had no such experience. Secondly, that attempts to explain in the sense of interpret a *religious* experience must deal with the fact that faith in God is the soul and essence of the experience. This means not only a belief in God as a real Being but involves distinct attitudes and projections of feeling and thought toward God, and conduct controlled by ideals which are believed to be God's will. God must therefore be regarded as an indispensable part of every experience which is to be named religious. We shall deal with these things more fully in the discussion which is to follow. This does not mean, however, that it lies within the method of the psychologist to deal with the grounds in reason for the validating of the idea of God. This is the business of philosophy of religion. But it does mean that the psychologist in the field of religion has something more to do than critically to examine the mental states which result from the idea of God.

The character of the material in any given field of investigation should be a prime factor in determining the method to be used in that field, not traditional ready-made methods passed over from another field. Psychology has been and unfortunately still is too much dominated by the viewpoints and methods of

biology. The result is that the effort has been more or less persistent to explain the whole range of human conduct and experience in terms of physiological process and organic reaction. The illegitimacy of this, logically, is coming to be recognized more and more, with the result that psychology is beginning to cut loose from domination by biology just as it had to free itself from the dictations of philosophy a generation ago. There is no objection to biologists of the mental life writing analyses and explanations of religious experience if they wish, but there is considerable objection to accepting what they have written as if it were all there is worth saying.

The implications of psychological analysis of religion in terms of mental structure and biological function alone are pretty disastrous to religious faith itself. Under the formulas furnished by these students of the human organism and its behavior the great convictions of religious experience tend to dissolve into deep-seated doubt. This doubt may partly conceal itself under social conformity and habitual adherence to the forms of belief and worship, but sooner or later it comes forth to strip away the assurances which religious faith affords. God may dissolve into a merely subjective idea socially inherited from the past. Or, with the assistance of the prevailing social philosophy, God may be identified with Society—an Idealized Society—of course much after the fashion of Comte and Rousseau a hundred years ago, only with the exposition of a far more adequate sociology. Prayer may resolve into meditation with auto-suggestive features, while public worship becomes group action in which the desired effects are

to be wrought through the suggestive power latent in ancient creeds, liturgies, and religious symbols. The immortal hope fades into the mere consciousness that the race lives and moves on, even though the individuals who compose the race pass into oblivion.

But are not these the great values which it is the function of religion to conserve? And how are they to be conserved? The only true answer is *through Faith.* A psychology of religion which deals in any adequate way with religious experience must deal with religious faith. Indeed, in its essential nature religious experience is religious faith. An interpretation of religious experience from the point of view of psychology must be in the last analysis a Psychology of Faith. While we shall need to deal with the structural features of religion and with some of the lesser meanings and values, we shall seek from the formulas of a psychology not only of human organisms but also of human selves such insight as they can give toward a fuller understanding of the meaning of religious experience, understood in terms of faith, and of the significance of religion as a conservator of the greatest values of our life.

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF EXPERIENCE

The Meaning of Experience. When used psychologically the word "experience" means all that takes place in our conscious life. Certain automatic activities go on in the physical organism of which we are ordinarily not conscious. In health we do not know that the stomach is in motion or that digestion is taking place. Digestion is not an experience, but indigestion is, since it brings with it discomfort and pain of which we may be very conscious. The attempt to induce sleep when wakeful is an experience though sleeping can hardly be said to be an experience. While asleep we may dream. Recalling the dream is an experience of our waking hours. Experience, then, includes all sensations, perceptions, feelings, emotions, judgments and volitions. Experience is practically synonymous with the content of consciousness.

Two Kinds of Facts in Experience. There are two kinds of facts with which the psychologist must deal —the outer or "objective" and the inner or "subjective." The objective facts are such as not only the conscious subject of the experience but anyone standing near and observing can know. Such events as muscle movements and the effects produced by them, sounds made, etc.—in short, any movement or action which someone else can observe. Laboratory experi-

ments and tests in psychology depend largely upon the observation and measurement of such "objective" facts. Then there are the "subjective" facts—events in experience which take place in the "inner" life. While a bystander can observe a muscular movement as well as the person making the movement, yet the person making the movement is the only one who can observe the "feel" of the muscles as they contract or the sensations coming from the tendons and joints as they slip. Someone else can see your flushed face and facial expression and read in a general way the meaning, but only the one having the experience is actually conscious of the emotional feelings which hold him, whether of anger or embarrassment or fear. These facts of which only the human being having the experience can be conscious may be called subjective. Thus the facts of mind or the "inner" life are called subjective while the facts taking place in the physical universe with which astronomy, geology, physics, chemistry and biology deal are called objective. The distinction is one of merely temporary usefulness and is not of much real significance when we come to more thoroughgoing discussions of consciousness. For, after all, the so-called "objective" facts of the physical universe must become subjective before we can be aware of them. We know things only through the ideas, or mental constructions which we make. These ideas of ours are not the things, but they correspond to them and are formed in accordance with certain stimuli to our organism which come from the things. Then, again, these ideas or mind constructs are not formed without certain attendant physiological processes in our bodies, especially in the nervous

system. Thus the idea rests upon the object in the external world; and the idea or subjective fact is always (so far as our experience goes) attended by processes with some of which biology, chemistry and physics can deal.

With this caution in mind let us pursue a little further this distinction between subjective and objective facts. Perhaps we shall find that the terms denote not so much the actual nature of the facts themselves as the way we have to deal with the facts in order to understand them and relate them to other facts.

The Field of Psychology. Physics deals with the energy manifested through material bodies. In chemistry we deal with the constitution and qualities of material things, and their relation to each other, but in psychology we investigate the mental life—learning something of the nature of mental states and the laws of mental process. As an illustration take a table of wood. Physics has certain things to say about the molecules of the wood and the forces which hold them, giving the wood of which the table is made its physical qualities. Chemistry discusses the constitution of wood, showing how it is made up of elements in certain proportions—carbon, oxygen, etc. But as a fact of mental experience we approach the table differently. It is an object for us now, to be seen, touched. We note the qualities through our various senses and call it "oak" because memory recalls other objects made of material with the same qualities which we have learned to call by the name "oak." We know the table because of its shape. Certain feelings may be stirred as we look at the table.

As, for instance, we learn that it belonged to Abraham Lincoln, or that the Declaration of Independence was signed upon it. Thus psychology deals with facts as *events in our conscious life*. All the facts with which psychology deals are in a sense facts of the natural universe, for we ourselves are a part of nature, and there is an organic or bodily aspect to all mental events. And yet, as we shall see, those sciences which study the body—biology, chemistry, physics—are not competent to give us a full and adequate explanation of the mental life.

Consciousness and the Physical Organism. We just said that there is a bodily aspect to all mental life or consciousness. What does this mean? When we have an experience of course we are "there"; that is, our bodily organism receives certain stimulus and we act in response, or react, as the psychologist says. There is no occasion to enter into or even mention the metaphysical theories which have been formulated to explain relation of mind and body. In psychology we work with the methods of science—the empirical or experience methods. This demands that all the facts or data from which we reason shall have come from experience. We have no right in science to argue what "must be"; we have to find out what really is, by accurate observation.

So far as our experience goes there is no consciousness in the absence of an organism. And the part of the organism most directly involved is, of course, the nervous system and the part of the nervous system most concerned in all conscious experience is the brain. It is a fundamental assumption in psychological science that all mental process is accom-

panied by nerve activity, and all conscious mental process is accompanied by brain activity.

We must not forget this when we approach our specific task in psychology of religion, which is the scientific investigation of religious experience. The scientific method employed in all psychological investigation imposes rather strict limitations right here. Psychologists must not drop into the language of popular religious thought, dominated as it is by a traditional theology. Thus we may not speak of "the soul" doing this and that. Even the expression "the salvation of the soul" will have to be interpreted in ways not out of harmony with the psychological point of view. The old dualism between the "natural" and the "spiritual," useful as it may be in some phases of religious thought, is out of place in psychology of religion. And even the word "spirit," if used at all, will mean self or person and cannot be separated in thought, as it often is in religious speech, from the ever-present organism. Psychology knows nothing of spirit except as the word may refer to the human person expressing his thoughts and purposes in the activities of the organism.

Consciousness and Movement. This truth that consciousness implies the neural processes of the organism is seen also in the movement or motor aspects of experience. Genetically (that is, with reference to the order of mental development), the motor reactions are the earliest indications. We cannot say that all movement is an evidence of consciousness, for that is not the fact. Nevertheless, when we seek the facts through observation, movement is the earliest and sometimes the only indicator of consciousness. The

biological psychologists (called the Behaviorists) are right in their insistence that the study of the mental life should begin with an investigation of those movements which affect the physical organism in various ways. Whenever we think critically about the nature of any mental experience—anything we are aware of —we can find these two factors. Conscious experience, then, depends upon the way the physical organism is affected by or acted upon by the forces of the surrounding world.

The forces are such as light, sound, heat, chemical action, pressure upon the surface of the skin. Under certain conditions our organisms are acted upon in specific ways by these forms of energy. Physics tells us that light consists of vibrations inconceivably rapid in a medium known as ether. Heat is vibrations also but of slower speed than light. Sound is vibration in air. These vibrations may fall upon our bodies with no effect except in certain places. Wherever on the body the forces of the natural world affect us it is always through our nervous system, and the particular spot where the effect begins is called an "end organ." Thus the end organ for light is the retina of the eye; for sound, the inner ear; for heat, sensitive spots thickly distributed over the whole body. The center for chemical action is the tongue, but many mucus membranes are sensitive to the action of acids and salts.

The nervous system consists of the brain and spinal cord; these are called the central organs. Besides, there is a vast network of nerve fibers which connect practically the entire surface of the body with these central organs. From the central organs go also the

nerve fibers to all the muscles of the body. Thus there are two sorts of nerves—those which go from the surface of the body in to the central organs, and those which go from the central organs out to the muscles. These nerves carry the nerve current. Its nature is not well known but it is a very definite form of energy. In some respects it is like electricity in its action. But its speed through nerve fibers is only 150-300 feet per second, vastly slower than electricity. When some one of the forms of energy in the natural world affect an end organ, nerve current is sent in to the central organ over the ingoing, or afferent nerves. In the central organ it passes across nerve tissue—and out again over outgoing or efferent nerves to certain muscles. When the current reaches the muscles a contraction of the muscular tissue takes place, which through the mechanism of tendons and bones results in a bodily movement. Thus all movement depends upon the ennervation of muscles by nerve current which has come from the central organs over the efferent, or motor nerves.

A stimulus is any force in the natural universe which affects the organism in such a way that movement or consciousness (generally both) follows. Thus light which is inconceivably rapid vibrations in ether, strikes the retina of the eye, producing a chemical change in the retinal substance. This starts nerve current from the retinal cells back through the optic nerve to the brain. When the nerve current reaches the back part of the brain, it affects the nerve cells of the cortex or gray matter and that form of consciousness called vision results; how we do not know. The sight generally results in an immediate

movement or control of our movements—as when one turns to avoid running into something he sees.

This is the stimulus-reaction activity. There are at least ten senses and through the organs of these senses various sorts of stimuli are received, all resulting in nerve current passing from the surface to the central organs of the nervous system (the brain and spinal cord) and resulting in movement generally, though not always, accompanied by consciousness.

Situation and Response. The mental life does not develop very far before matters become more complex, and instead of a single force acting upon end organs in the form of a stimulus, we have the organism confronted by a set of stimuli to which we give the name "situation." On the lower levels of conscious life in both animals and men the "response" to the situation is simply a complex reaction or set of reactions looking to adjustment in the interest of the organism. But on the higher levels in human life response to a situation involves an element of judgment. Here the response is more or less the grasping of rational relations. Instinct is never wholly vacated, but rational thinking has appeared.

This passing from simple reactions which follow stimuli on to those more complex reactions named responses marks a most important stage in the development of the mental life. It is a long journey from the clam or the turtle which when tapped on the shell promptly closes, up to a man who concludes that even though the hotel in which he is stopping is on fire, yet there is no immediate danger and he may take his time in getting his things together and then walking

out without undue haste. In the first case we have an organic reaction to a simple stimulus, with the exact and invariable sequence, namely, a reflex; in the second case, a response to a situation involving reason.

Behavior and Conduct. All reactions to stimuli—in which the organism makes some kind of adjustment to surroundings are called behavior. For example, when a man is blown over by a fierce wind, he is acted upon by a physical force outside of himself. This is not behavior. But if as the wind attacks him he braces himself—his movements are adjustive, and are therefore behavior. But after careful thought in which various courses of action are presented, a man decides what he will do and proceeds to execute his decision. This is conduct. Conduct involves volition. Volition, or will, is not the simple mental power it is popularly supposed to be, but an exceedingly complex response involving the whole mental organization.

Behavior is the action of organisms under stimulus.

Conduct is the action of conscious selves or persons when faced by situations. When the situations involve relation to other persons, conduct has moral value, and rises to a level far above mere behavior.

Meaning of Soul. There are certain concepts which are very fundamental in that psychological analysis which proposes to deal with human experience on the higher levels of morality and religion. They are "soul," "mind," and "self." The concept named soul has a predominantly theological content except where it is used in popular speech for human being. Thus one may say "Every soul on board perished." When,

however, the question is asked, "Does a man have a soul?" or "Why the soul has a body?" we see that the word "soul" stands for an entity which is supposed to be capable of existence separate from a bodily organism. That much in our popular and traditionally theological conception of soul has come down to us from the crude and somewhat material ideas of primitive religion is undeniable. Jewish theology taught that the body went into the grave while the soul found its way to Abraham's bosom. In Christian theology the soul goes to heaven, and in the Roman and Greek churches requiem masses are said for the soul's "repose."

When the question is asked, "Has a baby two days old a soul?" (or, better, "Is a little baby a soul?"), most of us would reply in the affirmative. But if pressed to tell just how we are to think of the soul of a two-days'-old baby, we might turn to traditional theological conceptions and find an answer. But when the psychological point of view is taken and the traditional theological answers begin to seem unsatisfactory, perhaps we may be led to affirm our conviction of the essential and abiding difference between a human child and a mere animal organism. Of course, biologically, the baby is an animal organism and nothing more; and, biologically, the baby grows up and remains an animal organism. But is this satisfactory and adequate psychologically? The biological psychologist who will only analyze "behavior" replies that it is adequate and must be satisfactory because it is strictly scientific. But, surely, we do not have to go very far in facing the actual facts to discover that there is a deep lying difference between

the baby and a pup. This difference lies in a capacity for development in reaction to a social environment. This means moral growth. The behavior of the baby will before long begin to be conduct. The dog's activities will always remain behavior. Now, surely, it is scientific to face all the facts and to deal with them when we try to make analyses and formulate interpretations of human experience. Perhaps belief in the soul of the baby is the way the psychologist in the field of religion has of recognizing the capacity of *human* beings for the development of moral control of activity which results in character and personality.

But admitting this, it is probably better not to employ the word "soul" at all. Not because we do not believe in the soul, but because the word brings with it so much popular and traditional theological implication for which there is little or no use in psychology.

Meaning of Mind. Will the same general objections apply to the concept mind? The older psychologist assumed the existence of mind and attributed to it various powers or "faculties." Man's life was thought of as threefold, consisting of body, mind, and soul (or spirit). When the methods of modern psychology began to be applied in the fields of ethics and religion, "soul" dropped away because it found no support in scientific thinking. And now the biological psychologists repudiate mind also and bid us direct our attention wholly to the organism, study its many adaptive reactions, and be content, because a truly scientific method forbids us, they say, to go further.

Mind may mean one of two things: first, the mental subject of experience; secondly, the mental content of experience. In the first place mind is that which experiences conscious states. There has been much confusion along this border country of psychology and philosophy concerning mind. Much logical scuffling of a purely verbal character could have been avoided if this distinction between mind as subject and mind as content had been recognized. In neither sense is mind capable of being objectively observed. But that mind, in the sense of the conscious states, is capable of being *subjectively* (or introspectively) observed is now agreed by all psychologists, except a group of strict behaviorists. The mental subject is an inference. But even if mind is an inference and not a directly observed fact of experience, it is an *inductive* inference, precisely like other inductive inferences which are not only legitimate in scientific thinking but quite fundamental. What, for example, could the modern chemist do without those highly basic concepts, the atom, molecule, and electron? They too are inferences. It is irrelevant to argue that atoms may not turn out to be ultimates—true elements—and that lead, for example, may have been radium countless ages ago. The atom is taken by the chemist as a concept corresponding to actual existence, or objective reality. It would carry no conviction in chemical thinking if this were not the case. With all his professions about the "merely provisional" character of analysis in terms of atom and molecule, the fact remains that the chemist's vast thought structure would collapse into a wreckage of unrelated facts were it not for the basic assumption

that his equations corresponded to objectively real combinations and changes in things.

Again, if psychology of religion is to be something more than merely an analysis of religious experience into its structural factors, and an attempt to explain only in terms of organic process, then we may be justified in affirming our belief in Mind as quite as fundamental as organism in making a fruitful investigation of religion. If it should turn out that the analysis on the body or organic side was inadequate, we would find the same justification for mind as the chemist and physicists do for their basic concepts. We should be entitled to use mind not only as a mere logical assumption or postulate but as an idea which carries with it the conviction of a corresponding reality. This, of course, is a very fundamental question and one which carries the discussion to the border, if not over, into the field of philosophy. The real issue is not whether the mind in the sense of the subject of the experience can be allowed and accredited as a scientific concept but whether an adequate analysis and explanation of human conduct can be made without it. Some convictions on this point may be clearer at the end of our discussion (after the attempt to analyze and explain the various forms of religious experience) than they are now.

Meaning of Self. In some ways the concept Self is more useful than mind. We have seen the two senses in which mind is used and the possible ambiguity and confusion which may result. Self, however, always means the conscious subject of experience, and the center around which the growth and organization of experience proceeds. The different schools of psy-

chologists find various justification and uses for the Self. The Behaviorists, or biological psychologists, refuse to allow it any scientific value. The Functionalists allow what they call an "Empirical" self, a gradually developing idea which comes to be the center around which the conscious life is organized but which always rests upon certain sensory experiences like the kinæsthetic and organic sensations. The Personal Psychologists affirm the possibility of *a conscious, governing factor in the mental life,* capable of organizing experience, *the existence of which is implied by certain directive tendencies in human activity.*

In the investigation of the mental life we come again and again to places where there seems to be a distinct conscious direction of mental processes. This is notably the case in Attention. Any study of attention reveals its fluctuating and rhythmic nature, due probably to the alternate fatigue and recovery of the nerve cells, either in the end organs or in the brain. The duration of these periods of high attention is brief, at best from six to twelve seconds. If this condition be graphically expressed, the oscillations or waves are distinct with crests and troughs well defined. But under the domination of a steady purpose on the part of the subject this decided fluctuation is greatly diminished. Attention of effort may persist for hours at a time. It is true that the form of attention called acquired spontaneous tends to come in, greatly diminishing the effort-element, but the fact remains that under the domination of purpose and the steady direction of the subject, the selective activity of attention goes on. All stimuli

not germane to the purpose in hand will be ignored. Those which attack will be received only briefly and with irritation, soon to be ignored as the chosen idea again remains the controlling sway. It is interesting to note the way some psychologists speak of the *selective* activity in attention. We are told[1] that it is the "organism" which selects the stimulus to which reaction is made while all others are ignored. The "ear selects" one sound rather than any one of a dozen others—as, for instance, when a mother in the parlor hears the first low cries of the baby upstairs! Now, what this organic selection is or how it is to be construed in human experience does not appear. Ordinarily, selection implies choosing one thing rather than another. This "natural," or organic, selection would seem to mean that "it happened that way"—one stimulus rather than another gets the right of way and is reacted to. But why this is the case remains quite dark so long as we have only the organism. The truth is we cannot deal in any adequate way with voluntary attention without admitting a distinct directive or governing activity which is determined by the purpose or idea chosen. And the best way of accounting for this directive tendency is to affirm the self as the conscious center not only of mental organization *but also of mental direction.*[2]

The Self and Memory. In memory too the need for a self as the conscious center of organization is very keenly felt as soon as we begin to think critically and cease using scientific imagination and scientific speculation as explanation. Without recognition

[1] For example, in the Psychologies of Angell, Pillsbury, Titchener, and others.
[2] Compare Ogden, *Introduction to General Psychology*, p. 205ff. Calkins, *A First Book in Psychology*, Chap. XIII.

memory would be merely imagination. The essential thing about memory is the consciousness that the present presentation has been previously experienced. Recognition is absolutely necessary to all re-presentative experience; the "feeling of familiarity" often cited in explanation of recognition is no explanation at all but is itself an initial phase of recognition which becomes fuller and more explicit as further associational connections are established.

In the absence of a conscious Self to recognize, a self which shall be the permanent element through the constant changes of sensory stimulation and reaction, it is difficult to see how there can be any recurrence in conscious experience or any consciousness of recurrence. It is common for psychologists to fall back upon speculation here. We are assured that there is a neural counterpart to memory—that all our feats of recall and recognition—even the old man who vividly brings back his boyhood days—rest upon distinct nerve processes. As to just what they are there seems to be difference of opinion among the theory makers. We hear of routings through the supersensory and association areas of the cortex, and even of molecular changes in neurones themselves. We are assured that all our past (or at least such of our past as can ever be recalled) lies recorded or registered in the nerve tissues of certain cortical areas much as a song may be recorded upon a hard rubber disc. We may accept this; but if we do, we should not forget that it is not a description of fact, but is speculation—none the less speculation because carried on in the field of empirical science. The replacing of these "registrations," as the nerve cells

which were "modified" by the original experience are themselves broken down and replaced is an unsolved difficulty. It must be confessed that thus far the standard attempts to explain recognition on a merely organic and mechanistic basis have been very unsatisfactory. Without a conscious self to recognize similar experiences in the past as its own, forming at least incipient judgments of similarity and identity, memory remains an unsolved mystery.

In Association too we find the presence of a directive power which saves us from that slight connection among ideas as they come and go, to which we give the name spontaneous or free association. Sometimes we are at the mercy of these haphazard connections, one thing suggesting another and leading us aimlessly on. The controlling power of purpose puts an end to this and most of the time protects us from being constantly diverted by chance stimuli.

Self and Volition. But it is in that complex summing up of all mental activities named volition that we find the clearest indications of a directive tendency which may now develop into steady control. The selective activity, characteristic of voluntary attention, is seen in the adoption of one idea rather than another as the aim or end of the consciously organized activity. After the end is chosen, the volition is completed—the rest is merely an executing of the purpose and depends altogether upon previously learned reactions. Here we must reckon with purpose the characteristic factor in a true volition—the element in our experience which cannot be explained by the usual synthesis of neural factors. How, then, shall we think of the Self? The orthodox doctrine

among most functional psychologists concerning self is that it is an idea gradually built up from sensory data. The so-called empirical self or self of experience is supposed to be a composite made up of various sensations. Especially the organic and kinæsthetic. Around this core of vivid sensory experience the self-consciousness grows, extending first to certain surrounding persons and material objects, and later on, as experience develops, growing into a broader appreciation of the general unity of human life and human interests.

All this is true enough, but it is not the whole truth. Genetically, no doubt the consciousness of self slowly grows over against a social environment. But an increasing number of psychologists are coming to regard the self not as a mere concept built up out of sensory material, but *a reality immediately experienced,* and as fundamental to mental organization on the human plane. There are certain important factors in the mental life which point to the truth that our self-consciousness is not different from consciousness itself in that it is immediately given in experience. Let the following point be considered:

First. I am conscious of objects (both other persons and things) *as in relation to me.* In the space-relation this is always the case, for objects are "there" or "here" and there and here have meaning always with reference to me. HERE (where I am) is the center of organization for all consciousness of objects in space.

Second. I am conscious of myself as persistent through many different experiences. That constant organization and integration which makes the flow

of sensory events *a unit with meaning* depends upon our underlying consciousness of ourselves as permanent through change.

Third. I am conscious of myself as the center of a complexity. I perceive, and I feel, I choose and decide and then am aware of actions completed more or less without my conscious supervision, as in reflex and habitual reactions. But through it all is the connecting thread of my consciousness of myself. I *remember* and *recognize* and thus feel very sure that through all the changes of physical circumstances and organic condition and even mental disposition, I have remained *the same conscious subject of experiences, the same self.*

Fourth. I am conscious of myself as a unique and irreplaceable individual entity. I am like others about me—may very strongly resemble relatives, etc. —but in the last analysis *I am myself.* Thus we must distinguish between the knowledge of our selves which comes from experience—the "empirical self"—and that awareness of our continued identity through all change, without which all of our conscious experience would be impossible.[3]

A Psychology of Selves. In view of all this, what type of psychology shall we find most useful in our task of the analysis of religious experience? I answer that we shall find *all psychology useful.* The biological approach to the study of consciousness is important because so large an amount of human be-

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[3] For treatments of the self in psychology see for empirical-functional view, Pillsbury's *Fundamentals of Psychology*, XVI; Judd, XIII. For personal-functional view see M. W. Calkins *Introduction to Psychology*, I—XII, *First Book in Psychology*; Ogden, *Introduction to General Psychology*, Part IV; and Coe, *Psychology of Religion*, II. For a thorough-going overhauling of the mechanistic psychology of organisms see W. McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, 1923.

havior—some of it religious behavior—remains on the plane of instinct, reflex reactions, and habit. Men do not leave their instincts behind when they slowly pass from barbarism to civilized life. Nor do they cease to have primal passions and organic impulses of strong driving power when they become religious. When the so-called "natural" man becomes "spiritual" he does not cease to be natural, however much a time-honored theology may have stressed the difference between natural and spiritual and tried to make them mutually exclusive. Yes, we shall need the biological formulas, and we propose to use them for all they are worth.

Development of Personality. But we shall need a psychology which deals not only with the physical organism but also with the *growing, developing* person. From the psychological viewpoint we may say that personality may be measured in terms of capacity for conscious control of action. From early childhood to maturity the human individual passes through various stages or levels of behavior from that of a purely instinctive or reflex nature to the higher levels of conduct and character. And all the way the progress is marked by more or less increase of conscious control. But along with this grow the desires. They are at first of an instinctive origin. Actions which spring from the primary and elemental desires show some measure of direction, yet the organism is still acting without resistance, and there is no conflict. But desires grow and are transformed. Springing at first from the level of instinct and basic organic needs, they may become expressions of controlling ideas, and even ideals. This means an altogether higher

kind of motiving of action and calls for loyalty and often sacrifice and the putting aside of the calls of organic impulse. When action goes forward under the domination of a sentiment,[4] as, for example, loyalty to native country or obedience to what one conceives as the will of God, then instead of being in the path of least resistance, the action may be along the line of the greatest resistance. History gives us countless examples. The prophets and martyrs who sacrificed personal safety, counting loyalty to God's will as dearer even than life itself, are cases in point. The great moral leaders have often followed, not the path of least resistance, but the path of greatest resistance. They have joyously chosen to do the hard things and even to walk the way of suffering for conscience' sake. When this takes place, behavior has given place to conduct in the highest degree moralized. Now, this control through which action becomes moralized develops around the consciousness of self and the recognition of the relation of the self to other selves, that is to society, and ultimately (in religious experience) to God.[5]

At the outset, then, we shall declare our loyalty to all psychology, but shall insist upon a method adequate to deal with human experience on the higher level of the moral as well as the lower level of the organic. *This is, after all, the only complete psy-*

[4] A sentiment is an object or a related group of ideas around which strong emotions center, and these emotional feelings have become relatively permanent.

[5] It will be noted that the terms "self" and "person" are in many respects interchangeable. If there is a difference, we might say that "self" refers more to the consciousness of experience as it is organized around individual desires, impulses, feelings, ideas; while "person" may be used of the more complex organization of social relations. Yet we must not forget that the self develops in a social environment and is in large measure a social product.

chology. A thoroughgoing Behaviorism is hardly more than a kind of Mental Biology. It does valuable service in emphasizing the importance of organic processes in their close relation to conscious states, and in its more adequate treatment of reflex, instinctive, and habitual action, which forms so large a part of the movements of all human beings as well as animals, but it fails in dealing with experiences on the distinctly *human* level. This will become increasingly evident as our study progresses.

Human experience then extends all the way from simple organic reflexes up to the most complicated series of actions looking to the realization of some idea which has been consciously selected or chosen as object or end. There is indeed a continuity as we pass from the lower levels organically determined to the higher levels in which reason is the controlling factor. It is a continuity, however, in which there are new factors appearing from time to time, as the evolution proceeds. Darwin's attempt in *The Descent of Man* to show that "there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher mammals in their mental faculties" ignores some distinctively human capacities and assumes a great deal in the higher mammals for which there is little or no evidence. Organic evolution has too often sought to establish the continuity without taking due account of the new facts which appear. We must not forget that differences are quite as important in evolutionary thinking as the identities upon which the affirmation of continuity is based. We must keep in mind this truth of the new factors which appear with the different levels of experience. Nor must we forget

that in *religious* experience we find both behavior on the level of the organic and conduct on the higher and more complex level of the moral. Behavior on the low level of the organic is submoral; conduct on the level of personal life always has moral value. It is therefore only on the level of the moral and personal that experience takes on those qualities which justify the adjective "religious." We must inquire concerning the meaning and implications of this word "religious" in our next chapter.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, experience in the psychological sense means the contents of consciousness. It includes all sensations, perceptions, feelings, and emotions, all awareness that we are making certain judgments or directing our actions to secure chosen ends—in short, *all* reactions attended by consciousness are experience. We must now inquire about *religious* experience, or the *religious consciousness*—what is its essential nature?

The Attitude Aspects of Experience. As human beings in social relations with one another, we have experiences which go beyond the perception of objects and the attending emotions. We take attitudes. Attitude is an aspect of consciousness itself. Feeling, in the sense of affective consciousness, is the manner in which the subject reacts to certain stimuli. To some, the subject reacts with evident desire for continuation. To others, the subject reacts with restlessness and effort to avoid or discontinue. The former are the pleasant affective reactions while the latter are the unpleasant. Pleasant and unpleasant are the two qualities of the feeling consciousness. But along with the feeling is found an attendant readiness to act. With pleasant-feeling reactions the motor readiness is for acceptance or nearer approach, while with the unpleasant it is for rejection or withdrawal.

Now, attitude involves attention together with this feeling and motor readiness. Indeed, attention itself, from one point of view, means the readiness to receive stimuli and to react. Here, then, is the attitude in its simpler structural parts—it is a relatively high level of attention with the tendency to movement and accompanying feeling. Attitude is the predominantly emotional response to a situation in which the important factors are persons. It is the whole manner in which we are affected by another person or persons and the way we respond to and relate ourselves to such personal situations. Attitudes are the social aspects of consciousness.

Attitude to God Fundamental in Religious Experience. If, now, we seek to reduce to lowest terms the essential meaning of the very complex concept named "religion," we shall find ourselves using the word "attitude," provided we think of religious experience in terms of current psychology rather than traditional theology. It would involve, then, attitude to a personal object thought of as superhuman and good—The Divine Being who not only rules the universe but also determines many things in our lives. This personal being we call "God." The idea of God is the highest ideal of which any human being is capable at the level of development which he has reached. A study of the growth of the idea of God from the early and rude forms in which it appears in primitive culture to the conceptions of a highly developed religion, like Judaism and Christianity, would be to a large extent the story of the growth of religion. But the idea of God at any level will include some common and essential elements. These

are: (1) superhuman power, (2) goodness or beneficence, (3) the element of mystery which is common to all spiritual or superhuman beings, and (4) the idea of control or determination in some way of the destinies of the lives of men. *When, now, there is toward a being as thus characterized an attitude, involving as we have seen, attention upon such being, and certain feelings which find expression in various ways, then we have religious experience in its essential meaning.*

Anthropology has done much during the last generation to broaden our view of religion. The studies of uncivilized peoples which are of the most scientific value are those by anthropologists and ethnologists trained in scientific observation. Practically all the primitive peoples of the remoter parts of the world have been studied during the past thirty or forty years, and their life, including rites and ceremonies, many of which are found to have a religious significance, have been carefully described. The results are recorded in the standard works published in the last two or three decades.[1] The gain to the science of religion has been very great. As a result some of the conclusions of the older scholars in history of religion have been set aside and interpretations of primitive acts more in keeping with the new facts and the principles of psychology have been formulated. It is now generally agreed that acts precede definite beliefs. This is true of religious acts. They generally begin as instinctive impulses and ideo-motor move-

[1] Among those works may be mentioned Spencer and Gillens' two volumes on the Australian tribes; Dudley Kidd on the Kaffirs, Howett on the Australian tribes; Skeat and Blagdon on Malay peoples. Such works as these are the source books for the foundation facts in sociology, social psychology, and history of religion.

ments, rather than as directed acts based upon definite beliefs. Primitive people do not think in terms of casual relations concerning the superhuman powers and then express this thinking in their action —ceremonials, religious dances, and other acts of religious ritual. That primitive peoples do have beliefs concerning the relation of spirits to natural phenomena is, of course, undeniable. But the acts come first, as impulses of an instinctive sort. These acts are for the most part group activities which take place under the social stimulus of imitation and suggestion. As such they may be called social reflexes. With civilized people, definite belief usually accompanies and precedes action, but with primitive men action is first.

But we cannot suppose that a religious dance of savages, for example, remains on the level of a mere social reflex. For when it has become established as a custom and is observed and described by the anthropologist it is found to be already accompanied by beliefs. For example, the belief in "Mana" the omnipresent superhuman power of early culture, also the well-nigh universal belief in spirits, both good and bad—these are found to lie back of the ceremonials of uncivilized peoples. Now, it is difficult to think that these ceremonials do not soon involve attitudes to the superhuman agencies on the part of those who take part in them. The dance cannot and does not remain merely an ideo-motor performance. It takes place because something is wanted—good crops, deliverance from disease, victory in battle, etc. It takes place also because the superhuman power is thought to be able to help, and so his assistance is sought.

Of course this is not formulated or definite belief; but when the acts reach the level of religion, or even magic, belief is present and the ends are sought through acts by which it is believed these ends will be furthered. Religion can hardly be said to emerge at all until actions become to some degree directed—until the help of the superhuman powers is consciously sought. If the attitude to superhuman agencies is not that of dependence, but, on the contrary, if the performance seems to be an attempt to compel or induce desired results through imitative action, then we have magic and not religion. The most useful and defensible distinction between magic and religion is that in magic the attitude of the devotee is that of mastery, he will bring about the desired ends by occult means (or the magician or witch-doctor will do it for him). In religion, on the other hand, the attitude is that of dependence. The help of the superhuman beings is sought.

On the high level of Christian culture, religion consists in all the ways men's behavior is modified and controlled because of a fundamental belief in God and because of the attitudes to God which accompany such belief. A child who has received Christian training receives his belief in God as a social inheritance. Later on the belief in God may secure deeper sources of validity than the authority of social tradition, but at first it is undoubtedly received by social inheritance. Along with this belief in God go the customary and socially approved acts. These also are taught. The result is that in a highly civilized religious system like Christianity some beliefs which are fairly definite and rationalized accompany

the acts which express the attitudes of the worshiper to the Supreme Power. The ~~rude~~ acts and vague beliefs of the savages are also a matter of social inheritance. The difference is in the degree of conscious and rational control of the acts which look toward the securing of desired ends. The savage is nearer the animal in that his acts are more completely on the plane of instinct and impulse. But he has risen far above the animal if religion, however crude and primitive, has emerged.

Attitude as Individual Experience. One thing we must not forget, and that is that however primitive a religious experience may be, it is the experience of someone. ~~That means that~~ Religious experience even in its early and rude forms is individual as well as social. If the scholars in science of religion of a generation ago erred by overemphasizing the individual aspects of religion (attributing powers of intellect to savages which they do not possess), it is equally true that many writers in science of religion to-day are stressing the social aspects of religion so greatly as almost to lose sight of the individual in religion altogether. Let us urge again that ~~so~~ long as primitive ritual remains merely group action it does not rise to the level of religion. There must be the feelings and desires of the worshiper—and this means the *individual* worshiper, or no attitude of dependence to the superhuman powers is possible. We shall need to revert to this again when fuller discussion will be in order.

Genesis of Religious Experience. With the question, Whence the belief in superhuman powers or spiritual beings? we are not specially concerned. But we are concerned with the question why ~~belief~~ believe in superhu-

man powers, or in a Supreme Power in the universe, ~~should modify men's behavior, making it very different at times from what it otherwise would be.~~ Recognizing the truth made plain by anthropology, that some kind of a belief in superhuman beings is well-nigh universal, why should such forms of reaction as we class under the general term "worship" take place? What is the origin, that is, the stimulus for such reactions? These questions will necessarily carry us below the currents of popular surface thinking on religion before we can find satisfactory answers.

There are some very fundamental needs in human life, such as protection from the elements, especially from the destructive forces in nature like storms, lightning, and disease. Food too is, of course, necessary to life itself. These needs are the basis of the elemental desires. Desire begins on the plane of instinct and organic need. Some of the sociologists have ~~assured~~ us that the three basic motives or driving forces in human activity and organization are food, safety, and sex.[1] If we are thinking of life only in terms of physical need, this is true. The great fundamental requirements of the organism become deep-seated desires. The satisfaction of these needs and desires are fundamental values.

Very early men found that the weather and the food supply are closely related. How natural, then, that in primitive culture men should learn to propitiate the forces of nature—the sun, rain, south wind. The tendency to think of nature as alive (animism) and to personify are characteristic of the primitive mind. ~~Now~~, When nature forces are ~~thus~~

personified and attitudes of dependence are taken expressed in rites intended to placate, we have the beginning of nature gods and their worship. In all primitive religions the principal deities are the gods of the weather. To them sacrifices of a rude sort and prayers of placation are offered. Why? Because men wish through the power and good will of the gods to make sure of conditions favoring a good food supply. And not only on what we call the lower levels of culture is the favor of the Divine sought with food as the end in view; "Give us this day our daily bread" finds a place in one of the loftiest and most spiritual of prayers. In times of severe drought how often are petitions sent to the Divine Throne for the rain which will save the crops! And this is true of Christians quite as much as of so-called pagan countries.

Food is a universal need—hence, a fundamental value to the securing of which it is believed religion has something to offer. And what is true of food is true of the other basic values of life—safety from danger, freedom from pain and disease, victory in conflict, children, prosperity, etc. The attitudes taken, therefore, by the worshiper to his Divinity are at first largely for the purpose of securing the satisfaction of these very basic needs. And the benefits or "blessings," the seeking of which forms so large a part even of our Christian worship (prayers of petition) are found to be in large measure these same fundamental needs.

Basic Motives in Religious Acts. It is true, then, that a basic motive in religious worship is the gaining of these values of life. Now, some psychologists in the

field of religion have supposed that this is all there is to it, and have therefore made religious acts to proceed wholly from utilitarian motives. Undoubtedly, this is correct as far as it goes. On certain levels of experience religious acts do come from utilitarian motives. This is true of religious dances in primitive culture and of prayers in Christian worship, when the petitions are for material gifts. But while many primary needs and desires remain the same for all men—savage and civilized—yet as life develops and passes to the higher levels of culture desires are transformed; moral values emerge and grow. To say that the basic motives in religions are practically utilitarian would be wrong unless we are ready to give to the word "utilitarian" a very broad meaning, making it include moral and spiritual values as well as the satisfaction of the organic needs.

And the time comes in the higher developments of religious experience when God himself becomes an object of adoration not simply because of the desires to secure benefits through his help but for his own sake—God becomes a distinct object of the emotional feelings of the worshiper and the worship becomes an end in itself, in contrast to all which men may hope to secure through worship. Acts of worship which express praise or gratitude are based upon an attitude to God as an end in himself. Thus it will be seen that religious experience when highly developed morally often includes attitudes and actions which express supreme affection and devotion and loyalty to God, quite aside from any underlying purpose to make use of God to secure benefits and blessings through his aid.

Then, too, moral desires and purposes unfold on higher levels. When a man prays that God will inspire him for some difficult or heroic service to his fellow men, religious experience has passed far beyond the regions of the economic motive. It is surely a long journey from the worshiper beseeching his God for good weather, to secure a tribal victory, or to insure a fair crop, to the prophet who seeks inspiration and strength from God to enable him to serve with courage and fidelity his day and generation.

Summary. ~~Summing up, then,~~ the essential nature of religious experience, ~~first in its lower and more elementary forms, let us say: It~~ is a conscious reaction or group of reactions in which an attitude of dependence is taken to a Superhuman Power or to the Supreme Power (usually conceived as personal) with the underlying purpose more or less definitely formed of soliciting the aid and help of the Powers or Power so as to secure the satisfaction of needs or desires.

Religion is thus an attempt to gain and conserve life's great values through Superhuman assistance. After having said this we must not forget to add that these values undergo a ~~progressive development~~ as we pass from the lower levels of religious experience to the higher. They begin in the basic organic needs, but they may end in the highest spiritual longings and desires. "Whom have I in heaven but thee, and who on earth is there beside thee?" exclaimed one of the spiritual princes of the later Israel—a man who found in God the satisfaction of his deepest spiritual longings.

As already stated, we are not concerned with the

question how the idea of superhuman beings first got afloat. That problem belongs really to social psychology quite as much as to psychology of religion. No adequate or satisfactory answer can be given in terms of a psychological analysis alone. Our present interests and problems have to do with the more individual aspects of religious experience. We shall not therefore attempt in any thorough way a discussion of the social origins of religion. That has been done by Durkheim and several American writers who follow him pretty closely, notably King and Ames. Their analyses are good as far as they go, but they do not go very far. Like the biological mechanistic psychological theories upon which they build, the conclusions do very well for an interpretation of behavior on the lower levels but not of conduct on the higher levels. Most of the group actions which are given such painstaking analysis are magic rather than religion. In this our preliminary survey of the meaning of religious experience we shall simply note a few fundamental matters. All that follows in the subsequent discussion is in truth a fuller answer to the question, What is religious experience?

Let us simply note now that religious experience is necessarily social in its origins and early forms, but it emerges from the great mass of social experiences. It becomes distinctly *religious* as contrasted with social when the attitude of the subject is toward a superhuman (or divine) power. Social experience, on the other hand, is a matter of attitudes and relations to other human persons. As we shall find occasion to urge in our later discussions there are ample reasons for emphasizing the social nature of religious

experience especially in such a religion as Christianity. Since the days of the prophets of Israel and of Jesus, religion—for the Western mind at least—has been thoroughly identified with great moral values, with justice and mercy and social righteousness. But granting this, there is no good reason for holding, as some psychologists do, that social experience *is* religious experience. It is true that our concept of God is slowly built up largely from the experience of social relations and contacts with our fellow human beings. The Divine is revealed in and through the human—human experience. This is truly a psychological aspect of the incarnation. But in religious experience the worshiper's attitude is toward a God who is always thought of as objectively real. A psychologist after analysis may report that he finds the conception of God to be a projection of the purest and highest ideals of the worshiper. But who is it who thus thinks of God as the projection of high ideals? Is it the worshiper? Surely not. No one long remains a worshiper who thinks of himself as taking attitudes toward his own projected concepts, however idealized. It is the psychologist of course—the observing analyzing bystander—who says God is a projection of social ideals. It is only fair to ask how legitimate this is. Even in a scientific treatment ought we not to try to describe the experience as it exists for the one who has it, not for an interested onlooker? This, of course, will involve interpretation in terms of *meaning* and *value* not simply analysis in terms of structural parts. When we think critically there is no escaping the conclusion that to the worshiper his experience means an attitude to a

personal Supreme *Power taken as objectively real.*[2] No, religious experience does not long maintain itself on the basis of projections of any sort. It rests upon a God whom we believe we do not make in our thoughts and project, but whom we find, as he reveals himself to us. This revelation is made progressively through the experience of our common life as well as directly and immediately (as we may believe) in individual experience. We enter into experience with the Supreme Person through the gateway of experiences with human persons. And it is very doubtful, as the apostle John says, whether one who has not learned to love his brother whom he has seen can love God whom he has not seen.

We repeat, then, in closing the discussion on the essential nature of religious experience, that even in its earlier and elementary phases religion is a matter of individual experience. It may seem to be very largely social in its origins, but in the last analysis *experience is always the experience of someone,* the one having the experience, the conscious individual subject. Social psychologists when treating religion have often lost sight of this. Even a man who has taken part in mob violence when he recovers his judgment, reacts as an individual to what has been done by the mob. He may deeply regret his own part in the proceedings. Under the emotional excitement and suggestions of the leader he fused with the social mass, lost himself for the time, and reacted in accordance with instinct and primal impulse. It is

[2] Even if we call admiration of the beauty of the universe a religion, no aesthetic worshiper in this sense could long maintain his attitude as a worshiper if he regarded cosmic beauty as the feeling quality of his own subjective states. He too must think of the beauty of the universe he professes to worship as more than his projection.

only when he emerges, comes to himself again, that he begins to have experience in the full sense. Judgment is restored and reaction begins again under full conscious direction. If religion could be regarded as merely a matter of emotional reactions, one might insist that it begins as a form of group action, instinctive, reflex, and ideo-motor. But religion includes the whole of the mental life, since conduct rather than behavior is its expression. And Conduct involves consciousness of meaning and the judgment. And these are the individual aspects of the mental life. Religion does not become articulate until there is some control under ideas as distinguished from mere reactions of an impulsive nature. We must urge, therefore, that in *religious* experience the ultimate reality on the human side is the individual—the Person who takes attitudes to the Divine Person believed in as objectively real, and expresses these attitudes in the manifold ways which it is the business of the History of Religion to describe and of Psychology of Religion to analyze.

CHAPTER III

THE METHOD AND TASK OF PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

It is scarcely more than a single generation since scientific Psychology was born. Before that there was "Mental Philosophy," sometimes also called "Mental Science." Mind was assumed as a fundamental postulate and then all sorts of powers and capacities were attributed to mind. Often it was thought to be quite a sufficient explanation to say that certain processes of the conscious life were "faculties" with which the mind is endowed. But this way of explaining the processes of the mental life —for the most part philosophical (and even theological) gave way before the advance of a true scientific method. In 1875 the first laboratory for the scientific study of consciousness was established by Wundt in Leipzig. During the eighties Ladd, Scripture, and Hall were laying the foundations of an inductive method in psychology. In 1890 Professor James published his psychology in two large volumes. From that time on the various phases of the conscious life were studied with the thorough, and exact methods of scientific investigation.

The Scientific Method. But what is the scientific method which came thus to be applied to the mental life? It is the method of exact investigation which has been gradually perfected through many years of

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Especially since the middle of the nineteenth century when biology grew to a fully developed science, the scientific method (sometimes called empirical) became the only approved method for trustworthy analysis and explanation. In this method all reasoning is based upon facts. These facts are the result of observation and experiment by trained investigators. Observation may be direct, as when the investigator goes forth to see what he can find by intelligent looking, as in the case of the botanist, zoologist, or geologist. Here the observer takes things just as he finds them in nature. Or observation may be under conditions which are controlled by the observer, as when one notes the changes in the circulation or digestion of an animal immediately after the animal has been purposely frightened. This observing under conditions which can be arranged or controlled by the observer is called experiment. But in any event, whether under conditions as found in nature or under conditions which can be artificially arranged and controlled, the facts upon which scientific reasoning is based must come from exact observation.

The type of reasoning too is called inductive. That means that the reasoning process goes from the particular to the general or universal. We do not reach scientific results until we gain general principles. These principles, when they express constant ways of action under given conditions, are laws. Thus, for example, when we give concentrated attention to a certain object we soon become conscious of the strain. It has been found that under this strain the power of perception is rhythmic with a regular ebb

and flow so that when we look or listen very intently we see or hear in waves, now clearly and now less clearly. This intermittent character of attention can be demonstrated by simple experiments. Now, as this ebb and flow has been found always to take place in substantially the same way, it has been formulated as one of the laws of attention.

Psychology as a Science. The scientific method, beginning as it did in the seventeenth century with astronomy and in the eighteenth century with physics and chemistry, was destined to include all fields of investigation. Its application to the field of consciousness came, as we have seen, in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. But how are the facts (with which all scientific thinking must begin) to be obtained when we seek to investigate the mental life? The answer is by observation—as in the case of all other scientific study. But as it is impossible directly to observe mental states in conscious beings, the first observation in psychology was observation of the workings of the observer's own mind. This is called introspection, or looking within and noting one's own mental states. But the careful observation of a mental state is not possible while the state is on. Thus if you wished to analyze the feelings of one who was angry, you could hardly do it in your own case while the angry feelings remained. For to begin to observe your own angry feelings would result at once in their dissipation. But in spite of this, introspection is a valid form of observation. For after the mental state we may wish to examine is over, we may recall it through memory, and when the recall occurs immediately we can bring back enough of the

experience to afford us very respectable material for observation of what we have perceived or felt. Direct, or, as it is sometimes called, objective observation is often possible. This means the observation of others. In the case of animals and young children, and adults when their reactions are of a primitive sort, the mental state may generally be inferred from actions. Of course we cannot observe mental states. All we observe is activity; the mental state, whether a perception or feeling, is an inference from the activity. Now, all activity from which we may make inferences pointing to some sort of conscious state is called *behavior*. Indeed, the term "behavior" is now applied to all activity of whatever sort which gives evidence of adjustment of the animal organism to its surroundings. This means that behavior as now used by psychologists does not always imply consciousness. When you find a clam with his shell partly open, and tap him, he immediately closes up tight. Whether this act is accompanied by consciousness we do not know. Whether it is or not, it is behavior, for the act serves a useful purpose—that of protection; the closing of the shell at once prevents the entrance of anything which might harm the animal within. This act may be a reflex which is adjustive but not conscious.

Scientific Method and Religion. It is inevitable that the method of analyzing mental states and processes which psychology built up should be applied to religion. About 1895 the psychological analysis of religious experience began in a thoroughgoing way. Conversion was the first form of religious experience which was taken up for investigation. In evangelical

Protestantism conversion stood forth as a fundamental and unique experience. It was generally accompanied with strong emotional reactions. Often the habits of life were quickly changed. No wonder, then, that it invited the investigation of the psychologists. Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion,* published in 1899, is largely taken up with a psychological discussion of conversion. The facts or data upon which he based some of his inductions were secured through the sending out of hundreds of sets of questions asking the recipient to answer frankly concerning certain phases of his or her religious experience. The result was that when the returns were in and carefully analyzed, certain generalizations became possible which were found to be of great significance—so significant, indeed, as to be really epoch-making. There have been many minor corrections and additions, but so thoroughly was the work of Starbuck done that the main results have stood. The work of Starbuck was followed by that of Coe; and in 1902 James published his *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* which at once became widely known and furnished great stimulus for the further study of various phases of religious consciousness by trained psychologists.

The Method of Psychology of Religion. The method in psychology of religion is, in general, not different from the method employed in other fields of psychological investigation. But objective observation or inference from behavior alone is always inadequate when we are dealing with experiences on the higher human levels. To secure the necessary data for the investigation of religious experience some of the early

investigators went directly to the subjects with questions. It soon became evident that this method is not without serious defects and limitations, for the question itself may suggest the answer, or the answer may be given in stock phrases of a familiar and traditional theology learned in Sunday school and prayer meeting. Psychological observation, especially of oneself, is a matter requiring considerable training, and in the absence of this training and practice the results of introspection are apt to be very inaccurate. Again, memories are unreliable, especially when the events recalled happened under conditions of emotional excitement. "Testimony" when often repeated (as when a person has often related his conversion in religious meetings) tends to grow. After many tellings such testimony is by no means an accurate report of the original facts. There may be misstatements, exaggerations, and interpretations taken as facts—and that too without the person being at all conscious of the glaring inaccuracies. For these reasons nearly all answers to questions concerning people's religious experience need to be carefully interpreted. Many allowances must be made, and often the answers must be taken for what they apparently *mean,* not for what they actually say. The questionnaire method like introspection upon which it rests, is so faulty theoretically as to seem at first sight almost useless, but when tested out in practice with the allowances and safeguards which experience has shown to be necessary, it turns out to be a valuable and often indispensable way of securing the original facts upon which all further psychological analysis rests.

Other methods of securing data are from religious writings. Here we have, first, those of biographical or autobiographical nature. Lives of the great religious leaders, biographies of the saints and mystics, private journals, and other records of an intimate character furnish a great deal of material which is valuable as data for psychological analysis. The danger here is that we shall take records only from the lives of those whose experiences were extraordinary. Thus common average religious experiences will be absent. It is evident that inductions based upon the experiences of such extraordinary characters as Paul, Augustine, Saint Francis, Luther, Bunyan, and the mystics would by no means represent the religious life of the average Christian. With all its suggestiveness and value this is the main defect of much of the discussion in Professor James' famous book, *The Varieties of Religious Experience.*

Besides the more private religious records, there are the sacred literature like the Vedas, the Buddhist books, Zend Avesta, the Koran, and the Bible. From these much may be obtained. Religious hymns and prayers like those in the Rig-Veda and the Hebrew Psalter are of the greatest value, since they reveal the spontaneous expressions of religious feeling usually on a fairly high level.[1] On the other hand sacred literatures are often taken up with the task of systematic exposition or partisan defense. Priestly writers are generally interested in the strengthening of their ritualistic system and so attribute institutions, customs, and laws to an early period

[1] Stratton's *Psychology of the Religious Life* is based upon data from sacred literatures.

to gain for them the authority of great age, as is the case with the priestly writers of Israel's history. This being so, data from sacred literature needs to be used in the critical manner that a knowledge of conditions and a sense of historical perspective teach. The advantage in their use lies in the broader nature of the generalization they permit. For when we study for example the hymns and prayers of the Rig-Veda, as well as the testimonies of certain Christians in modern Protestant evangelical churches, we gain a more comprehensive insight into the nature of those deep emotions which are common to all religious consciousness both in India a thousand years before Christ and in America nineteen hundred years after.

The Task of Psychology of Religion. We have used the phrase "psychological analyses of religious experience." Now we must ask what is meant by this. It means the scientific description and explanation of facts and processes in those forms of experience which we call religious. We have seen in the preceding chapter what we mean by religious experience and how it is to be differentiated from the rest of experience which we do not call religious. But in spite of this differentiation, religion must not be separated from the rest of experience. Religious experience is a part of the sum total of experience, and the principles of "religious psychology," as it is sometimes unfortunately called, are just the laws of the conscious life applied to the analysis and interpretation of religion. But after having said this it is equally necessary to point out that while religious experience is only an aspect of all experience, yet it is an aspect having certain unique characteristics.

For the distinctive thing about religious experience is the attitudes and relations to power or personality conceived to be divine. This implies a superhuman or transcendent reference. Now while we cannot use divine purpose and activity as a category of explanation in psychology of religion, it should be noted that wherever God is believed in as a really existent Divine Being, religious experience must include a supernatural or transcendent reference which cannot be excluded without impairing the distinctive character of religious experience as such.

Religious experience was the last field to be brought under the method of scientific investigation. There was, as might be expected, opposition to such a procedure. Religion, it was urged, cannot be observed from the outside, for in its very essence it is an experience of an inner and spiritual sort. The observer, unless he too has entered into the experience, may know but little about it, and his interpretation will be apt to be superficial and of doubtful value. It must be admitted that there is some truth in this contention. The mere onlooker can, indeed, tell us something about the form and structure of an experience, describing the organic processes involved in the reactions. This is good as far as it goes, but the trouble is it does not go far enough. For a comprehension of the *meaning* of a religious experience and the appraisal of its *value* we must have something besides scientific onlooking. While certain phases of religious experience can be dealt with adequately by the method of objective observation, yet the fact remains that the "inner" or feeling side of experience remains largely an unknown quantity to one who has

never had the feelings. Thus, introspection, or the observation of one's own experiences, remains an important source of a knowledge of the facts in psychology of religion. But this observation of one's own experiences is most significant when it discloses the meaning of the experience as a part of a whole, and the value of the experience to the one who has it. So far as the organic processes are involved—that is, describing the experience in terms of its nervous and brain elements, the trained onlooker is probably the best qualified to analyze. But for interpretation in terms of value the trained onlooker may be lacking in a sympathetic appreciation of important features, which may prevent him from seeing the experience in its relation to the whole of life. The best results are obtained, undoubtedly, when the trained observer has himself entered into some of the experiences he seeks to investigate. This supplements the exact and disinterested method of observation—a supplement which makes it much more probable that the investigation will include an adequate explanation of the subjective or inner aspects of the experience. But it should be pointed out that while we must give an important place to the subject's interpretation of his own experience, yet the value is never to be measured in terms of the mere enjoyment of the experience by the individual who has it, but, on the contrary, is tested ultimately by certain modifications of character which help the individual to make better adjustment of himself to other selves in the social order called human life.

Structural Analysis. The business of psychology, then, is analysis and explanation, like other fields of

scientific inquiry. And the method of psychology uses analysis with respect to structure and description with respect to function. It is important to understand the distinction between these for it saves much confusion when the explanation of certain forms of religious experience is attempted. When an experience is to be investigated, two sets of questions may be asked. First, what are the component parts of the experience—that is, what are the mental states or processes which constitute the experience as a mental event? Secondly, what is the significance of the experience, or its value for the whole of life? The first of the questions has to do with the structural aspects of the analysis. Thus, taking an illustration from general psychology, we may be trying to understand that type of reaction called volition. A volition is an act performed under full conscious control. But it is soon found that the control is possible only when the act is preceded by certain images or ideas of the act itself and of its end or outcome. If I am to whistle a tune, the auditory image of the tune must be in my mind before I can begin. Without such image I give up, saying, "I cannot think how the tune goes." Besides this there must be some idea of the necessary muscular movements required in the act of whistling the tune. The analysis which investigates the experience in order to determine what are the mental factors or components of the reaction is *structural.*

Functional Analysis. But important as the structural features are they carry us only a part of the way in seeking to understand a particular experience. So the next questions will have to do with what the

psychologists call function. And what is function? Here arises a fundamental question and one which divided psychologists into different schools or camps. In determining the meaning of function, let us take as an illustration that type of reaction known as habit. Habits are certain complex acts or ways of doing things which we have learned. When first acquiring the reaction there is constant need for conscious supervision and control. But the oftener the action is performed the less it demands this full conscious control. In other words, attention falls away the better we learn the reaction. After a while the habit becomes deep-seated and can be performed with very little conscious direction. Thus the little child dresses with great difficulty—each button being a problem requiring full attention for the little mind and fingers. But a few years later dressing is accomplished swiftly and with very little attention. When actions are once learned the mind lets up its careful supervision. Now we may ask what is the significance of this—the use of it. The answer is evident. If we had to give full attention to all the multitudinous little things we have to do every day, we should not get very far in organizing and developing our lives. Again, when we learn that in anger certain glands pour their secretions into the blood, thereby temporarily increasing the vigor of the muscular contractions, we may ask, "What is the use or meaning of this?" And the answer generally given is that in primitive life the states of mind called fear or anger were accompanied by such bodily changes that one could fight with vigor, or run faster if flight were the means to safety. Thus the functional analysis has

to do with the *meaning* of a certain experience with reference to the whole matter of welfare or safety effected through prompt adjustment of the organism to its environment. This is the biological sense of the concept function.

But when experiences of the personal life are under consideration we need a larger meaning for the word "function" than the sense in which the biologist uses the term. Here "function" is used in reference to the satisfaction of desires—desires not simply of a physical nature like food, sex, safety, etc., but desires born on a higher level—the desire for fellowship, sympathy, the desire to help and serve others, the desires born of moral love. Thus the word "function," when it rises above the biological levels of the organism, comes to mean "value."[2] Now a value is anything which has the power to gratify desire or afford satisfaction. On the plane of the physical, value may refer to anything through which elemental desires are satisfied, the desires which spring directly from the organic impulses. But when life passes on to the personal and moral levels then the concept value takes on a higher meaning and has reference not merely to the gratification of physical impulses and needs but to the satisfaction of all those desires and longings of the moral life which are characteristic of man as a social, personal being. Human life has a unique character. There is what Aristotle calls the "distinctively human" and it is on this plane that the word function must be given a broader and higher meaning than is possible or necessary when psy-

[2] Professor Coe in his *Psychology of Religion* defends this use of "function" in the sense of value in a convincing way (see pp. 21 and following).

chology attempts to describe experiences simply from the point of view of biology. In our discussion, therefore, we shall use the word function, not only in the ordinary biological sense, but also in the sense of meaning and value.

But this will imply and also justify including an element of interpretation (in the sense of adequate explanation) in the description treatment of religious experience. For description which goes beyond mere analysis into component parts, and attempts to deal with experiences of the personal life on the basis of meaning can hardly avoid interpretation. But before we have gone far in the attempt to describe and explain religious experience, we shall come upon some aspects of it for which explanation in terms of the usual organic psychological classifications seem quite inadequate. Thus, unless we are content to explain faith in God as an emotional attitude to the projection of our highest concepts, and prayer as merely autosuggestion, we shall have to demand that the method which has grown up in psychology under the influence of biology shall be broadened so as to permit the affirmation that God exists to every genuine worshiper and to everyone who truly prays. The content of the idea of God must be left largely to theology and the formal validation of the idea to philosophy of religion. But to suppose that his method shuts the psychologist in the field of religion out of any affirmation of the Divine Personality would be about as absurd as to suppose that because he is a scientist and energy is a supersensuous idea, therefore no physicist may affirm the existence of the energy with whose manifestations he is constantly

dealing. We propose, therefore, to speak of God as a real existence without apologies.

In answer to criticism of this method as "unscientific," we may demand valid reasons why the psychologist in religion should feel obliged to keep his own convictions carefully out of sight whenever he attempts a psychological interpretation of religious experiences? Why should scientific procedure demand that the investigator be only an interested bystander? It would seem as though a psychologist who himself had had certain religious experiences might analyze them quite as well and interpret them better than a psychologist who had never had the religious experiences in question but had always been merely an observer of others. Analyzing and evaluating experiences which one has never had would not seem to promise the highest outcome, even though some might pronounce it sound scientific procedure. Yet in order to have genuinely religious experience, one must believe in God, not as a mere concept in one's mind but as a real Being to whom attitudes can be taken. That one can engage in worship, either alone or in a religious group without faith in the personal object of worship would seem impossible. This faith is more than a formal acceptance of intellect; it is the outgoing of the human personality in confidence and trust of the Divine Personality. One who has had the real experience called worship, one who prays so that prayer becomes an experience of the whole self, finds it very difficult to assume the rôle of a merely objective observer. Objective observation of oneself, which shall preserve a neutral and noncommittal attitude concerning the existence

of the Divine Person, when one attempts to analyze and interpret such comprehensive experiences as those of religion, would seem to be very difficult, if not impossible. If it be true that the traditional method of psychology of religion demands that the observing and analyzing psychologist separate himself *as observer* carefully from himself *as experiant,* then the time has come for the enlarging of such traditional method. And this enlargement would seem to be justified on several grounds.

First, the artificiality, and even the impossibility, with some temperaments of such separation; secondly, the meagerness of the output when psychology of religion is allowed no interpretations which assume a Divine Personality. Under these limitations religious experience is soon reduced to a barren subjectivity. It is not strange that certain able thinkers in the field of religion have brought against American psychology of religion the charge that it is destructive to the very thing it seeks to analyze and evaluate, and, more than this, that even the analysis itself shows meager results so far as religious values are concerned.[3] Psychology of religion has suffered at the hands of its exponents who would lay upon it the methods of the inorganic sciences and of biology. To define the scientific method is necessary and to adhere to it guarantees a division of labor which saves us from confusion. But why the biologists should lay their traditions upon workers in another field does not appear. After all, each group of investigators must develop their own method—a

[3] See Wobbermin, *Die Religions-psychologische Methode in Religions-Wissenschaft und Theologie,* pp. 275–284.

method best suited to deal with the class of facts which lie within their field. Now, the field of psychology of religion is preeminently that of human experience, with the emphasis upon the adjective *human,* and this human experience named religious, while in most respects like other experience, has its distinctive and unique characteristics as already pointed out.

There is a real difference between applying psychology to the interpretation of religious experience and bringing religious experience into the field of a type of psychology whose method is largely that of biology. The former may be both scientific and useful from the standpoint of religious values, while the latter may be nothing more than an attempt to bring "religious phenomena" within the range of biological analysis. If scientific method is to be measured in terms of its utility and adequacy and not in terms of adherence to tradition, then human personality is a justifiable scientific concept. And when we come to religion we may think of some phases of human experience as dependent upon the Divine Personality without being ruled out as unscientific. We believe in energy, supersensuous though it is, because such belief seems demanded by reason whenever we turn our attention to the facts investigated and explained by physics. In like manner some of the discussion in these studies will take the Divine existence for granted because such belief is a necessity when we turn our attention to the analysis and interpretation of these experiences named religious.

CHAPTER IV

RELIGION IN CHILDHOOD

We have seen what is the nature of a religious experience. It is now in order to inquire to what extent it is possible for a child to have experiences which are clearly religious. But before an attempt is made to answer this inquiry we are faced by the question, what is a child? It is customary in genetic psychology to divide the life from birth to adult years into divisions. These are generally given as follows:

From birth to about 2 years Infancy.
From 2 to about 6 years Early Childhood.
From 6 to about 8-9 years Middle Childhood.
From 8-9 to about 12-13 years Late Childhood.
From 12-13 to about 16-17 years Early Adolescence.
From 16-17 to about 21-24 years Late Adolescence.

In these divisions there is considerable variation possible. The development from infancy to maturity is, of course, gradual and there are no clearly marked lines of demarcation between these periods. Some children are mentally older at eight years than others are at ten or twelve years. But after due allowance is made, the divisions indicate the various stages of development. Mental and physical development advance with fairly equal progress.[1]

We now turn to the question whether young chil-

[1] The intelligence tests of the psychologist must not be taken with too great seriousness. The fact that some adults show up so poorly in the tests may indicate not that they are mentally dull—but only that they find pen and paper unfamiliar tools, and have a very small vocabulary.

dren can have experiences distinctly *religious* as contrasted with social? Can a child of three or four years have religious experiences? We should probably feel inclined to say "No." And yet a dogmatic statement here is not in order. The correct answer undoubtedly is that it depends entirely upon conditions whether a four-year-old can have a religious experience or not. If the child had begun to think of God as *his* Great Father—as caring for *him,* as pleased when he tries to be good, and as grieved when he is naughty, who shall say that a little child cannot begin to have personal attitudes toward God which modify his behavior—and this is the essential matter in religious experience. The conception "good" and "naughty" have been learned from the social contacts of home. *Good* to the little child has no such weight of moral meaning as it comes to have later on. It means that of which mother and father and others approve and which produces smiles and pleasant consequences, while *naughty* means that which produces frowns and disapproval and sometimes punishment. But when the idea of God as the Great Father of all children (and of all grown-up people too) is born and begins to develop, and is followed by attitudes to this Great Father in heaven, then religion as an individual experience certainly appears.

But before we discuss the important matter of how to teach children about God let us begin at the beginning and ask, With what does the baby commence life? It is very certain that the child comes into the world with an equipment of senses, reflexes, instincts, and organic tendencies which guarantee

certain adjustments to environment insuring the preservation of the child's life. Thus the baby sucks and grasps immediately after birth, though these movements involve a considerable amount of muscle coordination. But we cannot forget that the child so equipped is soon to be able to respond not only to an environment of things and forces, but also to respond socially to an environment of persons. In this respect he will soon begin to place a great gulf between himself and all the other animal creation. Reacting to this world of persons, he is himself to develop as a self or person in a way that none of the lower animals do, however intelligent they may be. Through this developing personality the child is to become capable of gaining conscious control of his actions in accordance with ideals and standards which he learns from social contacts with other persons about him. It is evident, then, that the statement of original endowment in terms of senses, reflexes, instincts, and organic tendencies, while adequate for the early life of the organism, is not adequate for the life of the growing person.

The "Soul of the Baby." If the question is raised whether a little baby has a soul, we find ourselves, following the teachings of theology, replying with a decided affirmative. When, however, we assume the standpoint and method of psychology and ask just what is meant by "soul" in the case of the baby, we find that to affirm a soul turns out to be one way of insisting in our thinking upon a very real difference between the baby and all other animal organisms. But this difference is evidently not a difference in actual present characteristics or powers. The two-

months-old dog is much better able to take care of himself than the twelve-months-old baby. The difference is not actual but "potential," as the philosophers say. It lies in what we know to be the capacity of the baby for development far beyond that of any other animal. It is a capacity to respond to a social environment—an environment of other persons; and a capacity to develop selfhood or personality, with its control of action in accordance with ideas consciously chosen and made one's own. In other words, it is the capacity for moral and spiritual growth, for developing conduct instead of mere behavior.

Educators and psychologists in the field of religion are pretty well agreed that there is no special religious instinct. But there certainly is a *distinctly human* capacity for reason, not only reason in the sense of relational thinking but the capacity for forming moral judgments—reason on the higher plane of moral values. The ideas resulting from these judgments are determined, of course, by the social group into which the child has been born. From the very first every child is molded by his social surroundings. But the capacity to respond to this social training and to appropriate moral ideas and develop ideals, and to govern behavior in accordance with these ideals —all this we may believe is the result of an inborn capacity which differentiates the human infant from all other animal creation and which justifies us in giving to the human child a unique place. This is really what we mean when we say the baby "has a soul."

Biological Inheritance. Modern biologists are agreed with practical unanimity that we receive from our parents through physical inheritance only our organ-

ism together with those capacities for action and feeling which depend upon its marvelously complex nervous system. This nervous system is adjusted at birth for some rather complicated movements. The organism is like an instrument, say a violin. There are very great differences in violins. Some receive from ancestors an organism strong and perfect, others an organism weak and defective. Some have an instrument sensitive, well-balanced, with capacities for quick nerve reactions. Others have organisms less balanced, with slower reactions, while some unfortunates receive a nervous system hopelessly defective. But nothing we have had to learn through experience and have thus acquired is transmitted through physical inheritance. Since the days of Weissmann, the biologists have been well agreed about this. No ideas can be passed on through physical inheritance nor can habits—the customary modes of acting which we have acquired.

The instincts, however, have their basis directly in the nervous system. They are inherited or the organic conditions necessary to their functioning are inherited. Some of these instincts are social in character, as, for instance, the pleasure one finds in being with others and the consequent impulse to seek company. So that there is a sense in which the things we like and do, and even the things we learn, modify the nervous system and so make it easier (or more difficult) for our children to acquire some things.[2]

[2] I think the facts justify the statement that in some respects acquired characteristics modify the organism in ways which may be transmitted physically. Thus, for example, the children of violinists or watchmakers whose work demands swiftness or delicacy of nerve reactions and muscular coordinations, probably inherit some modification of the nervous system which makes it much easier for them to acquire skill in the profession of their father and grandfather.

Social Inheritance. We find no place, then, for religion in physical inheritance. But there is another kind of inheritance—social. Almost from birth the child begins to be molded and trained by his social environment. He receives his habits through the powerful influence of custom. Language and institutions he receives ready made. His opinions and beliefs he takes for the most part from those about him. The forms in which he may express himself are soon set for him by usage and convention. His religious convictions are altogether those of his social inheritance, except in the case of a very few who may break away from their early training and recast their opinions and beliefs through their own efforts.

Childhood Conceptions of God. We are now ready to inquire concerning the content of children's religion. Most fundamental is the idea of God. The little child receives his first conception of God through social heredity. These conceptions come in two ways. First as the child enters into the "common consciousness" of his social surroundings—family, school, church, etc.; in other words, as he responds to an environment of persons in which God has a place; second as the result of definite religious instruction.

Before little children are able to make much of the instruction given them they have already begun to enter socially into what has been called the common consciousness; that means the ideas, feelings, and attitudes shared in common by a social group. Children respond very early and promptly to social situations, and take attitudes. These attitude-responses are of a predominantly emotional character. The acquisition of clearly defined ideas comes later. There

is really nothing to take the place of this early emotional response to a social environment in which God may have an important place. If God is never mentioned in the home, and there are no acts which call forth the child's feelings toward God, how can attitudes toward God or the part of the child be developed? On the other hand, if God has a place in the social environment (and this means the family for the most part), if this Divine Will is held up as a standard for conduct, if the child sees his parents and other adults in reverent attitudes toward God, and hears the voices of those he knows in prayer to God, there will be responses to this in the growth of certain feelings. These feelings are indefinite no doubt at first, but they are fundamental and important and form the beginning of what is to follow in the way of established habits and acquired ideas of a religious sort. This unconscious imitative response of the child to social surroundings in which God has a recognized place is of the greatest importance. Here is one of the lamentable weaknesses of many homes to-day. God has no place there. His name is not mentioned, his will is not appealed to, the little children see no acts which express personal attitudes toward God. For only a few minutes a week, in the devotional exercises at Sunday school and church, are they actually in contact with a social environment which can call forth their growing feeling of reverence and gratitude. It does not take much psychological analysis to understand the power of the old-time family altar. To the parent and teacher the practical inference is plain. There is no substitute for the religious atmosphere, or the social en-

vironment in which God has a recognized place. For it is this alone which first calls forth in the child—through all the powerful influences of social suggestion—those early feelings, so fundamental to the personal attitudes which are to follow, and which make religion as a personal experience possible.

The Child's Idea of God. But conceptions of God grow through the gradual acquiring of ideas, and ideas come through the informal instruction of daily social contacts as well as through definite religious instruction in the regular way. Many a child has gotten some of his first ideas about God and heaven and the devil from the hired man or the nursemaid. The authorized source of information in these matters may be the Sunday-school teacher, but this authorized person often does only a fraction of the work. Children pick up ideas much as little boys pick up things for storage in their pockets. The child's mind is not a clean page upon which the trained teacher may make her impression on Sabbath mornings. Sometimes the crudity of children's ideas about God comes to adults with a shock.[3] God is verily made in the image of man. But this is only as it must be and therefore as it should be. Thinking of the Divine in the thought-forms of the human is called anthropomorphism. It begins in a simple and crude enough way, but it must not stay crude. The idea of God—the greatest conception of which the human mind is

[3] "God must have an awful big stomach," said a little boy on returning from church.
"Why?" enquired his mother.
"Because the Bible says, 'in him we live and move and have our being.'"
"Does God make it rain?" asked a six-year-old miss of her father.
"Yes, dear."
"Did he make it rain last week and spoil our Sunday-school picnic?"
"But God sends the weather because he—"
"Well, if he sent that rain last Saturday, he ought to be spanked."

capable—should be a constant growth as the child's social horizon enlarges, and as his moral ideals grow God should be the personification of the purest and highest ideals of which the child is capable at his age. It is to direct this enlargement of concepts, the slow growth of content and meaning, that all formal religious instruction aims.

In the beginners class in the church school (where graded lessons are used) the little folks begin at once to learn about God's care for the birds and flowers, and for them. But who God is they have yet to learn. It is a great meaning which will require considerable time to grow in their consciousness. The children are told that God is our Father and that he cannot be seen. Father and mother can be seen. Psychology tells us how keen and active the child's imagination is, and yet how all images rest upon the life of sense perception. As the child is taught about God as the Great Father he must begin his thinking about God in terms of his daily experience. The earthly parents are the first molds in which the child's growing thought of God must be cast. They are the first objects of the dawning love of the child. Children who learn to love God must have learned first to love their parents and others about them in the social circle.

But the growing thought of the child soon passes beyond the actual and begins to seek the ideal. Parents are soon discovered to be fallible, and the day comes when the boy realizes that there are persons stronger and better than his father. That is the moment when the results of instruction, it may be for years, are summed up in a new capacity to project thought beyond the narrow limits of the daily

social contacts. God now becomes the growing embodiment of the social ideals. And God is a distinct somebody—not father nor the policeman. Now the crudely anthropomorphic images begin to give place to conceptional meanings. These meanings are gained from the expanding social consciousness. After a little the child may begin to take God for granted as he ought to do. If the attitude of loyalty to God is to be fostered, instruction must now see to it that God is associated with all that is best and richest in the child's life. God is presented as the gracious giver of all good things. Children's prayers should be largely expressions of gratitude and love to the Divine Father for all his kind gifts.

Place of the Image in the Child's Growing Thought of God. Children's imaginations are very active. And psychology tells us how immediately images rest upon perception. Even as adults we know how important sense experience is in giving to us the reality —feeling. In teaching children about God we cannot be abstract. We cannot say, "Now, children, we cannot see God, for he is a Spirit." And yet as soon as we try to be concrete enough we find ourselves in danger of presenting material too human. "No man hath seen God at any time," said the apostle. And the difficulty of giving to our children an adequate idea of God when we know their dependence upon images, sometimes fills the psychologically instructed parent or teacher with dismay. Theoretically the difficulties in the way of teaching children about God seem formidable. So serious indeed do they appear to some psychologists of religion that they are ready to tell us it is quite useless to seek the religious

motiving of conduct in young children.[4] The best plan, they assure us, is to begin our religious training with the moral and social motives alone, seeking to build them upon a foundation of instinct and to develop an early loyalty to Society. It will be well enough to postpone the *religious* motiving of conduct until the children become older and are capable of building an adequate idea of God in terms of moral meanings and values. Others in the field of religious education are assuring us that the moral and social ideal *is* the religious ideal and therefore moral training which teaches the child loyalty to society *is* religious education. With both of these positions we must take issue. To postpone teaching children about God because we think we cannot give them an adequate idea of the Divine would be as unwise as to keep the baby from creeping because creeping is a poor and inadequate substitute for walking. And, besides, to postpone teaching about God to a time when concepts or meaning-thinking becomes possible is exceedingly risky. For the most decisive and permanent impressions upon the child's growing personality are made in these very years when thought is so predominantly of the image-type.

Now, as a matter of fact, these difficulties in regard to teaching children about God which appear so formidable from the theoretical point of view are not very serious practically. In truth, many a parent or primary teacher has gone on to achieve very good results with little or no consciousness of this problem. It is not infrequent that theoretical difficulties are

[4] So Ames, in his *Psychology of Religious Experience*. Though Ames' main reason is that he identifies the social and the religious, and young children, he thinks, have not yet developed a social consciousness.

thus out-flanked by practical effort. The best way to make sure that our children develop attitudes and a personal relation to God is to go right ahead and teach them about God, with due regard, of course, for the capacity of the child's mind, and quite undismayed by "anthropomorphisms." They need not disturb us. The truth is we shall never fully outgrow the need of thinking of God in terms of human experience. Two or three considerations are worth keeping in mind right here.

First. The invisibility of the heavenly Father is not nearly so much of a handicap to the child in his growing thought about God as some of us more sophisticated adults suppose. The very vividness of the child's imagination helps here. Watch the little children at play. The child's imagination soon peoples the world with personalities which are not seen but which exist for the child. If the real material things are not at hand, they can easily supply them in imagination or substitutes which seem perfectly impossible to adults. Dining-room chairs become railway cars and the larger armchair becomes the engine.

Second. We may practically realize the truth of Jesus' words to Philip, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." The child's first impression of God will be thoroughly anthropomorphic; that is, cast in forms of human experience. Father and mother must in the very nature of the case serve as the beginning of the child's growing thought about God. But that thought must soon outgrow the imperfect human molds. And here is where the great fact of the incarnation finds its use in religious education. We can-

not teach the child that God is a man, but we can teach him that there was a man named Jesus, a wonderful man, far more kind and loving than any ordinary men. Under the religious instruction of the home and church the child may soon learn much about the human Christ: how unselfish he was, how patient and heroic and brave. That Christ should be loved and become a great ideal in the child's thought and feeling is the purpose and the inevitable result when religious education has done its work. And as is always the case, the human becomes the way to a richer and fuller realization of the Divine. The child, thinking at first about God in terms of his human parents, inevitably discovers imperfections and outgrows the parents as models or incarnations of his growing conception of the Divine. But not so with Jesus. He is not outgrown as ideals of moral perfection advance. In middle and later childhood the personality of Jesus can and should be the means by which a boy or girl develops a real hold upon God. And this will not be through theological teachings of a formal sort about Christ, but simply because human thought in seeking to know God has always found the human a very necessary help. That Jesus is God in a metaphysical sense is a teaching for which we shall find very little use in religious education. But that all we can know of God is found incarnated in the human life and personality of Jesus Christ is a truth of which we do well to make large use. For after children outgrow their first crude concepts or, rather, images of God, it is doubtful whether an idea of God which is adequate in its moral value can be built up without using the truth Jesus himself ex-

pressed in his answer to Philip—"He that hath seen me hath seen the Father."

Summary. We conclude, then, that children can have genuinely religious experience. They can motive their conduct under the dominating ideal of pleasing the heavenly Father. But this means, of course, that a growing moral content must be built up *as the heavenly Father's will.* The child will have to be taught a great many things which he must learn in order to become a good member of the social order. In other words he must learn obedience to the moral law. This is indispensable. He will soon learn that certain conduct calls forth approval, and certain other conduct results in disapproval and even punishment from those about him. He will be told, if the training is religious, that to do certain things is displeasing to the heavenly Father; but he will also be told that certain things are wrong and he must not do them. And unless the religious ideal—to please God—is accompanied with and backed up by the moral ideal—to do what is *right*—that is, to do what brings social approval, the religious ideal will soon fail in compelling power.

It is perfectly evident, then, that religious education includes, (1) the development of an attitude toward God and (2) a body of teachings concerning the conduct of life. Since the days of the prophets of Israel and of Jesus, both of whom laid such great weight upon righteousness, we cannot think of the religious motive, loyalty to God, as not including also the moral motive—loyalty to the moral law. Religion has long proclaimed the moral law in terms of the will of a holy God who loves righteousness

and hates iniquity. In Christianity and Judaism especially religion has become in a high degree moralized. When we now accept the modern ethical point of view and recognize moral ideals and standards as the product of countless generations of social experience, we need also to think of a divine power and purpose as immanent in the age-long social evolution out of which our present moral ideals have come. There is, then, no difference of content between religious education and moral education. Both aim at righteousness and a life ordered and controlled under the moral ideal. But the religious ideal has a dynamic which the moral ideal does not possess. Loyalty to the moral law is at best loyalty to an abstract ideal, or to an Idealized Human Society. Truly this is not to be disparaged or minimized. But when the moral law can be conceived as also the will of God, and an ideal Society can be thought of, not as Utopia, but as the "Kingdom of God," that is a veritable embodiment of the divine will in human relations and institutions, then I think it must be agreed we find in the religious motive a power which the moral motive alone does not possess. And this added power comes, as has been already pointed out, from the added emotional warmth which loyalty to a personal object always includes.[5]

[5] The religious motive points onward and upward to heights of living which may seem almost superethical, more than a complete fulfillment of the moral law. Some of Jesus' loftiest teachings indicate this. The moral ideal inculcates the requiting of evil with justice. But Jesus said, "Love your enemies! Bless them who curse you; pray for them who despitefully use you and persecute, that ye may be children of your Father in heaven."

CHAPTER V

RELIGION IN ADOLESCENCE

The period known as adolescence extends from approximately twelve to twenty-two or twenty-four years. It is usually divided into Early and Late Adolescence, sixteen or seventeen being the dividing line. It is a time of very marked growth, both physical and mental, and consequently is of the highest significance in relation to the development of religious feeling and thought. The outstanding characteristic of adolescence is the maturing of the reproductive organs and the consequent appearance of the sex-instinct. This is the last of the human instincts to appear and as it is one of the strongest and attended by organic impulses of a powerful nature, its significance for morality and religion is very great.

There are psychologists in the field of religion who argue for the closest connection between sexual feelings and religious experience. They are the biologists in psychology who assume that the mental life is explainable in terms of organic reaction. Some of these go so far as to try to explain the origin of religion by way of sex-feeling. This is an extreme which seems little short of absurd when one considers the higher phases of religious experience in their moral meaning and value. Others point out the predominantly social nature of both sex-impulses

and religious feelings and would have us believe that religion is impossible until the sex-instinct and the attending social consciousness are developed. This position too rests too exclusively upon biological consideration and fails to reckon with elements in the psychic life which are quite as important as organic reactions. Nevertheless, that the instincts are a background against which the religious feelings develop admits of no denial. Adolescence is the flowering time for religious experience. The religion of childhood is individual and outward, as we have seen, lacking in both the social elements and in those idealistic and even mystical features which characterize the period of early maturity.

Physical Growth in Childhood and Adolescence. It is always fitting to begin the study even of religious experience with significant facts which biology can furnish. The growth of the physical organism has significance. It will be profitable therefore to notice briefly the main facts concerning weight and height in both childhood and adolescence. A baby's weight should double during the first six months, and at six years of age the child weighs approximately six times that at birth. In height the baby increases fifty per cent the first year, and at six years the body is about twice its length at birth. From six to nine years the growth is still rapid, and during the early years weight increase is about one third. From nine to twelve growth slows down considerably and the body seems to be compacting what has already been grown. It is a period of good health and vigor in which children generally outgrow any weaknesses which are not structural or organic.

After this pause in late childhood, growth begins again and proceeds more rapidly than at any other period save in the first three years. A fifteen-year-old boy generally has 92 per cent of his full height, and a girl 96 per cent. In both height and weight girls gain on boys in the first two years of the adolescent period. The gain is fully a year. In mental and social development girls outstrip boys by at least two years. After sixteen the boys begin to catch up first in physical growth, then in mental development, both arriving at nineteen to twenty with the temporary gain of the girls quite eliminated. It will be understood, of course, that the above figures are general averages. Climate makes a difference, the figures for countries like Norway and Sweden, being at least two years later than those just cited.[1]

Mental Development in Adolescence. At the basis of the mental life lie the sensory processes. In adolescence the organism acquires an increased sensitiveness to all stimuli. The brain itself, while not increasing much in weight, does show a deepening of the convolutions with a consequent increase in the area of the cortex and the number of cortical nerve cells. The most striking characteristic of the mental life of adolescence is without doubt the increase of emotional feeling. This has a marked religious bearing. It will be appropriate, therefore, to inquire into it with some care.

The first psychological fact which we must keep in mind is that the affective or feeling reactions always accompany other processes. Feelings do not occur alone. They are always the manner in which the indi-

[1] Summarized from Tyler, *Growth and Education*, and G. Stanley Hall's *Adolescence*.

vidual reacts in the presence of some object. Emotions accompany instinctive acts. Indeed, they are the feeling side of instinct. Here are the so-called primary emotions, such as fear, anger, etc. Emotional feelings also accompany various perceptions. Now, instinct is an original tendency to act without any previous learning. Some of these acts are elaborate, involving a complex muscular coordination, like the sucking of the baby or the pecking of the new-born chick. The nervous system is all "set" at birth for certain movements. But certain emotional feelings occur also without any previous experience. Babies show fear. These simple or primary feelings are an aspect of the instincts. Thus under certain conditions we would feel a strong tendency to run, as, for example, when a bull starts toward us in a field. And along with this tendency to run would go the tendency to feel afraid. We may speak, then, of the *instinct of fear,* meaning both the spontaneous tendency to action in flight and the tendency to feel afraid.

We cannot go into the neural theory of emotion, for that belongs to general psychology and would take us too far afield. But we must bear in mind that emotion is closely linked up with the instinctive tendencies of the organism. Now, all instinct means an organic set or tendency to movement. This is the impulse side as we have seen. When the action toward which this impulse or tendency would drive is in no way impeded, there is no state of nervous tension set up. There may be emotional feeling but it will manifest itself as a feeling reaction and not as a continued nerve tension. That the maturing of a

powerful instinct should be attended by greatly increased nerve tensions (especially as the impulses which might arise from the instinct are suppressed), is therefore not to be wondered at.

These two facts need to be kept in mind when we ask why adolescence is a period of such intense emotional states. First, emotion is always an attendant of some other process, and, secondly, emotion is the mental counterpart of that organic condition which we have described as increase of nerve tension. Some of the phases of mere physical development in adolescence are enough to produce emotional states. The very rapid growth, with the resulting imperfect adjustment of muscles and bones, involving as it does awkwardness of movement, makes some young people seem stranger to themselves for a while. But the new and powerful instinct, involving as it does the experience of brand-new feelings, makes the boy and girl feel for the time as though they were becoming a new self with which they were not well acquainted. In adolescence the growth of the consciousness of self which has progressed more or less regularly in late childhood receives a jolt and takes a new start. Now the youth delights not merely in the companionship of his fellows in the "gang" or set, but begins to reach out socially to the other sex.

The adolescent soon finds himself again, thanks to the discipline of social contacts, and the period of wonderment at the new-found self begins to give place to the realization of a *larger social self.* Now new purposes and ambitions are formed far beyond anything in the childhood years. He begins to see his life in larger relations—his own relation to men

and to the social order. This enlarging social self-consciousness brings with it a new sense of power. He begins to think of his own part in the world's work, and to dream of what he shall be and do. He either wakes up in school and becomes a better scholar or becomes impatient with study and wishes to leave school and "go into business" or "get a job."[2] In any event, a sense of growing independence is at hand. But along with this goes the realization of dependence upon parents and home for everything. Fortunately for most young people, this means the hampering of the dictates of new-found ambition. If they can be tided over these two years or so, they will gain in power to think and will continue the important business of securing an education.

Growing Capacity for Thought. Thought in the psychological sense is that phase of consciousness in which we attend, not to things as mere objects, but to the relations among things. Now, it is through thought that the elements of experience furnished in perception are organized into an intelligible whole. Thought, then, implies the rational organization of experience.

Sense stimulation gives *objects* of perception when we react with constructive interpretation of the stimulus based upon experience. Objects which are recalled are *images.* The *concept* is the first step away from the perceived object and the image; that is, toward that emancipation from bondage to sense which leads on to the levels of the moral. The concept is a meaning, and meanings grow out of experi-

[2] The number of boys who drop out of high school at fifteen and sixteen—during the first and second year of the course—is astonishingly large.

ence. Conceptual thinking is thus a part of that higher aspect of the conscious life which, as we have said before, is distinctly human. We have no reason to believe that conceptual thinking (except as an elementary classification of mere sensory object may be incipiently conceptual) is possible to animals.

This unfolding capacity for thinking comes in childhood but really flowers forth in the adolescent years. It is thus true that in the years when imagination has grown vivid the growing boy or girl learns those thought-modes which enable him to put back of the fleeting stream of images the steady meanings which in the end become fundamental for all social experience and personal growth. Thus in the symbolic idea, or symbol, he is able to sum up the essential meaning and value of great numbers of particular experiences, and in the power of generalized or symbol thinking we have the beginning of mental maturity.

The power of rational judgment too is another step toward emancipation from the life of particular and concrete sense experiences. The judgment is traditionally defined as attending to the rational relations among our ideas. Thus it is the simplest unit or element of thought. But it is really more than this. It involves an attitude which we take toward the relation-meaning. And this attitude means belief, for belief is psychologically an attitude of agreement or assent or negatively of disagreement or dissent. Now, this modern doctrine of the judgment does not mean that the thinking subject stands apart from the ideas, perceives their relation and then unites them in a judgment. Thought processes are

rarely as detached as this—especially with adolescents. In judging matters of human interest and on the level of the moral we usually involve ourselves more or less closely—we take sides, making affirmations and giving or withholding assents. We compare and evaluate. But in all this we are not simply performing a logical process, but we are *in the process,* and our affirmations and assents and beliefs are bound up with our interests. Relations among the objects of our consciousness are not simply perceived and affirmed—they are experienced. This means that attitudes not simply clear-cut thought processes are involved. The powers of abstract logical thinking come later than adolescence, and with many people do not come at all.

This involving of the self with the results and outcome of thought processes is the explanation, I believe, of the intensity with which many adolescents go after the truth. Many a young person begins to question or reject beliefs which have been received in childhood on authority. This is not so much actual doubt as it is an insistent demand for reasons by the youth who is just learning to think. The process of rationalizing belief is on. Things received by custom and parental or church authority may now be brought before the bar of the youth's own reason and either verified or rejected. Conventional religious ideas and moral sentiments and rules of conduct which have been imposed by authority are all challenged sooner or later, and if not confirmed with the approval of the growing moral judgment will be apt to be discarded. This individual moralizing of custom and tradition is an important phase of the

development of the personality of the growing youth. It means, as we shall see, the increasing control of conduct, for the ideas under which conduct will be motived will have become the subject's very own. It means also the development of a limited but very real freedom which is indispensable to moral conduct.

Growing Capacity for Control of Action. We can only note, and very briefly, a few of the more important considerations. The actions of human beings are classified psychologically as native reflexes and instincts, acquired reflexes, habits, ideo-motor and voluntary acts. Adult human behavior includes them all, but characteristic human action is without doubt of the voluntary type. In adolescence volition should become the dominant type of action, and the controlling ideas should be chosen more by processes of rational judgment and not so much through suggestion and imitation. In early adolescence, however, volitional control is often unsteady because of the varying emotional tensions. The great underlying purpose of all moral and religious training is to help the growing boy and girl to bring action out from under the domination of the swift impulses of instinct and ideo-motor activity and place it under the control of reason. This means that action shall be, as far as possible, motived by ideas, chosen by the subject himself and not for him.

But in adolescence a powerful instinct matures. The driving force of an instinct is emotional not rational, and the emotional motive is always strong. The controlling forces necessary for self-mastery are those of reason. They come from ideas, not from emotions. Here is where the inhibitions

save the situation. For while there may be "protective" instincts, such as modesty, etc., yet it is undoubtedly true that inhibitions which are sufficient come from the cognitive and ideational. Ingrained ideas of right, and purity and propriety—in other words, deep-lying moral ideals—these are the safeguards in adolescence, and, indeed, in all life. From them spring inhibitions strong enough to stand against the floods of impulse if they should come.

Enlarging of the Social Consciousness. The capacity for the conscious control of action is an accompaniment of the growing consciousness of self. In an instinctive act or a mere reflex there is no conscious control and hence no moral quality, but a controlled act is *conduct* or action with moral value. Action from instinct, or those social reflexes which we call action under suggestion, seem to involve no resistance. Not so when action is controlled under the domination of an idea or a sentiment,[3] as, for instance, loyalty to native country or obedience to what one believes to be the will of God. Now, instead of acting mechanically or in the path of least resistance the person may seem to be acting in the path of greatest resistance. He may have to subdue his instinctive impulses and obey what he believes to be a higher call. Under these conditions behavior is completely transformed and becomes fully moralized conduct.

Now, it will be noticed that the call to conduct on the high moral level finds its authority because of attitudes of loyalty, and loyalty is a social sentiment developing in a social environment; that is, an en-

[3] Sentiment is here used in the sense of a group of ideas around which have grown up deep and permanent feelings.

vironment of *persons*. We may perhaps say that loyalty may be called forth by abstract ideals and principles. But for the great mass of men loyalty is an attitude which means a warm emotional response to a *personal* object. Hence growing control of action and the whole moralizing of life has its source in the growing consciousness of the self as related to other selves—that is, to Society.

Adolescent Friendships. The finest flower of the Social Consciousness is the growth of the sentiment of loyalty to others. This manifests itself crudely in the so-called "gang-spirit" of late childhood and early adolescence. But it manifests itself more perfectly in the increasing willingness to give the self for others. Its early expression is found in the sportsman-like attitude of good "team work" rather than in efforts of the "star" variety yielding glory to the individual. Athletics in high school and college nourishes and trains this tendency, but team play in life as well as in athletic games enlists and develops loyalty. In childhood social attachments beyond those of the family are largely a matter of community of play interests. But with the growth of personality there appears the appreciation of the personal worth in others and thus *friendships* are formed through real personal attachments. Often these are very strong and the friend is invested with a kind of romantic appreciation. This means friends of the same sex, as well as those of the opposite sex. Young adolescent boys greatly admire strong men who can do things, generally in athletics, but also in business and other active aspects of life. Girls will often glorify some older woman, who takes a warm friendly interest in

her, to the point where the attachment approaches adoration.

Adolescent Idealism. Not only is adolescence a time of great personal development, through the intensifying and enriching of feeling, the growing capacity to think, and the enlargement of the social consciousness; it is also a time when ideals are formed and cherished as at no other period in the whole lifetime. Before we go on to a discussion of some phases of adolescent idealism we ought to know just what we mean by ideals.

We learn in general psychology that a voluntary reaction, or, in more popular phrase, an act of the will is an act which is consciously directed under the domination of an idea which has been selected from a number of possible ideas and made the goal or end of the action. The selection means the centering of attention upon one idea rather than upon others. But the centering of attention is the result of interest, and interest paves the way for desire. Both interest and desire are incipiently emotional. As experience develops and leaves the levels of what is merely instinctive, the ends of action become less immediate, less matters of immediate desire. They tend to become more remote. That means they are chosen with reference to ultimate outcomes rather than immediate gratifications. Generally speaking, a full volition means action motived not by the prospect of immediate gratification, but by *long-range* desire. But the object which means immediate gratification of desire has all the emotional warmth and driving power of the instincts. If, then, we are not to lose in driving power as experience passes from the level of

action motived by instinctive impulse, up to action motived by judgment and choice of ends, some compensation must be effected by which the more comprehensive though remote idea may retain some of the interest and attractiveness possessed by the object promising immediate satisfaction of desire. This compensation is secured when the larger end to be attained in the future is endowed with some of the feeling which always attaches to objects of present desire. *When a broad idea conceived as embodying the highest worth is thus chosen as an end, and is endowed with the warmth of emotional feeling, we have an Ideal.* An ideal can call forth devotion and loyalties as the ordinary judgments of value do not.[4] Motiving conduct by ideals is thus very comprehensive, involving image, meaning, judgment, and feeling—indeed, involving practically the whole self.

Now, in early adolescence the ideals do not remain mere objects or impersonal principles. They are incarnated in persons. Usually it does not take much to start the idealizing process and transform some person into an object of admiration, or even adoration. With boys it is usually some man of friendly disposition whose achievements are in the realm of the physical or, at any rate, the practical. With adolescent girls it may be a woman who is gracious in manner, and sympathetic generally, one possessed of good looks and who dresses well. The parent or

[4] It may be asked whether ideals are attained and whether they can remain after the end held up is reached. Anything like an adequate discussion of this question would lead us too far afield. We must be content to note in passing that where an ideal is so lifted on high as to be regarded as practically impossible of attainment, such ideal loses its motiving power. It may continue to call forth admiration but not devotion, since devotion and loyalty are emotional and tend to action which looks toward realization and attainment. The ideal must, at any rate, be regarded as approachable. While it cannot be fully attained, it can in some degree be realized. Only when so regarded will an ideal continue to arouse devotion and call forth effort.

teacher is sometimes quite at loss to account for the intensity of the new-found attachment. But a reason is that this idealizing process is not so much a judgment of things as they are. It is emotionally creative. Under the spell and fascination of the new, the object of the idealizing process is invested with qualities which are born in the creative imagination of the subject. It is a response to one who is believed to understand and sympathize.

Practical Implications. The practical implications of this for religion will be at once apparent. God must be so presented that he will be not only a Someone—a personal Reality, but also a Someone who will call forth feelings more than awe and reverence. God should inspire loyalty, devotion, and love. We have seen in our study of childhood's conceptions of God how indispensable is the figure of Jesus. In him all the qualities of the Divine which make God real are embodied with the added touch of his perfect humanity. For the adolescent no less than the child, Christ is the way of God. And to present Jesus in a way that will be attractive to boys and girls is one of the first tasks of the teacher who desires to lead his pupils into a realization of religion as an experience. The Sunday-school pictures need to be supplemented and interpreted so the boys will not down in their hearts think Jesus effeminate. He should be presented as the greatest moral hero. His loyalty to his disciples, his unswerving fidelity and unflinching courage must be set forth in order that the whole conception formed may be such as to challenge admiration and call forth a decided attitude of loyalty.

Character of Adolescent Religious Experience. But

someone may ask, "What has all this to do with religion in adolescence?" And the answer is, "Much in every way." Religion for the modern adolescent is generally not a serious introspective matter of well-balanced beliefs, but is joyous, exuberant, social. It is cast in very human molds. It depends upon social environment whether or not young people to-day have experiences of a deep, heart-searching character like conviction of sin. There is a pretty general absence of the type of doctrinal preaching which used to produce such apparent depths of conviction. But even to-day, when the appeal is strong enough and sufficiently long continued, the emotional and crisis types of religious experience will appear among many young people. This would indicate that the absence of so-called "old-fashioned" conversions is due not so much to spiritual degeneracy of the times as to the absence of those conditions of strong suggestion and social pressure which used to make them the natural response of young people with their emotionally susceptible natures.

The great aim of religious education for the adolescent period is not simply to get young people to declare their loyalty to Christ and come into church membership, but to teach them what loyalty to Christ means. To show them that it means control of oneself; that is, of one's conduct through motives which are not external but from within. And these motives are formed under the complex attitudes which we name loyalty and love—loyalty to God's will and an attitude not simply of intellectual respect but of personal affection for Christ. This is the ideal for religion in adolescence, and in all life indeed, for there

is no essential difference between religion in adolescence and religion in middle life or old age save in the forms of expression and in the richness of the content of the ideal—which richness, of course, can come only with the experiences of the passing years.

It is perfectly natural for adolescents to reach out toward the Ideal, for we naturally crave the perfect, living as we must amid so much which is so imperfect and disappointing. When this ideal becomes the will of God and the service of Christ and fellow men, then religion becomes a most natural way in which personality develops. Indeed, I believe the more we regard religion especially in childhood and youth as *natural* the sounder will be our principles and methods in the religious leadership of young people. The new birth into personality and a larger selfhood which comes in adolescence ought surely to be *natural.* That which is born of the flesh is organism and that which is born of the Spirit is personality; and personality should grow under the great ideals of Jesus Christ. This is being born again, and it may be and ought to be a beautifully natural entrance into the larger life of spiritual meanings and values.

CHAPTER VI

CONVERSION AND EVANGELISM

It is difficult for most people to think of conversion except in the thought forms which have been pretty definitely shaped by a time-honored theology. This is especially true among ministers and Christian workers in those evangelical churches which have made much of conversion as the standard method of entering the Christian life and the fellowship of the church. In approaching conversion with the methods of psychology we shall have to discard some of these distinctly theological points of view. But we cannot wholly discard what theology has done, for theology professes to be the systematic formulations of Christian belief upon the great matters of religion. It is based upon experience and aims to be an interpretation of experience. In its doctrines of God, of Man, of Sin, and Salvation there is altogether too much which is of permanent value for even the psychologist in religion to disregard. This does not mean that we shall build upon theology. It is, rather, the duty of a modern theology which understands itself to build as far as it is able upon psychology. The sciences which deal with human relationships must rely upon psychology for their foundation principles. This is true of sociology and ethics. It is true in philosophy where any theory of knowledge must begin where the psychological anal-

yses leave off. It is true to no small degree in metaphysics so far as metaphysics endeavors to give a theory of values. And it is true of theology.

In illustration of the statement just made let us take the teaching concerning regeneration. The word is distinctly theological, but the type of experience to which it is applied may be interpreted psychologically—indeed, must be before it can have authority in modern thinking. The phrases about a man being quickly and miraculously endowed with a new nature have little meaning to-day except with those who cling to traditional phrases. Theological regeneration doctrines have suffered severely at the hands of those who would rather take figures of speech literally than inquire carefully and intelligently into what the figures of speech should mean. That there is an exposition of regeneration in harmony with psychological ways of thinking we have already begun to see. In late childhood and adolescence the youth begins to "find himself." His personality develops, his social consciousness grows with its increasing valuation of other persons, its broadening of sympathies, its appearance of dominating ideals and governing sentiments like that of loyalty. This whole process of idealization as life expands, and as selfhood comes to fuller flower is in a very true sense a second birth. The first birth is physical "That which is born of the flesh is flesh"; that is, organism, instincts, primary emotions. "That which is born of the Spirit is spirit"; that is, a growing capacity for love and sympathy and the control of conduct through the ideal. And when this growing control of conduct finds its central motiving in the ideal as

incarnated in Jesus Christ, we have a new birth which seems natural, and, like most natural processes, is gradual.

The word "conversion" stands for several meanings. This, then, is our main inquiry. How is psychology to analyze the facts which are called conversion? We may also go on to the further question, What is the meaning and the value of such an experience for life?

In taking up the analysis of conversion we soon find that the facts or data are of wide range and point to two forms of the conversion experience. One is of the distinctly emotional and crisis type. The other is more gradual. In a "testimony meeting," where people speak freely of their religious experiences, if the leader calls for testimonies concerning the conversion of those present, we should soon conclude (if we were listening for data) that there are two ways in which those who testified came into the Christian life.

First, there are those for whom the experience is very vivid and distinct. They tell of exact times and places, of many accompanying circumstances. The experience stands out vividly as a single and unique event in their lives. On the other hand, there may be a few testimonies where the memory of exact spots and hours and days is lacking; where the feelings were less intense and the experience seems rather to blend into the life as a whole rather than to be a wonderful and outstanding event. There will be fewer of this sort of testimonies, because the persons having this type feel that it is less dramatic, less interesting, and therefore they hesitate to speak of it in

the presence of those whose experience is more glowing. And yet, if all present would speak freely and fully, there would be many who would confess that their entrance into the Christian life was of the type of Peter and Andrew on the shore of the lake of Galilee rather than of Paul on the Damascus road.

Here, then, are the two types of experience. They are familiar enough. Shall we call them both conversion? Concerning the vivid type of experience we are agreed. But is the more quiet coming into the Kingdom and the church as the result of Christian training and influence also conversion—especially when it is not accompanied by any unusual emotional overflow? And when the change in habits was so slight, perhaps, or so gradual that the person did not really know exactly when he underwent it. Is this also conversion?

Now, most of the psychologists who have written in the field of religion seem fairly well agreed not to call this quiet and gradual type of experience conversion. This does not mean that Christian people who have had this type of experience may not speak of it as conversion, but only that it seems to stand in need of much less of special analysis and explanation at the hands of the professional analyst. Professor James uses the terms "once-born" and "twice-born" men and rests much upon temperamental differences in the self. But we refuse this classification. All who come into the Christian life we say are *twice born.* The real distinction is as to the method by which one enters the life of Christian faith and the manner in which the experience affects the subject.

Definition of Conversion. Our discussion to this

point makes it clear that if we are to formulate a definition of conversion, it must not be such as will include only experiences of the decidedly emotional and crisis type. We must include the more gradual form of experience. What, then, is conversion? Our study is primarily of religious experience in Christianity. Let us say, then, it is *the experience of entering the Christian life.*[1] Two questions immediately present themselves: (1) What is the Christian life, and (2) What is the nature of the experience by which or through which one enters the Christian life? Let us answer in terms of psychology.

(1) The Christian life means conduct controlled by the Christian ideals; that is, all feeling and thought and activity governed and dominated by the ideals which Christ taught and exemplified. This might be greatly elaborated, but it is sufficient to summarize the Christian ideal by saying that all conduct—all activity involving relations to fellow men—must be dominated by the feelings and ideas summed up in the word "brotherhood"—"One is your Father, even God; and ye are brethren." But how imperfectly as yet has this vast and glorious ideal been realized!

(2) As to the nature of the experience through which one enters the Christian way of living—that will engage our thought for the rest of this chapter, for a psychological analysis of conversion seeks to answer this question. Here we may ask concerning the nature of conversion first in terms of structure of the experience, and, secondly, in terms of the mean-

[1] This definition purposely narrows the experience to Christianity. A somewhat broader definition would be *the reorganization of the life under a new and supreme loyalty.* Gradual conversion would be the *organization* rather than *reorganization.*

ing or value, which, as we have agreed, is the significance of "function" or the higher plane of the personal as distinguished from the organic life.

Consider first that "entering the Christian life" may mean all the way from a gradual learning to control conduct under the Christian ideal to an experience full of struggle and crisis in which the victory over the lower self means at last the acceptance of Christ and the new Ideal and the pledging of undivided loyalty to him. At one end are such types of experience as that of Dr. Edward Everett Hale, who said there never was a time in his life when he did not consciously love God as his Divine Father and try to do as he believed God wanted him to. There was no struggle, no crisis, no consciousness of a divided loyalty. As a child Doctor Hale grew up in a thoroughly religious environment, where he enjoyed the best of Christian training. This is perhaps not a very common type of experience, but it is entirely possible—and as beautiful as it is possible. Strictly speaking, there is no particular experience under conditions like these definite enough to be called conversion. There probably did come a time when Edward Everett Hale pledged his loyalty to God and to the ideals of life which he recognized as God's will. This may have been when he joined the church or dedicated himself to the Christian ministry. This might have been his conversion, though in the religious environment in which he was brought up, the Unitarian communion, probably the word "conversion" would not be used. But we must recognize that there may be lives where a person grows gradually into the Christian way of life without any

experience definite enough to be brought under the meaning of the concept we usually label "conversion." At the other end is the type of experience of which the records are full—the experience of entering the Christian life through conflict and crisis, with the pronounced emotional tensions which always accompany mental struggle. Here there is much more to analyze—much more, indeed, which stands in need of analysis, if we are to evaluate correctly this type of experience.

We should frankly admit, therefore, that while the value of the crisis conversion is no greater than experiences of the quieter and more gradual type, yet they are more interesting psychologically and more in need of analysis and explanation. But in discussing conversion of the sudden type we must remember that we may not take any experience and separate it from the whole of life of which it is an integral part. The life is the real unit, and any particular experience finds meaning and value only as it is seen to result from many antecedent experiences, and to be the basis for many experiences that follow. We separate it from the rest of religious experience, for a purely logical reason—that is, to study it. There is no such separation in reality.

Structural Analysis of Conversion. Recalling again the testimonies of the testimony meeting, we shall remember that many of the conversions presented three features or stages: (1) The period of dissatisfaction, depression, and even sorrow, commonly called conviction. This leads to (2) the crisis, which is followed by (3) the coming of reassurance, peace, joy.

First, the period of depression and anxiety called

conviction. What are the structural elements in well-defined cases of conviction? The truth is there is such variation that we can generalize only with care, on the basis of statistics gathered from a rather large number of cases.

Starbuck was the pioneer in investigating conversion. His data and inferences were secured over twenty years ago. Coe went over much the same ground, and the conclusions of the two agree. The data were obtained by the questionnaire method from young people brought up in evangelical churches which emphasize conversion. Thus Starbuck found:

Cases examined, 73—men, 49; women, 24.

(*a*) Fear of God's wrath, death, hell, etc., 20.

(*b*) Sorrow for sin known to have been committed, 13.

(*c*) Sorrow for sin of a general and indefinite sort, 15.

Fear played an important part in only eighteen per cent, since seven of the above cases distinctly stated that their fears were really insignificant. Sorrow for sin played an important part in only a little over one third. And of these the sorrow for sin was vague and indefinite in more cases than it was definite.

Generalizing from the data, it appears that there may be restlessness with a sense of one's unworthiness. Feelings of dissatisfaction and depression are present. There often is sorrow for sin, with keen regret, or even grief, that one has fallen far short of the great ideals of Christ. But that this period of turmoil and disquiet does not always include a sorrow for sin becomes increasingly evident from conver-

sion data both in Christian experience and in the religious experiences of men in the nonchristian faiths, notably modern Hinduism. That conviction means, in a broad sense, dissatisfaction with oneself, and restlessness and depression is to be inferred from the testimonies available to-day. Now, there is a dissatisfaction with oneself which may not be necessarily religious. Some adolescents show it. They grow impatient with themselves because of their own lack of confidence and poise. It is the consciousness that they are not so socially sure of themselves. But far deeper than this is an actual self-judgment, often a self-condemnation—a recognition of one's own imperfection and weakness which comes when a great ideal is presented. This is the heart of conviction, and it depends largely upon surrounding influences, the religious training, the type of preaching, etc., just what form conviction will take. Where there has been conduct known to be wrong, hatred, dishonesty, impurity—violations of the moral law—the self-condemnation of conviction will take the form of a consciousness of guilt. This was usually the older meaning when conviction always implied a deep sense of one's sinfulness, but the ideal of life as incarnated in Christ may be accepted naturally and easily, without self-condemnation and struggle, as is borne out by the concurrent testimony of many young people to-day. Stoutly to affirm that all who find Christ must be convicted of sin before they can enter the Christian life is to insist upon a uniform experience for all. And this insistence is generally made under the influence of certain traditional theological conceptions of regeneration, as that "all men are born in

sin." Hence it is concluded there must be conviction of sin before conversion can take place. It is no part of psychological thinking to say what must be. In scientific thinking we try to determine what can be by finding out what is. But an experience which means a pledging of loyalty to Christ and the acceptance of his ideals of life, while it does not necessarily involve conviction in the sense of strong self-condemnation and a consciousness of guilt, certainly does imply some degree of change in the life. And the extent of the change will depend upon the character of the previous life. In some cases it may involve the breaking up of habits which have become deep seated and the beginning of new ways of feeling and thinking and activity. In this case conversion does indeed involve a thoroughgoing repentance or change of mind (*μετάνοια*) and an actual turning about (*ἐπιστροφή*, Acts 15. 3).

We have already noted that conviction means unrest, dissatisfaction, and often self-condemnation to a greater or less degree. These mental states are predominantly emotional and they are evidenced by emotional reactions of various sorts. What about these emotional reactions and the conditions under which they arise?

1. External Conditions. Among these may be the following: The various devices arranged to catch the attention and to induce as many as possible to come to evangelistic services; that is, services where conversion is the main object or end. Here are the well-known advertising schemes, which are intended to arouse curiosity and interest. They are successful when they make the services the center of attention

and induce persons in good numbers to come. But the interest thus aroused is only temporary, and other devices must be employed to hold up the interest already generated by the publicity campaign. These other devices are familiar. The unusual conditions under which the meetings are held—a board tabernacle, an orchestra, a great popular chorus, new song books, etc. These arrangements offer the element of novelty. Here also should be noted the revivalist's voice and mannerisms and eccentricities, and abilities as a humorist or actor, or even acrobat! These things induce various degrees of emotional excitement through the arousing of interest, for interest, as we have seen, is primarily emotional. Some of these devices may be considered justifiable because they are effective in centering attention upon the services and stimulating interest. But they should never be allowed to fall below the level of sincerity and good taste. They often do, and for that reason are justly condemned. No insincerity or bad taste can ever be justified by the excellence of the back-lying motives.

2. More Important Factors Leading to Conviction. But all this is preliminary. It is really the character of the messages in the evangelistic preaching and the nature of the reactions to it which result in the conviction. In the traditional type of evangelistic preaching the stress has generally been laid upon the nature of sin and the fact that all are sinners, with the punishments which follow sin. Christ has been presented as the only way by which men escape from the guilt of sin and from its consequences. In form or manner of presentation the evangelistic mes-

sage is keyed far higher emotionally than the regular pulpit ministrations. The appeals are presented with all the moral fervor and dramatic power the preacher may have at his command. Indeed, what has generally been considered effective evangelistic preaching is largely a matter of emotional fervor and imagination. These, by the way, are doubtless important characteristics of all effective preaching but especially so in evangelistic work. That both the truths mentioned and the manner indicated are necessary if the pulpit is to arouse men to face their responsibilities to fellow men and their obligations to God is beyond question. We are not interested just now in justifying the evangelistic note in preaching but in pointing out some of the ways that hearers of various capacities and temperaments react to it.

But what is the object or end in evangelistic preaching? The answer is, Conversions are the end. The main purpose is to lead men to accept Christ—to declare their loyalty to the ideals of life Christ has put before us. Let us try to analyze a bit more clearly and ask what this may mean psychologically? Does it not mean that we are trying in evangelistic appeals to bring a certain group of religious ideas into the very center or focus of attention? Men may not have been thinking much about their relation to God, or the loyalty they ought to give to Christian ideals. But the preacher seeks in every way to lead men to face these obligations. Religious concepts and beliefs must be brought into the very center of consciousness. Men must be compelled to face facts and to think about them before any prospects of dissatisfaction and self-judgment will emerge. Sometimes

people have been facing facts and thinking seriously, in which case the evangelistic messages may serve to bring the processes of conviction to a head. But in any event, ideas and beliefs already formed and accepted must be in the background of the consciousness of anyone who is to experience conviction and conversion. Such great ideas as the character of God, the meaning of Sin, the moral responsibility men must face for their conduct, etc. In the absence of great fundamental conceptions like these how could we expect conviction? But with many people even in Christian countries the grasp upon these fundamental religious truths is weak and concepts of this sort have undergone only a slight development. It is for this reason that all effective evangelistic preaching must include moral and religious teaching. Often the fundamental demands of the moral law will need to be presented in no uncertain way as the will of a holy God who loves righteousness and hates iniquity and will surely hold men to account for their evildoing. And more than the mere law will need to be proclaimed—the higher ideals of social righteousness, of sympathy instead of selfishness, of brotherhood as the will of God. This is the true prophet's message which needs to be sounded with all the intensity of which the preacher is capable if men are to be made to face their own lives. Fervid appeals "to come to Christ" without this background of ethical teaching and a summons to a high ideal of living will be either without effect or the effect will be purely emotional. This is where many evangelistic appeals fail.

If the preacher has succeeded in concentrating at-

tention upon the great religious ideas presented, this is not enough to produce conviction in his hearers. Whether conviction ripens will depend upon the judgments—the moral judgments formed. In order to feel conviction a person *must form the judgment that he is concerned.* It is *his concern* to seek forgiveness and secure "salvation." It is his concern to stand on the side of right and to ally himself with the forces of righteousness doing what he can to help make things better. It is his concern to respond to the great love of God. The judgment formed may be of danger to himself through neglect of the divine forgiveness or it may be a judgment on himself because of the consciousness of his own weakness and sin. In any event it is a judgment not only that he is concerned, but that he is condemned if he does not seek to make his own what he now comes to acknowledge as the true ideal of life. This with the various degrees of emotional feeling which accompany these judgments, constitute essentially the experience called conviction. The elements of the experience, its extent, its forms of expression, and even whether it takes place at all or not, depend, as we have seen, upon the conditions noted.

The Crisis. This is the turning point. It means relief of the nerve tensions and consequent release from fear, anxiety, grief, or other emotional states. This relief comes primarily through the beginning of action, not mere muscular reaction but an act of the will, a decision to venture forth in earnest endeavor to conform to the ideal. This is the most important structural factor in the conversion experience. It may begin in a mere instinctive impulse

such as fear or self-preservation, but in the end it becomes moralized—an act of the will, that is, the whole person consciously seeking and directing attitude and act. Suggestion and social imitation may have played a part, but in the end the act of faith is the act of the individual quite in his own right. Here is the actual crisis—the high-point in the experience.

This act, named faith, may be viewed from two points of view: First. It means making the new ideal one's own. Second. It means a surrender of the self to God.

Making the New Ideal One's Own. This is when the conversion really takes place. It is often spoken of in the language of evangelism as the "decision." Just when it takes place is not possible to say. Sometimes the decision seems to be made in the evangelistic meeting, at the altar, when in reality the action in the service was largely of an induced sort, suggestion being the source. The candidate raised the hand with a lot of others, or signed the card, or said "yes" when asked at the altar whether he had "found the Lord." But if an actual decision and resolve has not taken place at the time, the experience disappears with the passing off of the emotional feelings, and little of permanent value may remain. There are cases now and again when habits are apparently broken and for a few days or weeks the life is changed. This may be due to the social stimulus of the new associations. The Christian friends watch over the new convert carefully. The old temptations are largely removed through the changed surroundings. But merely to alter the en-

vironment without changed attitudes and fresh purposes to lead a new life is rarely productive of new habits and new character. This is the fallacy which underlies much well-meant effort for regeneration through "social betterment"—changing the conditions under which men live is often necessary if they are to live better lives. But environment is not the only factor. The formation of purposes and the control of action under new aims and ideals is indispensable, and this is not group action but a highly individualized matter.

These considerations lead us to conclude that there is, after all, no real or essential difference between the two conversion types. In the absence of the decision (a purpose formed at the time of the emotional crisis, or later) there will be no permanent adoption of new ideals of life and no enduring modification of habits. This is true whether the conversion comes with apparent swiftness in emotional crisis or with the more gradual growth into the appreciation of new ideals and life-values.

Surrender of the Self to God. It is wise and good counsel to say to one who is seeking to enter into the Christian life: "Do you fully realize your need of God's forgiving grace? Very well, now stop trying to do anything for yourself—*just surrender yourself wholly to him,* and in perfect confidence in his promises, leave all the rest to God." The central point in this counsel is the idea—*surrender yourself to him!* What does this mean—this act of self surrender? If the conviction has been marked, there is now considerable nervous tension which is expressed in emotional reactions. Just how it shows itself will

depend upon the training, taste, and temperament of the individual. Many are quiet when they feel most deeply, and culture on the whole tends to the repression of the spontaneous affective reactions. We no longer make the mistake of supposing that quietness indicates the lack of emotional feeling.

What will the suggestion, "Put yourself wholly into the hands of God," tend to do? If accepted, this suggestion will start a lowering of the nerve tension. The idea that one needs to do nothing more in order to secure what one is seeking comes as welcome relief, from the anxieties which have been burdening the seeker. And with the relief from tensions and the dispelling of the anxieties the experience begins to take on a pleasant affective tone. Unfortunately, this is as far in the analysis of conversion as some of the psychologists deem it necessary to go. Ames, for example, seems to think he has said all that is called for when he remarks, "The attitude of self-surrender seems many times to result from fatigue and nervous exhaustion due to the effort to resist the conviction of sin."[1] Here is an excellent example of the ignoring of the most important factor in any act of self-surrender which has moral meaning and value. The implication of Ames' discussion is that the fatigue and nerve exhaustion *cause the self-surrender.* That they are physical concomitants no one denies, but we protest against the inference that they are cause. The idea of self-surrender may be suggested; but when it is accepted and results in a letting go and giving up, this is by no means all there is of this stage of the experience.

[1] Ames, *Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 262.

Any act of self-surrender which is to have moral significance must come from the judgment—it must be, in other words, an act of will; and will means the whole personal self in action. We repeat, then, that the mere acceptance of a suggested idea and the relaxation of nerve tensions will not of themselves produce action from new ideals, nor changed habits of life. And if action from new ideals and changed habits of life do *not* follow, there has been no conversion. Shall we call relaxation of nerve strains, with resulting feelings of relief and pleasure after pain, by the name conversion? Not if we are dealing in moral values. Here we must insist that action from new ideals will come from resolves so to act. This, of course, means the moral judgment.

Self-surrender leading to conversion implies, then, even psychologically, *the voluntary choosing of what one believes to be the will of God as the law of one's life.* As a mere physical letting go because of fatigue it is not significant. When conversion has taken place, action thereafter is governed more or less by that choice. This is the value aspect of the experience as contrasted with the mere structure aspect.

In closing the discussion on this important topic a few points are worth brief consideration. First. Why did the crisis form of conversion become the standard way of entering the Christian life in the so-called evangelistical communions? The answer is no doubt because the outstanding leaders of Christianity, especially those who shaped its theological thinking, were men of intense personalities whose experience had been of the crisis type—Paul and Augustine, Luther, Wesley, Bunyan. Their theology

was written out of their experience, but when once formulated it became a norm or standard to which the rank and file were expected to conform. Thus for the great majority the *form* of the experience was dictated by the type of theological belief preached and the religious training given. In this way a crisis came to be expected of everyone. It was the approved form. Without conformity to the customary type of experience it was thought that one remained outside the limits of divine grace, as he certainly remained outside the fellowship of the church.

Second. The Methodists and Baptists especially in their early days in England worked outside the Established Church and the conventional religious circles, claiming for the Christian life many whose lives had been godless. When the change came to these it was very decided and involved a sharp turning about with the deep feelings which naturally accompany such a type of experience. This again tended to set crisis conversion as the standard form of experience.

Third. The work of the evangelical churches, especially the Baptists and Methodists, was for a long time characterized by mass movements. Great crowds attended the preaching of the non-conformist leaders. The people were plain folks whose lack of high intellectual culture made their emotional expressions free and spontaneous. They were the plain folk who lived much in the imagination and feeling. Conversions took place under the conditions which we now recognize as crowd-feeling and crowd action. The forces of suggestion (which modern social

psychology has so carefully investigated) were in full swing.

Fourth. The crisis type of conversion has always been thought to bear the marks of the *supernatural*, while the more gradual processes of religious development have been thought *natural* and therefore not so significant. But a psychological analysis tends to make the apparently miraculous character of crisis conversion far less convincing than formerly. Then, too, we do not now make the sharp distinction which used to be made, between the natural and the supernatural. The time was when men thought the unfamiliar and the unexplainable were the marks of the Divine. But a philosophy of religion which emphasizes the divine immanence teaches that the divine power is quite as manifest in the more gradual and familiar processes we call natural as in the unfamiliar processes we call supernatural. And as students of psychology we come away from investigating conversion with the conviction that in the conversion experience, whether crisis or gradual, no laws of the mental life are set aside. The suddenness of a conversion is, after all, as we have seen, only a relative matter, and the suddenness is really only in appearance. Nothing takes place without adequate antecedents. The regularity of the mental life is seen in its laws of growth and change quite as surely as uniformity is expressed by the laws of nature. Nevertheless, conversion doubtless has its aspects not only of form and structure but of inner meaning and content. The phenomena are not those of impersonal and mechanically determined forces. In conversion, as with all experiences of the inner

life, we deal with that variable known as human personality. Many conversion experiences involve factors of a distinctly mystical character. The discussion of these we must postpone until we take up the important subject "Religious Mysticism" (Chapter XI).

Fifth. A few words of a practical sort may be added concerning evangelism and religious education. What is the inevitable effect when religious education does its work effectively in a parish or a community? The answer is that the number of crisis conversions is much lessened and the conversion experience itself tends to take on the aspects of a gradual and natural transition from the ordinary motives of instinct and self-interest and the ideals of conventional morality, to the ideals of Christian living. Thus, if the dying out of "old-fashioned" conversions means that the methods and program of modern religious education are being taken seriously, it is cause for joy and not lamentation.

But it must not be forgotten that a great many persons who have passed far beyond the years of childhood and adolescence are living with no loyalty, expressed or implied, to the great ideals of life which Christ gave us. They are living in selfishness and sin and indifference to God's will. The summons to higher living under the ideals of Christ must be brought to these. This means that the church's message cannot dispense with the evangelistic call. It is to-day, as it always has been, the supreme business of the church to win men for Christian living. Is the revival or the evangelistic campaign in harmony with loyalty to modern programs of religious

education? Entirely so. The special services should create an atmosphere in which it becomes easy to talk in a natural but earnest way about personal religion. And not only to talk about religion but to work—persuading men to accept Christ's ideals and to pledge an affectionate loyalty to him. Then, too, public services are needed to afford an opportunity to confess and confirm in an open way decisions which may have been made in private. Christian people too need the atmosphere created by public services to renew their loyalties and to nourish their enthusiasms.

One of the dangers which beset our growing trust in modern scientific methods in religious education is that we shall forget that making the best of plans and programs furnishes no motive power. Organization is, after all, only good form or arrangements. Results are always achieved by intelligent and persistent effort. And effort can be sustained only by the interests and enthusiasms of men and women who give themselves over to the realization of a great ideal. The carrying out of the best programs and the completest organization demands sacrifice which comes only from kindled enthusiasms and real consecrations. Churches which never come together for special seasons of prayer and consecration may be able to maintain themselves, but their work will generally lack the aggressive character needed to make Christianity victorious in these modern days.

CHAPTER VII

THE SUBCONSCIOUS AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

In our investigation of the experience named conversion it has appeared that all the factors which can be included in an analysis of the conscious aspects of conversion are not enough to account for the experience in many cases. The will factors—the choosing of ideas or an ideal, the forming of purposes and the venturing out actively to realize the purposes—these are exceedingly important. Yet any list of conversion "cases" is sure to include those where there seems to be at the time very little of the conscious and deliberate and much which looks like mere response to a social situation. So that the question becomes very pertinent as to how much in a given conversion experience is a matter of conscious self-direction and how much is wrought out below the level of full consciousness. This brings up the question of the subconscious, a vast and much mooted question, and one which in the hands of popular exponents has gathered about itself much of extravagance and even nonsense.

The Subconscious in Conversion. Some facts which must be noted in studying conversion are not to be explained in terms of choice of a new ideal and conscious direction of thought and action. They are the characteristic facts of the crisis (where there is a

decided crisis); or a sudden and apparently spontaneous awakening to a sense of one's need of a worthy ideal of life and one's obligation to seek it. In the crisis type we find the sudden realizations which may seem almost like an instantaneous burst of light. "At that very moment," says one, "God spoke peace to my soul; my burden was removed and out of darkness I came into a flood of light." Another of a different type, speaking of her experience at a Student Volunteer Convention, said, "I now saw for the first time how trivial my life had been and how utterly lacking in a great central purpose, and I resolved to dedicate myself wholly to the service of Christ and to go where he might want me to go." In both these cases the facts of the inner life of which testimony is given are by no means fully explained by the attendant conditions. There seems to be a summing up, a swift consummation of processes of the existence of which the subject was largely unconscious. This fact, so characteristic of conversion in most of its forms, is one of a great class of facts. They are, in general terms, those sudden insights which seem to be consequences far greater than their immediate antecedents would warrant. Indeed, the immediate antecedents fail utterly to explain them.

The Problem of the Subconscious. It must be understood that the subconscious is no fact of experience; it is a conceptual construction and its function or purpose is explanation—explanation of facts in mental experience which otherwise seem to stand alone. What are these facts which give rise to the problem of the subconscious? (1) Visual and audi-

tory experiences which seem like sensations. (2) Impressions which seem to involve knowledge or insight, or at any rate bring a strong feeling of conviction or certainty, but with no trace of the logical steps which usually lead to a conclusion. (3) Movements we make, but which we are sure do not result from our own control. Here are the automatisms of various sorts, such as "speaking with tongues," automatic writing, and ouija-board performances when the subject takes them seriously. (4) Inner realizations often vague and general, but the characteristic feature of which is that something not mine comes to me in an unusual manner.

Noting the nature of these facts, it will be seen that they all are of a sort which leaves the subject in doubt as to their origin. When we hear a person speak, or think out a problem, or sign our name, or express an opinion, we are not left in doubt as to the source of the fact. We react to the stimulus received, or we act in accordance with certain direction we give to our movement. Thus the act is my act, the experience is my experience. Every experience of which I am conscious is mine. But what is the real nature of this "my" quality of an experience? Is the "my" consciousness primary and elemental? I believe we shall have to say that it is. Just as consciousness of the self is fundamentally an original datum of consciousness so is consciousness of "my" or "mine." But the self is also a concept which grows as we react to social situations, learning in our early years to recognize other selves. So also "my" is an idea which grows not simply within the limits of the distinctive self-feelings, but which de-

velops also as we recognize the meaning of that which belongs to other selves. The case is analogous to that of consciousness of time. It may be asked, Is the time-consciousness native and underived or is it the result of experience? The only adequate answer is, Both! There is a consciousness of succession, that is, of events as following each other, which is simple and underivable. But after this, the content of the time-consciousness is derived from experience.

Keeping in mind, therefore, both the immediate character and the derived nature of the "my"-consciousness, it is now in order to ask what are the marks of this "my"-experience? When is an act mine—which means, psychologically, under what conditions am I ready to acknowledge that I performed it? The answer is: (1) When it is attended by the usual sensations of movement, that is, the kinæsthetic and visual sensations. (2) When it is preceded by an image in my mind or by a purpose I know I have formed. (A purpose or motive is—psychologically—the image or idea which I select and make the object or end of the organized movement which is to follow, and in which I seek to realize that object or end.) Thus when I voluntarily sign my name the mere act itself is a set of motor coordinations which I have learned. Habit looks after the performance of the movement. But in order to be a true volition or consciously directed movement there must precede it some idea which I have adopted as mine, or at least to which I have accorded assent. When, on the other hand, am I unwilling to acknowledge the act as mine? The answer must be (1) When

there are no attendant sensations of the movement and (2) When there is no consciously formed purpose. This simple bit of analysis may serve us well when we try to understand some acts which are highly organized but which seem to the subject to be quite without antecedents in consciousness sufficient to account for them.

Nature of the Subconscious. The subconscious is, as already noted, an inferential mental construct like the miracle of theology, or the electron of physics. And this construct is for the purpose of explaining, that is, classifying these facts in experience which do not lend themselves easily to explanation of the ordinary sort. The subconscious is a category, therefore, into which we will put these facts, and having done so, we feel easier because they are not left unclassified and standing alone.

But the next question is, How is the subconscious itself to be conceived and described? There are several theories of the subconscious.

First. The Physiological or Neural View. Those who hold this view (Jastrow, Munsterberg, Ribot, and others) insist that old nerve tracts may be restimulated without the usual associational connections. The result may be an act or a conscious state which appears to be quite without adequate antecedents. It is what Doctor Carpenter fifty years ago called "unconscious cerebration." But there is nothing really new in the way of experience, only a representation of what has happened before, but which may seem to the subject of the experience to be new because there are at the time none of the usual associational connections which enable the subject to

recognize the event and include it in the mental organization called self-consciousness.[1]

Second. The Theory of Ultra-marginal mental activity. This interpretation is based upon the well-known gradations in attention. High-level attention has been called the focus, and from this center of clearest consciousness there is a shading away to the so-called margin. In marginal attention we are still conscious, but objects are not clear and distinct. Beyond the margin lies the region where experience is said to be possible, but it is "sub-attentive." When feelings, ideas, or movements appear with no apparent antecedents to account for them they are believed by these who hold this view to have emerged from the subattentive into attentive consciousness. The focus of attention shifts, bringing matters which were quite beyond the margin into clear consciousness. This is the theory. But it must be acknowledged that the facts are often such that the theory must provide not only for the mere shifting of perceptive material but also for the organizing and relating of this material. The problem which baffled the night before is understood and promptly solved on awaking the next morning.

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[1] It may be pointed out in passing that this attempt to explain conscious states by purely neutral processes is not legitimate logically, since it assumes that the physical processes are the cause of the mental states, and the psychologist may not make any such assumption. The object of physics and chemistry is to build up a complete description of the universe in terms of motion and changes in physical form. In order to explain, thinkers in these sciences must make use of a set of concepts among which the concept "matter" is preeminent. In like manner the psychologist seeks to explain the world of consciousness, and in doing so makes use of the concept "mind." Consciousness cannot be explained in terms of matter and motion. Both workers in the "objective" sciences and the psychologists must be allowed to go ahead giving the best explanations each can in the respective fields. But when a psychologist faces a difficult problem he may not leap to the field of physics and begin to employ in his explanation the concepts of matter and motion. This is always the logical weakness of the student of the mental life who wants to use the methods and tools of the physicist and the chemist.

(See Bernard Hart, Essay in *The Unconscious*, p. 166 ff. Edited by Dr. Morton Prince. Also Moore, *Foundations of Psychology*, p. 166 ff.)

The prophet suddenly finds himself with new convictions, the poet with a new inspiration. The material which thus suddenly appears certainly *seems* new. Now, it must be confessed that there are some serious difficulties for any theory which affirms or implies subconscious reasoning. For the heart of reasoning is the formation of new judgments on the basis of relations already recognized in preceding judgments, and this seems to demand consciousness of relations throughout.

A third type of theory has been called the Subliminal. "Limen" means "threshold," and the theory thus uses a figure of speech. The whole mind is thought of as divided into that portion which is above the threshold (or limit of consciousness) and that portion which is below. It is like an iceberg, a large part of which is submerged. This great submerged, or subconscious, part of mind is thought to be the "reservoir" or "storehouse" of a vast amount of experience which needs only the appropriate associational connection with something in consciousness to lift it up above the threshold into consciousness. Of course these words "reservoir" and "storehouse" are merely metaphors, and they must be taken as analogies or illustrative comparisons. They are often taken for far more than this by enthusiastic advocates of this view.

A fourth type and last type of the subconscious is the so-called "unconscious." This is really an extension of the preceding. According to Freud, what lies beyond the boundaries of an attentive consciousness is the first level of the subconscious, known as the "fore-conscious." Below this lies the "uncon-

scious." The "fore-conscious" can easily be brought up above the limen through associations or voluntary efforts. But the unconscious, which comprises memories, desires, ideas, and feelings which have been "repressed" (not allowed to emerge into and remain in consciousness), is a vast area, and is our "real self" in the opinion of Freud. From this region images, ideas, and desires can come forth only after certain "resistance" is removed or overcome. This removal occurs in dreams, hypnosis, and under certain forms of psychoanalytic treatment.

It will be seen at once that these theories contain some very evident obscurities. The phrase "unconscious experience" is a particularly dark saying. What can it mean? There are well-known psychologists like Baldwin who declare it means nothing and who insist that mind must be made synonymous with consciousness. "Consciousness," he says, "is the one condition and abiding characteristic of mental states."[2] But it must be confessed that the great majority of psychologists at the present favor extending the concept mind so as to make it cover a much wider area than consciousness. They recognize the need of some way of thinking of memory images and ideas between the time they were originally experienced and the time they are subsequently recalled. Furthermore, in dreams and in fever or under hypnosis, experiences long forgotten are sometimes brought back into consciousness. And often these experiences are such that no amount of conscious effort would have succeeded in reviving

[2] Psychology, vol. I, "Sense and Intellect," p. 45.

them. This seems to demand a continuity of the present with the past experiences recalled by memory, or at least some basis of unification of our entire experience.

Two answers to the problem are given. The first is in terms of nerve process. All experience is retained by the nervous system. Every image or idea is not only attended by nerve current sent over a particular routing through the nerve cells, but these routings, or pathways, when once the current has passed that way involve some modification of the structure of the cells, such that when current passes over that routing again a similar idea or image will occur in consciousness. Thus "patterns" or "pathways" or "neurograms" are thought to be formed in the very cell structure of the brain. The neural current traversing the neurons effects some kind of molecular modification in the cell structure. What this "modification" may be no one seems to know. But whatever it is, there must be a very great many varieties of it. When I recall the face of my mother, for example, the molecular modification or registration in nerve cells has to guarantee that I shall not recall the face of someone else. It looks as though there would have to be a particular routing which when nerve current flows over it produces image of "mother." There must be another for father, and one for each and every individual in my family, neighborhood, church, club, etc.—indeed a "neuro-gram" for each and every person I have ever met and whose face I may ever be able under the requisite conditions to recall. Likewise neural "registrations" for all objects and scenes and ideas

and words until—well, until it must be confessed the theory begins to break down through the sheer weight of its own elaborateness and demands for unlimited credulity.

A second answer is in terms of "subconscious" theories like these we have outlined. However the subconscious may be precisely conceived, this way of trying to account for the facts is equally imaginative but has the advantage of being psychic and not merely physiological.

But there has been a vast amount of dubious material put forth by both the psychologically competent and the incompetent. The appeal the subconscious has made to popular interest is seen in the rather absurd and dangerous extremes to which various psychic gospels of suggestion, and autosuggestion have been carried, especially by popular expounders of "applied psychology." Then, too, there is a group of investigators (of whom Dr. Morton Prince and Dr. Boris Sidis are representative) who have dealt so long and so exclusively with the pathological aspects of mental organization that their views of the subconscious while probably valid for the kinds of minds which they have so thoroughly investigated, are nevertheless not very valuable for our purposes as we investigate the phenomena of religious experience. That many persons of psychopathic temperament have had striking experiences of a religious sort the history of mysticism bears ample testimony. But that these psychopathic types are as significant for religious experience as is often made out is to be doubted. In our present study we are interested in the analysis of those types

of experience which indicate a normal mental organization. There are without doubt here and there among the great leaders of religion persons who show at times a tendency to that mental disorganization or dissociation which is called to-day psychopathic. But they are great leaders not because of this but, rather, because of the intensity of their feelings and the clearness of their ideas coupled with unusual capacities for organized action—in other words, because of the strength of their personalities and their devotion to the great practical interests of the moral life. There is a great contrast between Luther and Swedenborg, or Wesley and John Bunyan in this respect.

Personality and Mental Organization. In all mental life of the usual sort experience is organized as a unit about one center of consciousness. This conscious center we call the "self." The most important feature of this organization of experience is the reason or rational judgment by which images and ideas arising within the mind are criticized and either accredited as real or rejected. When the integrity of mental organization is unimpaired, this judging of the constant train of centrally aroused conscious presentations takes place instantly. For example, in fancy (where images come and go freely), I may see myself rising from the earth and floating off into space until I pass the moon. But this cannot go far before the critical judgment stops it. I know, of course, that such an occurrence is quite impossible. In fancy where the mental condition approaches that of dreams it may last for a few seconds. In dreams of our sleeping hours it may last longer—indeed,

may stand undisputed and unrejected until in waking hours we reject it as real.

Now as long as the judgment is active only those images and ideas which can be rationally accredited are allowed in our consciousness. In other words experience is rationally organized about one center. But under some conditions this unity of experience is not attained. Instead of organization or integration in experience the unity breaks down. This is known as dissociation. It occurs in slight degree when we suffer from lapses of memory. When these are occasional they are only annoying. But if they become frequent, especially if we forget very familiar matters, it is an evidence of incipient mental disorganization which may be due to fatigue, advancing age, or to more serious conditions. In sleep, because of the cutting off of communication through nerves which connect the surface of the body with the brain, and because of the lowering of the nerve tensions throughout the body, dissociation characterizes consciousness. We are conscious during sleep, but not of the surrounding world. Nor do we criticize or judge the images and ideas which may arise in the mind. The result is that in the consciousness of sleep or dreams experience is free from all critical restraint.

A similar condition exists in hypnosis, but the cause of the condition is not the same as in sleep. Here the critical judgments and ordinary inhibitions of waking hours are held in abeyance through the intense concentration of attention upon some one object. The result is to lower the intensity and even to render ineffective all stimuli except those coming

through this one channel which attention still keeps open. Under these conditions ideas which would ordinarily be rejected and images recognized as preposterous are allowed to remain in consciousness. And as images and ideas tend to find expression in motor reactions unless inhibited, a hypnotized person may try to do something quite impossible or absurd without realizing it.

But all forms of dissociation, whether hypnosis by another or self-hypnosis through autosuggestion, are apt to be weakening to the unity and integrity of the personality. For dissociation becomes a habit. The mental life tends to be organized around more than one center. When there are two distinct centers of organization tending to be more or less permanent, as sometimes happens, we have so-called dual personality. Under such conditions the individual may live most of the time with experience organized about one center. But on occasion as when neural tensions become heightened, there may be a shifting to the other center. This means the appearance of two more or less distinct selves, and is not only abnormal, but pathological.

In explanation of such facts as these, the various theories of the subconscious are offered as we have seen. But whichever type of theory may be adopted as offering on the whole the most adequate explanation, two considerations are worth keeping in mind.

First. Any doctrine of the subconscious involves much pure theory, for at no point is the subconscious actually a matter of observation, either objective observation or introspection. As soon as subconscious mental content becomes observable by the sub-

ject, it enters the realm of conscious experience and therefore ceases to be subconscious. Thus theories of the subconscious are really the product of constructive imagination. This is really nothing against it, for all scientific theorizing does this. But it is well not to forget that such a process partakes of the nature of speculation, and scientific speculation is speculation no less than philosophical. The ardent student of "empirical science" sometimes forgets this in his pursuit of explanation for his facts.

Second. So far as the subconscious is taken as explanation for phenomena which may be classed as psychopathic, it does not seem to be particularly significant for religious experience. Notwithstanding the high value which has been placed upon emotional conversions of the crisis sort, they are, after all, rather exceptional and generally due to temperament and to strong suggestive influences in the social environment. And as will appear later in a discussion of religious mysticism, the extraordinary forms of mystical experience, visions, voices, and ecstasy are by no means essential to a direct and immediate consciousness of the presence and power of God.

The Subconscious and Religious Experience. There is, however, a sense in which the subconscious is profoundly significant for religious experience. But the subconscious in this connection will have to be taken in a broad sense *as the whole background of the mind.* Any critical consideration of the content of consciousness at any particular moment will reveal the fact that it is but a fraction of our mental resources. Thus a physician is diagnosing a difficult case. The data just obtained in the examination are

before him, but his judgment, while based upon these findings, rests also upon a far larger area of knowledge. His past experience is an important factor in his decisions. But the past is gone, it is in no sense a part of the present content or experience. True, some part of the past—which is relevant, may be recalled through memory and so become reinstated as present content. But it is evident that many important judgments rest upon more than the data which we may be holding in present consciousness. Areas of past experience of which we are not conscious affect our thinking. And the broader the experience, the less need is there for the formal processes of deliberate reasoning, and the swifter and surer are our judgments. Thus, for example, a specialist in a field because of his ample knowledge does not need to reason out each case but makes most of his judgments with a certainty that is immediate. He uses his wide knowledge but a fraction of which is present mental content, when he makes a decision. Much of it remains background experience.

Most of our judging in maturer life is of this type. Logic sets forth the formal processes of reasoning, but we do not always reason by the methods we study in the logic books. Thought finds the swifter and more immediate routes. Insight is a kind of immanent and abbreviated reasoning resting upon large areas of background experience. The conclusion is there but not the premises. The process, whatever it may be, is completed by the time the result emerges into full consciousness. Yet the feeling of confidence and certainty is not lacking. Is

this subconscious reasoning? Objection to such a phrase is made on the ground that it involves grievous contradictions. Reasoning demands consciousness, we are told, since the judgment means *attention to relations.* But if this orthodox and traditional definition of the judgment is to stand, we may have to agree that swift judgments with no antecedent premises in consciousness are not to be called *reasoning.* Another word might have to be used, a word like "insight." But this is, after all, largely a matter of nomenclature. And it may be that the accepted definition of reasoning which demands conscious processes will have to be replaced by another which is more in harmony with the facts. The point to be emphasized here is that much of our judging and deciding certainly seems to come out of areas of past experience which are not in our present consciousness at all. And what is true of judgment is also true of belief. Belief is supposed to be a rational product. Some times it is, but often it is not. Many of our more comprehensive beliefs came out of our past not as cogent logical inferences but as resultants of traditional opinion, hearsay, and suggestion often uncritically accepted. Other beliefs have a larger element of the rational but not the rational which is fully conscious of itself. Only the few can give a well-ordered rational account of the faith that is in them. The many cannot do this, yet they live in the possession of confidence which is quite as reassuring—a confidence that their faith rests upon secure foundations. And this makes clear the truth of the affirmation that our beliefs come out of life. The superficial view is that in a well-

ordered life beliefs are the result of rational thinking, and then life is controlled and organized around our beliefs. But this is generally not the case. Many factors out of the background of experience go into our beliefs. And to such an extent is this true that our more comprehensive beliefs are far more the product of our life than that our life is the product of our beliefs. The great majority of men live much of the time by instinct and elementary desires, by the authority of hearsay and tradition. Suggestion rather than rational reflection plays the main part in the formation even of our governing ideas. This largely explains both the conservatism and dogmatic nature of much of our opinion and belief.

But besides judgments and beliefs there are in the subconscious background of the mind the desires and the ideals. The desires are at first merely instinctive. We do not outgrow our instincts but their imperiousness and the exclusiveness of their demands are modified. And the desires which spring from them are correspondingly transformed, under the influence of growing ideals. An ideal is an idea or a group of related ideas of supreme worth richly suffused with feeling, and projected as an end to be striven for. Thus it combines both the elements of cognition in the implicit judgment of its value and the warmth and driving power which always come from emotional feeling. These ideals have been born and have grown under the social contacts and personal influences of our environment. In time many of them give place to others, but the older ideals though laid aside and largely forgotten have left their deposit. They become a part of back-

ground experience. The writer remembers the days in his youth when he aspired to be a great organist and composer of church music like Dudley Buck, whom he often heard play and whom he greatly admired. This ideal went the way of many another, but its influence still exists in a keen enjoyment of fine church music, and an attention to the structure and composition of anthems and organ pieces while listening to them.

Now, all this is very significant for religious experience. The present content of our religious consciousness is determined to a large degree by what has gone into the background of the mind. Our early concepts and beliefs, the desires we cherished, the ideals which grew—all these enter into our present life. Out of the past the present is born, and that past is largely determinative of present experience, even though most of it is never brought back through memory's recall into the light of full consciousness. Here too is found a reason for the tremendous importance of early education in religion. Often this will mean the ingraining of ideas which are only imperfectly understood. The "pedagogical principle" sometimes quoted, that we should "never teach children ideas which they cannot fully grasp," is plausible but impracticable. It fails to reckon with the truth that we grow into our ideas. The Roman Catholic system of religious education, with its rigid insistence upon the verbatim memorizing of catechism, however we may pronounce it fundamentally defective because it is mechanical and fails to recognize the child as a growing thinking person, nevertheless aims at laying in a content in mental

backgrounds. While the method is largely fallacious, the aim is sound. Much definite religious instruction given in early childhood may be forgotten so far as definite and accurate recall are concerned, but it is by no means lost, for out of this background content influences emerge which modify all subsequent thinking. Just as habits are supposed to be ingrained into the nervous system through the permeable "pathways," so opinion, belief, and, indeed, our whole way of looking at things, will be influenced and controlled by those early conceptions and ideals which may indeed be formally replaced later on by those we can better defend, but from which we never are wholly clear. The practical implications here for religious education are too evident to need further elaboration.

The Subconscious and Inspiration. Returning now to the facts called Inspiration it will be recalled that belief in the subconscious rests primarily upon the fact that some factors in experience are discovered which apparently have no antecedents in immediately preceding consciousness to justify or explain them. Here comes that type of experiences which are put under the general name "inspiration." The prophet feels his convictions burning and suddenly pours forth his message with an intensity of feeling and a clearness of insight which leads him to declare that he speaks not with his own authority but under the direction of God. The poet feels the fire and the poem is swiftly born—the pen having difficulty to keep up with the flying images and thoughts. The essential thing about inspiration is the increase of power, whether of feeling or insight, or capacity

for action. This increase is so sudden that it seems mysterious and the mystery grows out of the apparent lack of antecedents to explain the increase. One may sit to prepare an address or write an essay. He goes through the usual processes of preparation in reading and thinking, and then taking up the pen begins to write. At first ideas come slowly, but gradually he gets under way and in due time the address or essay is finished. It is a well wrought-out piece of work, and on reading it over its author sees the orderly processes of thought and the way the material gradually took shape under the direction of the mind. He may think the work well done but he does not think of himself as inspired. If, on the other hand, he is seized with the impulse to write, he begins to cover sheet after sheet with the thoughts which come clear and aglow with feeling. After he has written he will do well to put the material away and read it in another mood. If it then still appears to be of value, he may think he was inspired. If it is his habit of thought to ascribe all things not clearly classified as under his own conscious direction to the direct agency of God, he may say that his inspiration was from God—that God helped him.

What was it, now, which gave rise to the belief that the sudden augmenting of his powers was due to the agency of *another?* Evidently, the fact that the augmenting was swift and not preceded by those facts which ordinarily would be sufficient to account for it. Had he put in long hours of study in preparation, and then had the ability to write excellent material come along not too suddenly, would he have considered the product the result of inspiration? It

is quite generally true that one does not have inspiration with outcomes of real value, without the days of preparation. They may not have immediately preceded the performance but they have preceded it. Poetical inspiration does not come except to those who read and love and study poetry. Flashes of insight leading up to the invention of a new machine come only to those who have been trained in mechanics. Wonderful songs like those of Schubert are not poured forth by those uninstructed in harmony and musical composition.

The common conception of inspiration has been that there is a sudden increase of the resources of the personality from the outside; indeed, it has often gone farther than this to affirm that the inspired person was only the channel or medium through which the power of God (in distinction from the power of the person) was being poured. This latter was the basis for the claims to divine authority which have often been made by the prophet. It is not *his* message, he is only the mouthpiece or the amanuensis. This conception may be held as a religious belief but not as a principle of explanation in psychology. And as a religious belief there is nothing which would make it impossible. The idea that God for sufficient reasons may so augment and intensify the powers of a human person, that the human agent is able to think or act far beyond all he could do without such augmenting, is not irrational, and so far as I can see is capable of defense. But the defense will be in terms of philosophical argument and not psychological explanation. Such things might happen, but whether they do happen must be determined by

an examination of the facts. And if it turns out that it is possible to deal with the facts without recourse to power or resources beyond those of the human person, we keep the explanation within the boundaries of our field.

Is it possible thus to deal with the facts grouped under the word "inspiration," without recourse to supernatural power? Undoubtedly, in most cases it is and the explanation is in terms of the subconscious. In the backgrounds of the mind are those resources which are suddenly made available in the moments of inspiration. Out of the prophet's own past the glowing message is born. There are the new elements, the present situation with its emergency character, in national danger or in keen realizations of the decay of loyalties and the indifference to moral ideals. The prophet always feels intensely. Usually his own age seems decadent. He turns to the future and speaks of the vivid images which hope summons with such assurance that they seem present realizations. He seems to be foretelling. But the fire of his fervor is the result of long brooding and the appeal to the ethical ideals pours forth from previous seasons of silence and meditation like pent-up waters bursting their bonds. In the white heat of his moral intensity ideas which in cooler hours are only logically connected are fused together. He feels himself swayed by forces which seem to come from beyond himself. Surprised by the rush of his own burning words and the strange tumult of his own feelings, he cries out that it is not he who speaks but God speaks through him. And in this he speaks truly. For without his divine

enthusiasm who shall say that he could have so swiftly summed up great meanings and brought to their consummation movements already under way but which needed the quickening touch of the inspired one to give them life and power.

But in the end the test of the inspired message is not in the prophet nor in the way he received his uplift, but in the content of the message. Truth is always the test of inspiration and not inspiration the guarantee of truth, and without the permanent moral worth of the message the manner of its coming is of little importance. Inspiration, we think, is the mark of genius, and these burning experiences are for the favored sons of nature. In one sense this may be so. Great has been the service to humanity of her inspired children. But, after all, the great bulk of the world's finest achievements has been accomplished not by the swift and extraordinary outbursts of power but by those who have performed their tasks in a less spectacular way. And even the greatest of the sons of genius have combined with their powers of sudden exaltation the capacity for the greatest labors. For without the days of working and waiting there could be no swift marshaling of the resources of even a great experience.

Then, too, all of us who are not geniuses have had some experiences at intervals approximating inspiration. Our best work is done in waves rather than on a steady horizontal plane, and at no time are all the factors necessary to account for what we think or achieve wholly above the horizon of consciousness. And hence we too may use the word "insight" and trust our feelings (as we call them). If in-

spiration is the mark of the prophet, the poet, the inventive genius, or the great leader, it is comforting to think that none of us is entirely without that which in much larger measure makes him an outstanding figure.

CHAPTER VIII

FAITH IN GOD

The word "faith" is the name of the greatest concept in human experience. Religious faith is that supreme act of trust and venture through which we gain an experience of God as the Eternal Reality. It begins in loving and trusting human persons and it ends in loving and trusting the Supreme Person.

Faith in God is often identified with belief in God. But faith in God, while it must include belief, is a greater experience. For it involves also the more intimate personal relations. We accept and believe truths but *we trust persons.*

Belief in God may be little more than an intellectual assent to a great truth on grounds which reason pronounces adequate. But this assent of intellect is not to be belittled in the interests of experience as some have done. For, whether it results from reason, feeling, or the "will to believe," belief in God is a matter of the greatest importance, since only on the basis of a sincere assent to the fact of God's existence can the whole self go forth on that larger venture of faith to find those attitudes of trust, reverence, and gratitude which make God not only an object of our thought but a center of our affections. God, then, becomes real in the most convincing way, for he becomes an experience. Our discussion in this chapter will have to do largely with *belief in God,* and the mental processes through

which such belief is psychologically validated—that is, gains for itself such assurance and certainty that the self can find rest and satisfaction.

We have already seen that the idea of God is the highest ideal which a human being is capable of forming at the level of culture he has reached. In terms of mental structure God is therefore a concept whose richness of meaning will depend upon the social inheritance. But God is more than a mental content. However psychologists of a certain school may seek to show that the idea of God is nothing but the projection of certain great social ideals, the fact remains that the religious man takes attitudes toward an objectively real God. For religious experience, God is a spiritual Being with the qualities of mind, the social sympathetic responsiveness, and the self-determination which give to personality in human experience its unique and distinctive characteristics. God is therefore personal.

The necessity for a personal conception of God with the idea of love and sympathy central is seen in the fact that religion as experience has never been able to get along without it. The preaching of the great eighth- and seventh-century prophets in Israel was a high-water mark for religion. And in the "night of legalism" which followed there remained those to whom God had become a personal possession even down to the days of Jesus. The later Psalms are a fine expression of religion as experience, and this would have been of course impossible without the great conception of God which Israel owes to her prophets.

The same truth is illustrated in other faiths,

notably Hinduism, Mohammedanism, and Japanese Buddhism. The Vedanta philosophy of the eighth century A. D., as perfected by Shankara and his followers, was a very elaborate and abstract pantheism. It was an abstract religious philosophy. Vedanta did not become a religion until Ramanuja, four hundred years later, transformed its conception of God. In the reformed Vedanta God becomes personal and his relation to men is thought of as loving and sympathetic. According to this school of Hindu teachers, men are saved not by superior knowledge, nor by fidelity to the ritual, but by Bhakti, that is, devotion to God. The finest parts of Hindu literature came from this movement. Substantially the same thing is true of the better class of the Mohammedan mystics like Al Gazzali and certain sects of Japanese Buddhists, who teach that faith in Amida Buddha saves, not meritorious works.

It is evident, therefore, that religious belief must find an adequate and worthy conception of God, if religious experience is to be possible. But mere belief in God, however worthy the idea, *is not religion.* Belief is confidence in our ideas, but *faith* is more comprehensive, since it is *confidence and trust in persons.* Belief is absolutely indispensable to religion as experience but it is not in itself religion. I may believe in Ohm's Law or in the theory of evolution, but if I am to reach the level of religion as experience, I do not simply believe in God; I trust him. There are two substitutions which make religion as experience difficult. The one is the substitution of the mere performance of religious acts without emotional content for their performance as

the expression of emotional content; and the other is the substitution of belief about God for trust in God and fellowship with him. Fellowship with God, which is a common phrase in religious literature, means not only a projection of our feeling and our thought to God, but confidence that there is response. A study of this confidence in the response we must postpone until we take up the consideration of religious mysticism. We turn our attention now to the nature of belief in general and belief in God in particular.

Belief in God. Is religion entitled to the word "knowledge"? That depends, of course, upon the meaning we assign to the term "knowledge." It is possible to define knowledge in such fashion that we would have to admit that it lies outside the realm of religious experience. Knowledge may be taken to mean: (1) immediate sensory presentation; (2) direct inference from sensory data (as when one sees smoke and knows that fire is there too); (3) apprehension of truth so direct that no uncertainty arises (as in the case of so-called axioms). If this is to be taken as the whole meaning of knowledge, then it may be urged that religion will have to be contented with the word "belief." The above specifications of meaning for the concept named knowledge are probably satisfactory to the logician. Logical definitions can be made clean cut, and with these the thinking can be made to appear clear and crisp. This is one of the joys of remaining in the realms of logic. When, however, we go up, or down (as you please) to a somewhat closer contact with life, the wonderful clarity and clean-cut divisions begin to disappear.

There is "atmosphere" which makes the decisive performances of the logical thinker (which are often so admired) well-nigh impossible.

When, now, in the inquiry about the nature of knowledge and the nature of belief we attempt to deal not merely logically with thought-forms, but psychologically with mental processes and states, we may discover that the clear distinctions between knowledge and belief are not so clear after all. To be more specific, in the above definitions of knowledge, No. 1 is psychologically insecure, for illusion is far more common than many suppose. No. 2 shares the fortunes of No. 1, while the so-called axioms in No. 3 do not carry their truth written all over them so that conviction always prevails.[1] From the psychological point of view the most characteristic thing about knowledge is the condition of mind which has come about when we say we *know* or *believe*. In both cases it is a condition of assent and of rest. Along with this goes an affective element, the feeling of satisfaction, whereas an attitude of doubt or dissent tends toward feelings of unrest and dissatisfaction. The satisfaction and rest vary greatly and depend largely upon the experience range of the person who finds the satisfaction. Thus the colored man who ran my garden told me that the only proper time to plant vegetables growing under ground was "in the dark of the moon."

[1] Traditional logic has been naïve in supposing the axioms to be self-evident. Any directness of insight they may call forth demands large areas of experience from which these insights become possible. Indeed, traditional logic in which such confidence was rested as an infallible revealer of truth has been rather badly shaken by recent critical assaults. Even mathematical certainty, the last stand of the logician, is going the way of other "absolutes." This does not, of course, leave us in the lurch so far as practical certainties are concerned. It only gives us what we shall find to be broader and securer ground for certainty.

"You believe that firmly, don't you?" I asked.

"Yessuh," he said, "I not only believe it, I *know* it!"

We must now take up these two concepts *knowledge* and *belief* at somewhat closer quarters. There is an essential difference between imagining a thing and seeing it—it is, of course, the difference between the image and the percept. In general, it is not at all difficult to distinguish image and percept. So far as the neural conditions attending imagination and perception are concerned there is this difference, that in the case of perception the stimulus comes from without, but in the case of the image the stimulus comes from within the organism, and the experience is, in the current psychological phrase, "centrally aroused." Practically, there is usually no difficulty and the distinction between percepts and images is sufficiently clear. The image is, as a rule, less vivid, detailed, and permanent than the percept.

But let attention to surrounding objects be lowered and the nerve currents originating within the organism may result in images more vivid than the dim percepts aroused through the end-organs. Under these conditions images may take on certain qualities of clearness and steadiness which they do not possess under ordinary conditions. In illustration let us suppose an old football star is sitting before his fire. He is living over again in vivid imagination a famous game in which he took a very creditable part. He feels the old thrill of it and hears again the thunder of cheering when the touchdown which won the victory was made. The call to dinner is unheard until at last someone pounds on his door and asks him

why he does not come to the table. Now, so far as we can make any judgment from the outside, we must say that the experience which was absorbing his whole attention was to him more real than the call which he did not hear and to which he did not react, though one was "objectively" real while the other was imagination. Of course the time soon comes when he begins to respond in the ordinary way to the peripheral stimuli. He then recognizes that the experience in front of the fire was imaginary, for it fails to find a place in the general congruity of his later experiences. As a result the reality-feeling which the experience might have taken on fails to persist. But what shall we say of an experience which has clearness and around which the reality-feeling remains and even grows? In other words, the experience does not subsequently appear to be incongruous with experiences which followed. Under such conditions would not the mental state be one of assent and satisfaction? And if so, would not that experience tend to be accompanied by the conviction that we were dealing with reality? The point I wish to urge right here is that both belief and knowledge rest upon this attitude of assent accompanied by the feeling of rest and satisfaction, which depend upon the recognition of a certain harmony and congruity.

Psychologically, then, the difference between knowledge and belief is by no means as great as we might suppose. Both of these expressions, it will be noted mean, "I accept this," that is, "I take it for true." On the basis of the attitudes and feelings of certainty which correspond to these expressions,

it may be rather difficult at times to distinguish between them. A concrete case may make this more evident. Here are the parents of a week-old baby which is very ill asking a minister to come and baptize the little one so it will "be saved." When the simple ceremony is over, the parents feel relieved. Now they think if the baby dies, it will go to heaven. They *believe* this because their church has taught it to them. Do they *know* it? The point is whether the mental states and attitudes involved here are not practically the same in believing and knowing. The emergency is very real to them—the baby must be baptized.

There seem, however, to be gradations in belief which do not exist in knowledge. In this sense knowledge may be thought of as a kind of consummation of belief. Logically, we may make differences through the construction of our definitions, but a psychological analysis indicates that the feeling states and resulting attitudes are not essentially different in belief than in knowledge. Nevertheless, we must not think there is absolutely no difference between knowledge and belief. Logic, whose main business is to deal with the validity of judgments, makes a considerable difference. But we are not now concerned with that difference, since it is not the main business of psychology to deal with the validity of mental states but rather to describe them. If there is a difference psychologically between the mental states corresponding to "know" and those corresponding to "believe," it seems to lie in the completeness of the feelings of rest and satisfaction by virtue of which all counter feelings are shut

out. When we sincerely say we "know" we rest quite securely in a feeling of satisfaction which brings with it the full assent we call *certainty.* And certainty concerning an object means the quieting and harmonizing of all the elements of experience when attention is directed to that object. Those great believers in God, the religious mystics, have had a most persistent way of saying "*I know.*" Shall we find this ultimately justifiable? To this question we must return when we come to the discussion of mysticism in religious experience.

In further illustration of the above, revert again to my colored friend the gardener who *knew* (as over against my hilarious doubt) that the dark of the moon is the proper time to plant vegetables. Consider also the way physicists and chemists have of writing about atoms, molecules, and electrons. They believe in these entities, and their belief certainly seems to reflect a high degree of conviction. Their attitude is that of complete *assent,* and satisfaction does not appear to be lacking. Do scientific men *know* or do they *believe* with reference to the Kinetic theory? Logically, doubtless they only *believe;* but psychologically, the difference, when measured in satisfaction and rest and conviction and the mental state we call practical certainty, reduces to very small dimensions.

Belief and Rational Thinking. Let us now come at belief from another viewpoint—one more distinctly cognitive. When we believe a thing we assent to it, that is, we accord it a place in *our* reality. And this brings the question, *Why do we assent to a new presentation in experience anyhow?* The usual answer

would doubtless be, "Because reason accredits it." This would be true for some of us most of the time and possibly for a few all the time. But for many it would not be true at all. For many the answer is not because of the accrediting of reason but *because nothing prevents the immediate acceptance of the presentation as real.* It is natural for us to give assent. Belief is, after all, a part of our original tendencies. Spontaneous belief—natural credulity! We see it in childhood. We are supposed to leave it far astern when we become adults. Fortunately, most men do nothing of the sort. Psychology justifies the statement that most of us accept things as real (or true) in the absence of reasons for *not* doing so. As Professor James puts it, "We believe all we can; and would believe everything if we could." Psychologically, doubt is cultivated; belief is the natural tendency. We do not doubt everything a la Descartes until we become pretty well possessed, not to say obsessed, with the critical and speculative spirit. Children accept everything at face value, as real. They will believe almost everything you tell them. We all *tend* to do this.

Experience, however, soon disturbs this spontaneous confidence in things, but with the great majority, fortunately, never wholly destroys it. Reason modifies it and brings in the critical moods. In later years uncertainty comes in to such an extent that some persons believe only when there seems to be no possibility of doubting. When this becomes the habitual state, certainty is reduced to small dimensions and chronic skepticism sets in. Skepticism is an habitual attitude of distrust. Now, if we wholly

outgrow the tendency to believe, we do so at a very considerable loss, for we find ourselves letting go of that basic confidence which is ours by right of our original nature, and which opens up a way to some of our most fundamental certainties. When those deep-lying sources of trust which are at the bottom of all conviction that we can know are undermined, the critical spirit has gone too far and the benefits it should afford have become a devastation. This natural trustfulness in our own mental processes is no more to be outgrown and replaced by the purely cognitive judgments than our instincts are to be entirely replaced by our volitions—and, as a matter of fact, they never are.

Belief and Doubt. But when spontaneous trustfulness gets us into difficulties experience furnishes correctives, and from this results doubt. In many respects the function of doubt is like that of pain. It is a great blessing when it is temporary and serves as a warning; but a curse when it becomes a permanent condition. Doubt is the inability to assent, with the result that the satisfactions which come from the reality-feeling are withheld. Now, mental rest departs and uncertainty with its states of dissatisfaction, and even annoyance, creeps in. When this is the case we usually cast about for some means for getting back the reality-feeling—in other words, some justification for assent and belief. We generally call upon Reason, demanding that the cognitive judgments shall accredit the presentation which fails to command the reality-feeling. If, now, we can connect up our questionable presentation by rational relations with some things already accredited and

which remain sure and steadfast—unquestioned parts of our reality—we are still able to believe. In the absence of our ability to find such rational connections, the doubt remains and the reality-feeling vanishes.

Reason Accredits Supersensuous Reality. It is unquestionably true that belief in the reality of our objects of thought is easier when they are the result of sense-experience. The further we get away from perception the harder it is to maintain the reality-feeling. This, however, is not true universally but only on certain common planes of experience. There are many things which we believe which are not matters of sense presentation at all. And the greater our ability for *thought* as distinguished from mere mental reaction of the sensory sort, the more numerous do objects of a supersensuous nature become. Indeed, all our ideas and concepts[2] are supersensuous and we maintain our confidence in these, even in the absence of the immediate presentations of sense-experiences. To be sure, the image factor in concepts does rest upon previous perceptive experience. But the essential nature of concepts is found not in the image but the meaning-content. Many of our concepts whose meaning sums up larger areas of experience become imageless.

The question now presents itself whether belief in God is possible in the absence of sense-presentations? And the answer is, It certainly is possible. In the absence of sensory attestation we call first

[2] Idea equals concept, except that idea stresses the image factor, while concept stresses the meaning element. I have an idea when the image more or less clear has become associated with certain meanings. An imageless idea would be a universalized or abstract concept.

upon Reason to accredit ideas. Consider three methods by which this can be done: (1) Belief may come—as already intimated—by linking up the idea, as yet unaccredited, with the ideas already accepted and steady in their place as a part of our Reality. The traditional arguments of theism for the existence of God use this method. (2) Belief may come by accrediting the idea on the authority of other persons. This may be the opinion of experts, the dictum of an authoritative institution like the church, or a kind of general consensus of those whose learning and judgment we respect. However, when this acceptance on authority takes place we generally are forced to find some satisfying grounds for accepting the authority, so that belief on authority is usually a kind of indirect rational accrediting. On the other hand, belief on authority may amount to little more than a traditionally received assent continued through habit. (3) Belief may come through the method of showing the consequences of doubt. We may be made to see that if we do not accept an idea as real or true, serious consequences to some of our already accepted beliefs will ensue. The alternative here is to accredit the new presentation or run the risk of having to overhaul all our beliefs to make them harmonize. Generally we accept a concept or doctrine and give assent even when that direct accrediting through rational relations called proof is not possible. The grounds of our belief in Personal or Moral Freedom are of this sort.

When, now, we inquire to what extent the time-honored reasoning of theism has survived, we learn that to many their belief in God rests upon what they

consider a foundation of reasoning. Professor Pratt, discussing this point says:

"A goodly number of my respondents say they believe in God because they cannot imagine how the universe could ever have been started or could be kept going without a 'Master Mind' to make and run it. Sometimes these arguments are expressed conventionally and glibly, sometimes with a good deal of evident feeling. It would certainly be a great mistake (if I judge by my respondents) to suppose that the cosmological argument has been dead since Kant's time or that Darwin gave the *coup de grace* to the argument from design. Whatever we may think of these venerable forms of reasoning from a philosophic point of view, the student of the psychology of religion must admit that with very many earnest men and women they are exceedingly vital still—perhaps not so vital as they used to be, certainly not so important as their upholders like to think; probably never the sole support of any real faith; but still very real aids to belief in God."[3]

It must be admitted, however, that there is an increasing number who find the validations of reason insufficient. And many of these know well the strength and the limitations of reasoning, and for these there is but little authority or comfort in the pragmatic consideration sometimes urged that belief in God is so beneficial in its effects upon human life. The trouble here is that which is apt to beset every purely pragmatic sanction, namely, that even a respectable presentation of utility considerations cannot dispel the fatal suggestion that the very useful

[3] Pratt: *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 212, 213.

idea of God is, after all, only a subjective affair perpetuated socially as one generation religiously instructs the next. Pragmatic considerations when they stand alone are found to be rather weak in the matter of validating our ideas. And this drives us to the consideration of the only remaining factor or element in our conscious life, namely, Feeling. When we gain a more adequate comprehension of the nature of the Feeling Consciousness, shall we find it affords assurances and satisfactions which we have heretofore expected only of intellect? Is there such a thing as a logic of the feelings, an "emotional thinking" to use the phrase of Troeltsch (an able thinker in the field of religious philosophy)? Whatever philosophy may have to say concerning adequate principles for the validation of such a great basic idea as that of God, the psychologist may point out that for many, feeling is more fundamental than the consciousness of rational relations for accrediting their belief in God and gaining for it the needed confidence and assurance.[4]

Belief and Feeling. The word "feeling" has several meanings. Professor James used it throughout his psychological discussions as synonymous with consciousness itself, but that more popular sense of the word has been given up among psychologists. The word has also been used for the less distinct sensations, though this too is no longer the usage. More strictly, feeling means (1) *affective consciousness;* that is, the manner in which the subject receives or is affected by a sensory or ideational presentation.

[4] See J. Jastrow's *Psychology of Conviction* for some very significant data and their interpretation.

In this sense its dimensions are pleasant and unpleasant. The ground of these two fundamental differences in feeling-tone is no doubt primarily organic. (2) Feeling may also refer to that more complex mental state where there is combined with the simple organic pleasantness or unpleasantness some measure of ideational content. This produces affective reactions involving those instinctive complexes named the desires. To feelings in this sense the names "satisfactions" and "annoyances" have been given. (3) We speak also of emotional feelings. These are more complex, for emotions, especially the social emotions, are far from being the simple reactions they have been supposed to be. With some, like the æsthetic and religious emotions, there is a larger measure of meaning content. (4) Lastly, feeling may signify what appears to be suppressed judgment—where the conviction may be general, and even vague, but not lacking in positiveness and convincing power, but where the usual rational relations by which we reach conclusions are not present. When an attempt to analyze feeling of this sort is made, it is found to be much more a matter of spontaneous attitudes which appear emotionalized than those attitudes which are taken more deliberately as the result of judgments consciously formed. Feeling in this sense is a quality of those swift summaries of experience which we call insights or "intuitions." Can we turn to feeling in this sense for a strengthening of the belief in God which is so indispensable to religion as an experience? I am convinced that we can.

But some will object at once to resting certainty

upon any form of the feeling consciousness. For, it will be urged, the feelings seem lacking in the universal or common-to-all qualities which we are told reason possesses. My feelings appear at first sight to be hopelessly individual, and "special to me." But the universal nature of rational processes and the merely individual character of the feeling-states have, I think, both been overemphasized. It is doubtless true that I cannot transfer to you my feelings—they are mine. But just as little can I transfer to you my ideas—they too are mine. But it is soon evident that my ideas and your ideas have a way of appearing in reaction to similar situations, and when we compare experiences we find the ideas practically equivalent. Then, too, I can offer stimulus in the use of words—the symbols of meaning—and your ideas begin to correspond more or less perfectly to mine. In like manner it soon appears that your feelings may be aroused by situations like those which aroused my feelings, and a comparison of our experiences may reveal the significant fact that we are *sharers in something common,* that your feelings and mine both point to the same values which we both seek to conserve. If men were *only* rational thinkers, directing their action wholly through the cognitive processes, there could be no realization of values. Besides this, the supposition of "pure" cognition and "pure" judgment is absurd, for we have noted before how the judgment processes always involve more or less of feeling. And often our judgments are quite charged with feeling, since we tend to identify ourselves emotionally with our judgments. It is desire, therefore, with its feeling-content which makes value

possible. This is significant when we begin to ask concerning the authority of feeling, or its competence to add strength to our ideas.

There are two common errors with respect to feeling which must be noted and avoided, before we point out how fundamental feeling is to all certainty which says "I believe" and "I know." And the first error is that feeling itself is but a function of Ideation. Feeling is far more than the way we receive percepts or ideas. To be sure there is no such thing as "pure feeling," that is, just feeling alone in the absence of perceptive or cognitive process. But feeling, while it always accompanies percepts, images or ideas, is nevertheless in the last analysis the basis upon which we determine the value of these images or ideas and hence it governs us in the assent we give to them. Now, this assent is usually immediate, and when reason does not subsequently forbid we rest in it as final. Of course this immediate accrediting of presentations as valid may have to be reviewed later by the slower and mediated processes of rational reflection, and when so reviewed, the accrediting through feeling—swift and apparently spontaneous —cannot stand if reason forbids.

The second error is that feeling is individual and therefore purely "subjective." The way out of this difficulty has already been suggested. There are feelings which are only my own—confined to some moments of time in that order of events which I organize as *my experience.* But there are feelings in which I learn through social relations with my fellow men that I am but a sharer. These are the "common-to-many" feelings as distinguished from the "special-to-

me" feelings.[5] These, the great common feelings of human experience, have a universality which cannot be affirmed of some which I recognize as merely my own. And it is through this growing community of feeling that we are brought into the larger relations with the world of other selves and ultimately with the Supreme Self. *Now, this universality in feeling-content may become a powerful factor in confirming the idea of God or in restoring the reality-feeling to that idea when it has been diminished or taken away.* And in proportion as the reality-feeling is established are we able to accept the idea of God as valid and standing for an objective Reality, that is, a Reality beyond that of our own creating.

Let us try to find reasons why we should expect this great service of our great common human feelings. Emotional conviction of God's existence means that this great conception which we have received by social inheritance answers to something in our original nature. This original human nature includes a range of instincts, some of them, like the social instincts, of a complex sort. Closely related to these are the primary and complex emotions.

Some of these complex emotions are not of the nature of transient feelings but are stable and permanent, so permanent as to be worthy of being called fundamental traits of human nature. Such are the emotions of wonder, admiration, awe, reverence, and gratitude. McDougall has given an admirable analysis of these complex social emotions and points out

[5] One cannot say "common-to-all" as Ferrier did. Feeling with regard to God is not common to all any more than reason as an authority is common to all. But it is common to many—and a great many.

that they are distinctly human.[6] Wonder is predominant in the attitude to nature, which makes subsequent emotions of a more unquestionably religious character possible. Wonder is primarily the feeling of self-abasement in the presence of that which is not understood. Somewhat more complex is admiration which dominates when we stand in the presence of superior power or excellence beyond our powers of achievement and acknowledge it. When to admiration is added an element of the primary emotion, fear, we feel awe. Gratitude, according to McDougall, is a compound of tender emotion and negative self-feeling (self-abasement) both primary, while reverence is the mood when gratitude is blended with awe.

There might be difference of opinion over some of the points in the analyses of these complex social emotions. But there can be no difference of opinion in regard to the fact that they are part of our original human nature, and that they are the very human feelings fundamental to all religious attitudes. It is not strange, then, that the idea of God should receive strength and confirmation from those great feelings, through which, far more than through rationally formed ideas, we are able to apprehend something of God. To be overwhelmed with a feeling of reverence when one bows before God in worship; to pour forth one's feelings in gratitude to God, are surer ways of gaining assurances for most of us than a rational consideration, for example, of the theological list of divine attributes. Not that the theologian's discussion is to be despised. It is doubt-

[6] See his *Social Psychology*, p. 132ff.

less needed to furnish thought-content. But there are times when nothing but feeling is strong enough to confirm and vindicate the thought-content so that the reality-feeling may remain with it. Then and then only can faith in God march confidently on to trust him, and to love him and to live in joyous obedience to his holy will.

Let us, as we conclude the discussion, briefly review the process of building up belief in God, from early childhood to the years of mature thinking. When a little child, vague images began to arise when the words "heavenly Father," or "God" were used to us. Of course these images were derived from the familiar sensory life about us. Your first image of God was in some way like that of mother or father. It was human—fully anthropomorphic. But it began to undergo transformation. It was not long before you began to think that God must be greater than your father. Soon the *image* reaches its limits as a mere image. The further growth of the idea of God means that conceptual elements, meanings and values begin to be included. These are the result of definite teaching about God, aided by social experiences. The child is told of the great love of God. And the meaning of love and sympathy comes to him out of his social surroundings—others' love for him and his growing love for others. You and I gained our first comprehension of God from the love of those about us in the tender ministrations of the family. In the face of the mother with her loving smiles and her tender care and solicitude for us we first began to comprehend God as distinguished from merely trying to image him. The parent's love

for the child, calling forth, as it does in time, the answering love of the child, is the real beginning of our love to God. This is truly according to the great method in which God always makes himself known —the method of incarnation.

The next step is where the child becomes conscious (through what he sees and is told) of the dependence of mother and father themselves upon the greater Father, the Divine Father of us all. When the child begins to feel the mother's dependence upon the Divine Father, and notes her reverent attitude when she talks to him in prayer, then through the powerful influences of suggestion and social imitation the child begins to share in the feeling and learns the beginning of the reverent attitude to God which lies at the basis of all religious experience. This grows and he is taught the *form* of prayer. And through that form the personal feelings and attitudes begin to be felt and expressed. Reenforcement comes in the shape of teaching by parents, teachers, and others who speak confidently and reverently about God. Here we have the foundations of belief in God in the growing religious consciousness of the child. And you will notice that it *begins in feeling* at first shared by the child with those about him in a kind of instinctive social sharing in the common feeling-consciousness. And the power thus to share is without doubt a part of our original nature. This is aided and augmented by religious instruction—the direct teaching of ideas about God. Thus fuller meaning is gradually built into the concepts already begun, and the personal attitudes already formed. And this process of building up our power to apprehend God

goes on aided by the experiences of life itself—both the emotional experiences and the rational which, of course, go hand in hand.

And now the image of God in terms of a human father ought to begin to give place to an image in a form which religious education has furnished, namely, an image of Jesus Christ the Saviour. For the child cannot at this period of his development dispense with the image factor in his idea of God. This transition to the image of Christ as the bearer of the growing moral meanings should take place early if Christian teaching has done its work thus far. And as the image of Jesus the Saviour is realized and appropriated, the image of God in terms of the human father falls away.

And, now, if the development of the inner life goes on, we shall have a slow but sure enrichment in the child's experience of these concepts. This enrichment comes out of life itself—out of the social experiences in which the child becomes a sharer—fellowship, loneliness, joy, sorrow; for the conceptual meanings taught through instruction have to be interpreted in experience before they are really comprehended. Thus in the life of the growing youth God can become the Great Companion of the inner life—not essentially different from the dearer fellowships of our personal experience, and at times richer and even more satisfying. To the logically trained and sophisticated adult whose reality is wholly a matter of sense experience and reason, such an experience of God may be well-nigh impossible. *But to those who have not wholly lost their ability to interpret experiences in terms of feeling* as well

as reason, God may become a very real Presence and the object of warm love.

And, now, as life goes on with its constant discipline of social experiences, the enriched idea of God may be *attended by a deepening consciousness of God.* I am here simply stating a fact of religious experience verified in the lives of a vast number who have testified that the consciousness of God has seemed at times very real to them. The reality-feeling comes out of no one aspect of the experience process: it is not reason alone, nor is it feeling alone, nor is it the consequence of recognizing fundamental needs of our moral life. It is all of these; and the combination, or synthesis, is effected in our normal social relations. Out of personal contacts with other persons, and out of a valuation of other persons do we become capable of realizing the transcendent value of the Divine Person. And this realization can lead to a sensing of the presence of God, by processes of consciousness which seem more direct than those through which our ordinary experiences of things about us are mediated. And this more immediate consciousness may be validated in experience though I do not think it is capable of a satisfactory analysis by logic. At those times when our belief in God is accredited by the whole of our conscious self we will begin to find ourselves possessed of deep satisfactions and a sense of poise and rest. Under these conditions the feeling of certainty grows to the extent that we may even begin to use a word which we do not think permissible on the level of the merely rational. We will begin to say regarding some of these experiences "I know." Jesus said it, affirming again

and again with a clearness and calmness which is strangely impressive his unity with God and his immediate consciousness of God's presence with him. Paul said it. "I know him in whom I have believed" was the expression he used when a realization of life's deepest meaning came to him out of a retrospective view of the whole of life. And the great mystics and lovers of God in every age have said it.[7] Thus, as we believe, *faith* in the larger sense can become the competent accreditor of belief, with the result that the spiritual insight born finds expression in phrases which stand for full conviction and certainty.

But we grow into this. The deeper kind of belief in God which makes faith in God possible is not an intellectual attainment so much as it is a spiritual achievement. It comes as the result not of keen and clever thinking but as the *consequence of full and deep living.* "No man hath seen God at any time." And so far as the certainty resting upon sensory experience goes this is very true. But it is equally true, as Christ himself said, that "The pure in heart shall see God."

[7] Whether we say "know" or not in religious experience will depend upon our training and our mental habits. Many may find it difficult because they have long validated ideas only through the clear perception of rational relations. The word is unimportant but that for which the word stands, a reasonable degree of certainty based upon the reaction of our whole self, is of the greatest importance.

CHAPTER IX

THE NATURE OF WORSHIP

All experience entitled to be called religious involves, as we have seen, attitudes toward the Divine. On the lower levels of culture where the gods are many the attitudes are toward many different gods, though worship is generally directed to one god at a time. On the higher levels the attitudes are toward one being. The Divine Being may be spoken of as the "Determiner of Destiny," the "Supreme Power of the Universe," Jehovah, Allah, or Brahma, or God. The word is but the name or label of a comprehensive idea. What is the content of the idea? The answer to this question must be in terms which will apply equally to the religious experience of the rudest polytheist and the most enlightened Christian.

Implications of "Divine." The conception of God is the highest idea of which any human being is capable at the level of development which he has reached. A study of the growth of the idea of the Divine from the early and rude forms in which it appears in primitive culture to the conceptions of a highly developed religion like Judaism or Christianity, would be to a large extent, the story of the growth of religion itself. But the idea of God at all levels will include certain common and essential elements. These are: (1) superhuman power and wisdom. (2) Goodness; for nowhere in the history of

religion are men found worshiping superhuman beings they believe to be bad.[1] (3) The element of mystery. A god thought to be well understood ceases to be a genuine divinity. The Greek gods were pictured as so thoroughly like mortals that they finally failed to command reverence. (4) The idea of determination to some degree of the fortunes and destinies of men.

Religious Attitudes Are toward a Personal Object. The attitudes of religious experience are, as we have seen, emotionalized attention states. This means that the object toward which the attitude is taken must be such that emotions may be felt when consciousness is centered upon it, and, furthermore, that some response may be expected. This is the psychological meaning of "personal." The formal definitions of "personality" commonly met in theological and philosophical discussion are not altogether adequate when we are trying to analyze religious attitudes, because they generally do not take sufficiently into account the social and emotional aspects of personal relations. The primitive worshiper of his tribal god thinks nothing about self-consciousness and self-direction. Yet his god is personal to him—indeed, everything is more or less personal. In the psychological sense (which is the more elementary and common meaning) an object of attention is personal to which the subject can project emotional feelings and from which he may expect intelligent and emotional

[1] Rites which are supposed to protect from evil spirits are not properly religious worship but to be classed as magic. Only when powerful and benevolent spirits are invoked to give protection and help do we have religion. It must be borne in mind, however, that the meaning of the word "goodness" in this connection extends all the way from benevolent or favorably disposed up to the highest ethical attributes.

response. One does not look for response from a "thing."

But it may be asked may we not take an attitude toward a principle? In a sense, yes. But here the attitude means a judgment, generally of approval. Our judgments may be—and, indeed, generally are—attended with degrees of feeling. As noted before we identify ourselves emotionally with our judgments. When we say that we love principles we mean that we give them an emotionalized approval. Our enthusiasm for them is an expression of this. But we expect nothing from them in the way of response to our emotion. Principles and things are impersonal. Men cannot feel reverent or thankful to a principle.

In like manner we may have certain attitudes toward "the universe," but unless this universe is thought of as personal and capable of responding to our projections of feeling, our attitudes will be largely those of judgment and cognitive process. Contemplating the vastness of the universe, we may respond with an emotion of admiration. Realizing the power of the universe, we may find ourselves with feelings of awe. But attitudes of this sort are generally below the level of the personal. Some have maintained that the feeling of awe in the presence of cosmic power, or of admiration and sublimity as we contemplate cosmic order and beauty, are religion. Our answer must be that this is not the sort of attitude-experience which we believe is entitled to the adjective religious.

Origin of Worship. In its broader significance worship means approaching or seeking relations with the

Divine. The problem of the origin of worship is the problem of the origin of religion. It was formerly thought that primitive people held certain beliefs concerning divine beings, and that these beliefs were more or less definitely expressed in the ritual of primitive culture. Attempts were made to explain this body of back-lying belief, but in so doing some of the older writers in history of religion (Max Müller, Tiele, Tyler, and even F. B. Jevons) assumed altogether too much by way of intellect and reasoning ability on the part of primitive men. Indeed, not a little of the explanation of how this primitive belief originated is excellent material for illustrating the so-called "psychologist's fallacy," which consists in attributing to the conscious object of investigations the mental processes of the investigator. But the vast array of facts gained through the researches of modern anthropologists have been interpreted more in accordance with the principles of modern psychology, with the result that many of the inferences worked out by the older scholars in science of religion have been greatly modified and some of them laid aside. Instead of theories of primitive revelation in which religious ideas were thought to have been somehow imparted to men from supernatural source, and doctrines of an original, and primeval monotheism, we now have a view of the origin of religious worship more in harmony with the more recently discovered facts.

If there is one truth which has been brought out clearly into the light, it is that the earliest religious facts are religious acts. These acts are of a spontaneous nature, instinctive, impulsive. Most of the

acts in primitive life which are significant for religion are group-acts. Men act together in the communal ceremonial and the tribal dance. Group action comes largely from imitation and from a sharing in the common emotional feeling of the group. These primitive group reactions harden into ritual and custom through the force of habit. Custom is group habit. This means that action takes place not as the result of intellectual processes like belief or deliberation, but through social instincts and reflexes. Tribal custom determines everything.

But this does not mean that certain objects to be gained may not exist as the ends of these socially determined actions. The objects which are the ends, more or less consciously realized as such, are such fundamental matters as food, protection from the forces of nature, deliverance from disease and misfortunes, victory in war, etc. These are the basic values in primitive life, and, indeed, in all life. Anthropology shows clearly that all primitive peoples have certain forms of concerted or group action which are intended to facilitate the obtaining of these desired values. Thus it turns out that however spontaneous and instinctive primitive rites may be in their origin, they have a purpose. True, some of the dances of savage peoples are probably only spontaneous expressions of the play instinct. Others more elaborate in structure are dramatic or imitative and the meaning is connected with food-getting, protection from disease and danger, marriage, birth, victory in war, etc. Thus war dances, for example, are performed before the fighting men of a tribe go off in a raid. Even when the men are away, the

women go through group movements, or dances, which give expression and relief to their suspense and excitement. Much of this is ideo-motor rather than reflex, for there are back-lying images and ideas of which it is the expression in action.

The acts thus far described seem to be predominately social; that is, they are performed by men in groups for the welfare of the group. How do they become religious? There is a group of writers on religion who maintain that these instinctive reactions of early men to provide themselves with fundamental necessities *are* religion. Religion, according to this view, means a system for procuring the basic values of life through the aid of superhuman powers. Professor Leuba[2] says that the idea of the divine stands for the means of securing needed values—that the gods give good things and perform services needed by men, hence the gods are supremely useful. He defines religion as "that part of human experience in which man feels himself in relation with powers of a psychic nature, usually personal powers, and makes use of them."

There is no doubt that much of early religion centers around the desire to secure values ("blessings," as we would say in religious phrase). And this persists in religion at the higher levels. Men do worship their gods because they want things which they believe the gods can give, or help them get. But that men—even primitive men—approach their divinities with only this idea of using them as a means to get things needed, is not borne out by facts. The gods are also approached for their own sakes.

[2] *Psychological Study of Religion*, 8.

Not all praise of the gods even in early religion is intended as flattery to facilitate getting things. Men praise the gods because they believe in them and are grateful to them and reverence them. The gods are ends in themselves, not simply means to ends. To make the economic motive the only driving force in early religion is a serious error. The elementary emotional feeling of early religious attitudes soon begins to center about the divinity as an object of grateful feeling. The primitive emotion of fear takes to itself other feeling qualities until it becomes the sentiments of reverence and gratitude and, at higher levels, of love.

But there is another answer to the question, How do social acts in primitive culture become religious acts? which is made by the writers of the sociological school in the history and psychology of religion. The answer is that these social acts do not become religious, they *are* religious, for the social and the religious are one and the same thing. Our main reason for refusing to accept this view is that in their efforts to do justice to the social aspects of religion the writers of this school ignore the real ultimate existence—the individual man. In the last analysis it is not the group which feels but the individuals who comprise the group. It is very true that the feelings of the individuals are what they are, and their actions too because they are with other individuals in the group. But the idea that the individual is completely submerged in the group is a fallacy so far as it has reference to emotional feelings and consciously sought ends. There is no getting away from the fact that it is the individual who feels, and who fixes his

attention upon the object desired by everyone in the group. It is the individual who takes the attitudes to the superhuman powers when they are invoked. And unless they are invoked the performance is not a religious act.

The conception of religion upon which we insist is not that of Durkheim and those who follow him. Religion must be more than "the conservation of values," to use the phrase of Höffding. It is more than the "consciousness of the highest social values" as Ames defines it. If we say this, then there is left no room for any difference between religious acts and social acts. Ames admits this and frankly says that to be social is to be religious. But does this not mean that any attitudes and loyalties which prompt acts are attitudes and loyalties toward our fellow men, idealized it may be? And does not the Divine in such a religion become nothing more nor less than an Ideal Society? And is this not the same teaching which others have put forth in various forms—essentially a religion of humanity? And does it differ essentially from the religion proposed a century or more ago by Auguste Comte, which religion was a form of Positivism, to use Comte's own word? God is Humanity, and Humanity (idealized to be sure) is God.

But someone might object and ask: "What of it? Why condemn a modern theory of the origin of religion by calling it Positivism or any other name?" Truly, for mere appellation is never refutation though it has often been mistaken for it. But it must not be forgotten that in spite of much elaborate exposition in which great arrays of facts are mar-

shaled and interpreted in defense of the theory of Durkheim[3] and his followers, the simple truth is that a sound psychological interpretation of the facts does not confirm the theory but rather refutes it. For there are a great many rites and ceremonies among primitive peoples which are clearly not of a religious nature. Such are the tribal initiation ceremonies, the blood brotherhood rites, and the corroborree. Others, like circumcision and subincision performed on boys and the ariltha performed on young women, are obviously sexual in their purpose.[4] But there are other ceremonies whose purpose is to facilitate in some way the procuring of things needed. When success depends upon the supposed power of some rite correctly performed or some mystical formula we have magic. Such may be the warding off of disease, or the bringing of rain by the rain-making ceremonies of the African witch-doctor and his assistants. But when an appeal is made to superhuman beings for their help in obtaining the things needed, then, and not until then is the rite or ceremonial really religious.

And where, it may be asked, does this idea of superhuman powers come from? The forces of nature act as a stimulus to a capacity for certain complex emotional feelings which primitive men possess as a part of human nature. Nature is the situation to which there is a response by the human mind. The objects and forces of nature are personified and thus become superhuman agencies to which emotional feelings are projected and toward which

[3] In the *Elemental Forms of the Religious Life.*
[4] Spencer and Gillen, *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, pp. 93 and 269.

attitudes are taken. The earliest expressions of these attitudes was no doubt spontaneous and simple. But thought follows attitudes taken to personified objects, and the vague concept of the omnipresent superhuman power "mana," "orenda," "wakonda," etc., is formed. It is primitive belief that this power is in the forces of the world, and when these are personified into divinities they are thought to absorb this great power. That men should learn to seek from these gods of nature the things needed needs no elaborate explanation.

Reasons for the Continuation of Worship. But even though we may be able to find from a psychological analysis of primitive ceremonials some answer to the question of religious origins, the more important question, after all, is not how religious worship started but why it continued, and why it continues to-day.

The first answer that comes to one who approaches the question from the psychological point of view is probably that habit, formed through the powerful influences of social inheritance and training, accounts in large measure for the continuation of worship. Those persons who faithfully attend divine worship in our churches to-day are very largely those who have been trained to the habit of church attendance in their early life. Years ago in religious families everybody was required to go to church. No one, not even the young children, expected to do anything else when Sunday morning came around. The result was a habit of attendance upon public worship which is not always in evidence to-day even among professedly Christian families. That habits

of church attendance, among Protestant people at least, are not formed now as they were a generation or two ago is perfectly evident to one who knows the facts.

Of late years the question why people do not go to church has been often discussed. A great variety of answers has been suggested, all of which may be simmered down to the simple statement that many people do not go to church because they do not feel the need of the services of the church and would much rather spend the time at something else. Many of these formed the habit of attending public worship in early years but formed other habits later on. Many others who do not go to church never formed the habit at all. Now, a habit when well established no doubt tends to insure the continuation of the forms of reaction which constitute it except, of course, when another habit replaces it. And another habit is soon established when another set of interests and desires gains the right of way. We often hear it asserted that when the habit of prayer or of attending public worship is firmly established in childhood that it will continue. The Roman Catholic Church is pointed to as an example of the truth of this statement. But though the methods of training in the Catholic Church aim at the establishment of habits through constant drill in childhood and youth, yet the mere habit is very far from enough to guarantee the continuation of religious worship. We must recall that in the Catholic Church remaining away from worship is considered a sin and must be confessed to the priest. Remaining away from the mass and from confession, according to the Catholic teach-

ing, jeopardizes one's eternal salvation. Thus the establishment of the habit through drill is supplemented by a very insistent and powerful instruction. But in spite of all this countless thousands who have received this drill and instruction fall away and rarely enter their church for worship. And among Protestant people the neglect of the worship of the church is so widespread that some are wondering whether the Protestant churches are not quite failing to hold their people.

While habit is of very great importance, its power has without doubt been overestimated. It is not true, as we often hear it asserted, that if parents to-day would only train their children in attending church faithfully, they would always continue to do so because of the powerful momentum of habit. Of course the chances of faithful attendance would be increased, but the continuation of a habit after it has become well established depends upon certain conditions. Habit rests upon interest, and interest upon the satisfaction of desire. Let new interests come into the situation and habits which are of long standing give place to others which soon become established in their stead. No, habit is not enough to account for the continuation of worship.

The recognition of obligation or the duty to worship is equally inadequate, but it certainly implies a higher level than the customary actions of habit, for to recognize the claims of duty one must have felt allegiance to some ideal. The ideal may have a source no higher than that of custom, and the feeling of obligation may be no more than the wish to conform to the conduct of others so as to gain social

approval. But this may be a sufficient driving power since approval of those about us is an elemental desire of our nature. Along with this motive of retaining the approval of those about us may go the wish to remain true to an ideal to which we have declared allegiance in the past even though other objects and desires are ready to claim the right of way. Thus while a "sense of duty" may help to hold a person to the services of the church, it will not last long in the absence of a recognition of real values. And what these are we must now ask.

The Values of Worship. The main function of worship is to keep alive and strong those basic conceptions, ideas, and emotions so fundamental to religion. From belief in God as a personal Being who loves men and is interested in them, and from the trust that God is accessible and available, there can come confidence, comfort, and moral strength for the control of conduct.

There is much in the universe to fill us with fear. We commonly picture primitive men as standing in the presence of great cosmic forces and sometimes flatter ourselves that with our triumphs of modern science we do not need to fear anything in the universe, for have we not conquered nature? We "harness the lightning"; but probably about as many people are killed by lightning stroke nowadays as formerly, and no doubt the number of deaths from electricity is vastly greater. We have isolated and photographed many disease germs, but tuberculosis is still the white terror from which a full million people are suffering to-day. There is much in life which is calculated to fill us with fear and misgivings. The

very fact that we can greet our friend, and in a few days—yes, a few hours—he may be taken and the familiar face and form laid away in the ground—this is surely calculated to fill us with fear if we allow ourselves to fix attention upon it. Salvation from fears as well as comfort from sorrows depends largely upon the way attention can be kept off the painful facts and centered upon other matters. It is thus that time heals sorrows and preoccupation cures doubt. But religion when it rises to the level of making God a factor in the experience of life, has something more to offer than cure of fear through mere diverting of attention. For belief in God as One who cares, especially the conception of God which Jesus Christ taught, makes the universe to the Christian "my Father's world." And this begets a confidence for the hours when life has to be faced in its darkest aspects. It is a confidence not in immunity from trouble. This figured much in the Old Testament. Earlier Jewish teaching held that the good man might expect freedom from misfortune through divine favor and intervention.[5] But as the power to interpret human experience deepens this naïve assurance is left behind. In its place there comes a profounder confidence based upon faith that God, the ruler of the universe, is good, and this fundamental cosmic goodness means the ultimate triumph of right. This does not, of course, solve all problems. Most of the dark perplexities remain, and rea-

[5] The Psalms are full of the idea that the "ungodly" suffer consequences from which the righteous are delivered by the special protection of God. "A thousand shall fall at thy side and ten thousand at thy right hand, but it shall not come nigh thee." The deeper thinking of a later age, however, found expression in such conceptions as are set forth in the drama of Job where the spiritual meaning of suffering and the triumph of character over physical circumstance are so impressively set forth.

son is baffled when it tries to deal with them. There is really no formal solution to the problem of pain. But there is possible a change of attitude and a replacing of fear with a broad confidence which calms and steadies us even in experiences which are hard to bear. Now it is one of the purposes of worship to enable us to express again and again our trust in God and our belief that God is accessible and sympathetic. And this greatly helps in our effort to banish the fears that weaken and to establish in their place a confidence which gives us moral strength. Thus worship by reenforcing religious conviction aids greatly in enabling us to feel "at home in the universe."

Worship also mediates comfort and consolation in those experiences which bring disappointment and grief. There is a very true sense in which each must bear his own burden. But there is also the possibility of bearing each other's burdens. This is through sympathy. Sympathy is more than pity, for it implies a sharing in the experience with a much keener feeling of appreciation than mere pity permits. When, now, it becomes possible for us to believe that the universe in the person of its Creator and Upholder is sympathetic with us, there is possible an attitude not simply of dogged submission to the inevitable (the attitude in Mohammedanism) but of acquiescence which becomes easier to bear because of the assurance that God cares and loves. Thus a lofty moral conception of God saves from those moods in which, like Prometheus, we might find a certain relief in railing at the heartlessness and injustice of the universe. If that sufferer, whom

the great Greek dramatist has made the type of a suffering humanity, could only have believed that God had known suffering and was even then suffering with him in love and sympathy, the intellectual problems would not have been solved but his attitude would have been altogether different and he would have had no inclination to pour out his soul in bitter defiance of one whom he thought of as tormenting him unjustly, but, on the other hand, would have found comfort in the thought of the divine sympathy and added strength to endure.

The confidence that the Power who rules the universe is good, results not only in confidence and freedom from fears, and in comfort when comfort is needed, but it also begets moral strength for the control of conduct and to do and dare for what one believes is right. Worship here may mean a tremendous reenforcement of moral energies, for from time immemorial worship has meant a renewal of vows, a pledging of loyalty. This was one of the essential elements in early sacrifice, and it remains to-day a significant feature of all worship of the spirit. It is the meaning of consecration. Now this pledging of loyalty to God implies that God is at the center of things. He is supremely interested, both in the outcome of a struggle on the battlefield of the individual moral consciousness and in the results of a great social enterprise for the triumph of righteousness over evil. Worship which acknowledges God as the supreme moral ruler, therefore, has in it much power to strengthen men for their moral conflicts. Worship thus comes to be one of the greatest sources of moral strength. It means strength for the

control of conduct, choosing the right because it is God's will, and rejecting the wrong because it is contrary to God's will. Worship thus becomes the chief source of energy for the motiving of conduct in accordance with what is believed to be the will of God. This, of course, means control of conduct through loyalty to the religious ideal—truth, righteousness, justice *as the will of God.* It is the great task of religious education to teach how the great moral values of life may be realized and conserved through control of conduct through the comprehensive motive of loyalty to God and his holy will. And in proportion as worship enables us to realize God, as it brings out clearly from the great mass of our percepts images and ideas, the one great idea of God—as the moral ruler of the world, God whose will is righteousness, in just that proportion worship reenforces our moral strength and enables us to keep the will of God on high above other competing ideas. The control of conduct is ultimately from within. Action with moral value is motived through loyalty to moral ideals. When loyalty to the will of God becomes the driving power, the life is religious as well as moral. Of course religious education must do its work in showing what the will of God is and how it coincides with the great moral ideals which have been gained through countless generations of human experience, but in the end religion will mean control of conduct in terms of the moral law conceived as the will of God.

If it is now asked, What does the religious man have which the nonreligious person does not have? the answer would have to include some of these

values which religious worship helps us to realize. These are: (1) Sources of confidence in the total order of things; a kind of "at-home" feeling in the universe which saves us from many fears which might weaken. (2) Sources of comfort in the dark and sorrow-bringing experiences which all meet sooner or later. This comfort comes from the belief that God not only cares, but knows what suffering is and sympathizes. (3) Sources of control of conduct through the religious motive—loyalty to the will of God. This will mean a warmth and hence a power to the motive not generally possible in loyalty to an impersonal and abstract moral ideal.

In the broad sense, then, the function of worship is to foster and strengthen religious ideas and feelings. Thus religion is constantly reenforced and saved from becoming weakened. This reenforcing is accomplished through these activities which put God in the center of attention. No one can long remain religious unless he thinks of God. If God is not the object of thought, and if toward him no emotions are felt, religion may continue to exist possibly as a fact to be observed through the behavior of others, but it will cease to be an individual experience. What, now, are some of the factors and methods by which the experience of religion is thus continued and vitalized through worship? This will involve some analysis first of public worship, and, second, of private worship or prayer.

Public Worship. Some analysis of the function and value of worship has been attempted. We have found that in a general way acts of worship tend to strengthen the consciousness of God, and this may re-

sult in increasing the sense of security and confidence in the universe as men meet those experiences of life which naturally produce dismay and fear. There is little doubt that the great value of religion is the way it enables men to meet the changes which life brings. The change from comfort to hardship, from enjoyment of social relations to loneliness, from health to sickness—these and others of the same sort call for ample resources of moral strength, and these resources religion as an experience of God is able to supply, as is nothing else in the world. It is this fact verified in the lives of countless thousands which accounts for the persistence of religion as a permanent aspect of human life. In the absence of some such values as these, custom and social inheritance would not be sufficient to perpetuate it. It would soon die because of its lack of justification through value, as, indeed, it does die, unfortunately, in the lives of many who discontinue those practices, ways of thinking, and social contacts which nourish religion as an experience of the personal life.

Forms of Worship. But now, after considering the function of worship, we must ask concerning its structure. This will include the outward forms which worship takes together with the mental states which are induced by or accompany these forms. Worship is sometimes spoken of as though it were altogether a matter of the expression of feelings and beliefs in various forms of action. Of course it is this. Forms of worship afford an outlet for feeling through motor-reactions, in accordance with the well-known psychological law that every mental state finds or tends to find some expression in action. But

forms of worship do much more than this. They should not only express feeling already experienced but they should be the inducing cause of other and deeper feelings. They should not only express religious thought and meaning but they should stimulate and inspire thought. Thus one ought to leave a public service (when that service has served its completer end) not only gratified at the opportunity for self-expression but inspired and enriched in thinking—ideas more clearly discerned and feelings intensified. In this way the worship will have an after result in steadier living under the ideals to which the person is already committed in loyalty. It is our present task to try to find out how this desirable result of worship is brought about.

As already noted, in its broad sense worship means an approach to God. "Coming to God" and "drawing near" to God are among the many biblical phrases denoting worship. Since God is not an object of sensory experience, this approach, or coming to God, is altogether mental. It means centering the attention upon God—thinking about God, and giving appropriate expression to the emotions which arise. But it must mean more than this, since worship includes some kind of fellowship or communion, and this rests upon the belief that the object which men approach in worship is conscious or personal and that some kind of response is not only possible but will be forthcoming. Nowhere in the history of religion do we find men actually worshiping *things* or inanimate objects conceived to be without consciousness or ability to respond. The old missionary hymn says, "The heathen in his blindness bows down to

wood and stone." But every student of the psychology of religion knows perfectly well that the heathen does nothing of the sort, but, on the contrary, bows down to the spirit or divinity which he fancies dwells in the wood or stone. In all early religion the tendency to animism is found, and even in highly developed religions the Divine must be conceived as personal before religious attitude and expressions are possible. An abstract and impersonal "Absolute" may serve very well some of the needs of philosophical speculation, but religion does not long maintain itself unless the impersonal Absolute be transformed into a personal Being of some sort.[6] A striking illustration of this is found in the development of the doctrine of God in the Hindu Vedanta, as has already been pointed out (page 154). Vedanta, was one of the six schools of religious philosophy which grew from elaborating and interpreting the teachings of the Upanishads. The greatest expounder and systematizer of Vedanta teaching was Shankara, who lived in the eighth century A. D. His doctrine of God was speculative, impersonal, unknowable, and without attributes, for the ascription of any attributes or qualities to God, it was thought, would impair the divine absoluteness. But religion could not develop with such a theology as this. So Ramanuja, four hundred years later, reinterpreted what he claimed was Upanishad teaching, setting forth the divine nature as not only conscious but responsive to the appeals of men. According to this Hindu theologian, when men express devotion to

[6] In my *Foundations of Christian Belief* this important point is given completer exposition. See pp. 166 to 171.

God, God graciously helps them in their endeavors to live so that Karma and unhappy rebirths are no more, and at death the soul passes to another world, and after suitable perfecting finds an abiding place in blessedness with God (Brahma). This was the widespread Bhagavata teaching through which the abstract philosophy of the Upanishads was made available for religious uses and needs.[7]

What is found here in Hindu religion is characteristic of all religious thought, and the history of religion always tells the same story, namely, that in order to worship at all men have had to believe in a God who is not only conscious but responsive. The Apostle James puts this truth in a very simple way when he said, "He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him."

The statement has just been made that men in order to worship at all must believe in God. This would seem to be so necessary and obvious that no comment is called for. The history of religious experience taken in relation to the streams of thought about God clearly shows that men do not long continue to pray to a projection of their own ideals. Let God come to be regarded as "an idealized Society" and worship begins to die a perfectly natural death. Of course it is not a sudden death, for habits and customs of very long standing have much social momentum which may keep them going for some time. But the power which will insure the perma-

[7] See Hopkins, *Religions of India*, pp. 496–497; also G. F. Moore, *History of Religions*, pp. 318, 319. The significance of this and of similar facts in Mohammedanism and Japanese Buddhism can hardly be overestimated since they are historical confirmations of a principle upon which adequate psychology and philosophy of religion rightly lays great emphasis.

nence of worship is gone. If an idealized society is God, then worship is work. We have heard quite a little of the "prayer-is-work-and-all-work-performed-in-the-name-of-one's-fellow-men-is-prayer" type of religion. That it is an important emphasis as over against a selfish individualistic and morally fruitless mysticism no one will deny. But that, as a view of religion and worship, it is only half the story, shallow and inadequate, no one will deny whose thought gets beneath the mere surface of things. For the fact remains that the great teachers and leaders in social righteousness have been men who have drawn their power and enthusiasm from a different God than Society or Idealized Humanity. The profounder meaning of worship as well as its perpetuation rests upon those fundamental assurances of the divine Reality and responsiveness which we mean by the phrase, "faith in God."

Analysis of the Forms of Worship. In the present discussion our interests are largely those in religious experience within Christianity. In the values revealed by a functional analysis religion is largely the same whatever be the social system or the particular forms under which it is expressed. So far as our data for the analysis of worship are concerned we might take them with equal propriety from a primitive tribal ceremonial, a Hindu temple, a Mohammedan mosque, a Jewish synagogue, a Christian church. For the sake of brevity, simplicity, and possibly added practical value we shall confine our attention to worship as it takes place in Christian churches, both Roman Catholic and Protestant.

One who enters a church where religious worship

is going on may note the several kinds of exercise in which the congregation engages. There is singing of hymns, or religious songs, reading together of certain devotional passages from the Bible, listening to the reading of a lesson or connected passage from some part of the Old or New Testament, listening to musical selections of a religious nature rendered by a choir, and last and most important of all, prayer. The prayer may be in the form of ritual in which all are supposed to join, or an officiating priest or clergyman may offer the prayer while the congregation listens, or there may be moments when in silence opportunity is given for each one to pray by himself. Whatever be the particular arrangement, these are the elements of a service of worship in a Christian church. In addition there may be certain acts such as walking or marching in procession, bowing, making certain movements like the sign of the cross, etc. In addition to ritual of prayer there may be certain rites in which a group of acts of a symbolical character are performed by all the worshipers, or by a group of the worshipers while the rest look on. But we must inquire further concerning these various elements in a service of worship.

Worship as Praise. An important part of services of worship is praise of God. We find praise in all religious literature, in the hymns of the Rig Veda a thousand years before Christ, in the sacrificial songs of the Greek religious festivals, in the Hebrew Psalter and in every Christian service with its doxologies, glorias, Te Deums, and innumerable hymns in which God is adored and addressed with many names and phrases intended to express honor. The

attempt to analyze, raises the question as to the meaning or the motive of these varied expressions of praise. Is it to offer that which will gratify God? Or is it to remind the worshiper of God's divine qualities and characteristics by a recital of them? Probably the true answer is "Neither," for praise is generally far more impulsive and spontaneous. It is rarely deliberate and fully conscious of itself, since it is largely *emotional* expression. And when emotion becomes consciously observed, or self-conscious, it tends to disappear. We must say, then, that when a worshiper praises God his frame of mind is such that no deliberate purpose comes to the surface of consciousness. On the higher levels of religious experience one praises God because he is happy, or at least trustful. The praise is a spontaneous outpouring of joy in the thought of God, of love for God, and gratitude to him. The song of Mary in the gospel history which has passed into the ritual of the church as the Magnificat is an example of this free and joyous expression of gratitude to and loving appreciation of God.

"My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour." Thus praising God is fitting and appropriate and worth while for its own sake. In true praise there is no ulterior motive of pleasing God as a preliminary to seeking a desired boon from him. It is only when the religious spirit has somewhat decayed and worship has degenerated into formal ritualism that this more sophisticated and self-conscious motiving of praise creeps in.[8] But praise is not always in the form of

[8] It certainly does creep into some of the sacred literatures, notably that of India.

hymn or song. It is quite as frequently a form of prayer, and is blended with thanksgiving. Many hymns are prayers, indeed our finest hymns are usually adoration, praise, thanksgiving and petition.

"Lord of all being, throned afar!
Thy glory flames from sun and star;
Center and soul of every sphere,
Yet to each loving heart now near."

This hymn by Oliver Wendell Holmes is a rich blending of dignified adoration and intimate mystical suggestion. Its last stanza is a petition in which the worshiper asks for depth of spiritual insight and warmth of emotional feeling:

"Grant us thy truth to make us free,
And kindling hearts that burn for thee.
'Till all thy living altars claim
One holy light, one hallowed flame."

A recognition of the spontaneous character of worship of praise is a sufficient answer to the modern critical objection to "objective worship." We may hear it urged that praising God with the end in view of doing something which will be pleasing to him is far too simple and naïve for the modern man who has come to think of the meaning and value of worship in a rather critical fashion. But who praises God with the purpose of doing something which will please God? Certainly not the intelligent worshiper who has a high and worthy conception of God. The on-looking psychologist may think the worshiper does this, but the on-looking psychologist is falling a prey to his own critical moods. He is slipping into the "psychological fallacy," which consists in attributing to the objects of our analysis the mental states which

really belong to the analyzing subject. Thus Professor Pratt, after contrasting pretty sharply Catholic services as largely "objective" and Protestant services as largely "subjective," concludes:

"But we must go deeper than this and ask ourselves the question whether we really believe that worship is any longer possible in the modern world at all. Plainly, if objective worship be impossible for the intelligent, and if subjective worship is a self-delusion, there is an end of all worship for the modern man. Plainly also, the second of the above hypothetical propositions is true—subjective worship without some objective worship cannot stand. The question, therefore, narrows down to this: Is any kind of objective worship possible for the man of our age? In answer to this it must be said plainly and first of all, that objective worship of the sort that aims to please the Deity is a thing of the past. The modern man cannot even attempt to participate in it without conscious hypocrisy. That is not the end of the matter, however. There is a kind of worship that is perfectly objective and sincere and that is quite as possible for the intelligent man of to-day as it was for the ancient, namely, the union of awe and gratitude which is reverence, combined perhaps with consecration and a suggestion of communion, which most thoughtful men must feel in the presence of the Cosmic forces and in reflecting on them. Such was the attitude of Spinoza and Herbert Spencer. Such was the genuinely objective worship of the ancient philosophers of Greece and India, and of many of the Hebrew psalmists and prophets."[9]

[9] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 308.

There are several things here worthy of inquiry. Is it true that *any* worship (no matter what symbols or materials are used) is "objective" to the worshiper? When a worshiper in a Hindu temple brings a bunch of flowers for Shiva, or a Roman Catholic burns a candle before a shrine, it is very doubtful whether the worshiper believes it is merely the flowers or the candle which is well-pleasing in the sight of the Deity. Is it not the gratitude or the affection of which the simple gift is but the material expression? Children do not give gifts to their parents at Christmas in order to please their parents. The act is far less sophisticated and cognitive and far more spontaneous than that. Children give gifts because they love those to whom they give them and the expression of the love in the custom is spontaneous and natural. Of course children are delighted when parents on receiving the little gifts seem pleased. But the person who thinks children give the gifts to please the parents does not know children. Of course gifts may be given to please a teacher as policy, but this is another matter. I am afraid it is to the psychologist that much of this worship is "objective," that is, intended to please the Deity.

The same thing can be said of "subjective" worship. Does the worshiper offer his worship with the consciousness that it has the power to reenforce his thought and stimulate his feeling? I think not. This would be to "give oneself a treatment"—an attitude which does not permit the acts—however beneficial they may be—to continue. This is always the trouble with all forms of self-treatment by suggestion, for

they are effective only as long as they remain below the level of full cognitive judgment. As soon as one begins to analyze just what he is doing and judge it as "subjective" in its benefits, the benefits begin to disappear. One no longer worships when his attention is drawn away from God, the only object of worship, and is fixed upon the worship itself. Religious worship is quite impossible without a supreme object of attention, and that object is and always has been God. Atheism cannot worship, nor can the person who has taken his attention from God to fix it upon some other object.

As to Professor Pratt's suggestion to the modern intelligent man that if he wants to be able to worship, he had better consider the value of attitudes to "the Cosmic forces," I am afraid that is only an old suggestion which has often been made from a point of view which is largely devoid of religious values. Who could feel *gratitude to a Force?* What does "consecration" mean to a Force? What would reverence to or communion with a cosmic Force be like? If the object of worship is thus to be reduced to something impersonal, how can any responses be looked for? And if the intelligent modern man is thus invited to project his feelings toward "Forces" with no hope of any such response as one might expect from a Conscious Being who loves, how long will such projection be apt to continue? No, when God is conceived as a universe of impersonal forces thought leads on to those barren regions where religious feeling dies from lack of any expectation of response. As long as Pratt's "Determiner of Destiny" is conceived as Forces, that is as impersonal, religious atti-

tudes as we have described them are impossible. All one can have are certain emotions of awe, sublimity, and admiration which may soon turn into fear and a sense of utter helplessness when life brings experiences impossible to understand and very hard to bear. On the other hand, if the Determiner of Destiny is personal, and thought of as Jesus taught men to think of God, then worship remains possible. And a more profound analysis will resolve it into nothing else than the various ways in which reverence, gratitude, love for God and trust in Him express themselves.

CHAPTER X

THE ELEMENTS OF WORSHIP

Some writers on psychology of religion make a rather sharp distinction between worship and prayer. By worship they mean those collective or group actions through which men seek to get into relations with God. By prayer they mean private and individual effort to approach God. At first sight such a distinction is appealing for it promises to promote clearness. But less superficial thinking may reveal the fact that it is one of those logical divisions to which there is no corresponding division in reality. For, after all is said about "group activity" and the "crowd mind" and the "instincts of the herd," religious experience which has moral value is the experience of individuals, not the behavior of human beings when they have become fused into a social group to the extent that feelings are reduced to the level of instinct and activities become social reflexes with a corresponding reduction of conscious control. For critical thought seeking to analyze and interpret the conduct of persons, experience means the experience of *someone* having the experience. In other words, the individual, not the group, is the actual reality. In the last few years we certainly have had an emphasis upon the social, quite enough to serve as a Nemesis for the former overemphasis upon the individual. Social psychology is young and among its writers are some who know but little about

critical thinking. The "crowd" and the "mob," and more recently that choice biological concept, "the herd," are supposed to have a consciousness all their own. "Crowd psychology" has produced some remarkable doctrines, and, uncritical and unscientific as it is, they are fascinating and popular. LeBon's famous book on *The Crowd,* along with a great amount of significant facts, contains much fallacious inference. And when the "crowd psychology" is applied in the analysis of religious experience, some pretty wild work has been the result. The assumption so popular to-day that the forces under which religious experience originates and develops are largely, if not exclusively, social is fallacy. When we come to the real truth in the matter a crowd is nothing more or less than a group of individuals each of which because of high emotional tensions acts under lowered volitional control. If the cognitive and ideational processes are very greatly reduced and if no inhibitions from habit prevent, the individuals composing such a crowd may act on the level of primitive instinct, performing acts which a subsequent rational judgment will recognize as outrageous. That such things have happened under conditions of religious enthusiasm like camp meetings and revivals such studies as that of Davenport have abundantly shown.[1]

But we may recognize these well-known facts and still insist that religious experience of moral worth is not the product of any such conditions. In these discussions we are considering the conduct of persons, not merely the behavior of organisms. And,

[1] *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals.*

keeping this in mind, we insist that a worshiping congregation is a congregation of individuals who are worshiping, not a "crowd" or a "herd." We recognize that the conditions under which the individual worships when he is in a group of his fellow men in a religious service are by no means the same as obtained when he worships alone. Even in the simplest services of a nonliturgical church there are possibilities of action under suggestion which do not exist when one turns to God in solitude. But in the last analysis the worship of the man or woman in a congregation is an individual reaction. The feeling and thought are generally in relation to a background of conditions and circumstances which exist in the individual's own life. And even when the objects sought are not individual values at all there is nevertheless the constant realization of one's own responsibility or privilege to help others, and to further the enterprises upon which the worshiper is invoking the divine blessing.

With these considerations in mind we shall have to refuse to allow the sharp distinction between *worship* as group experience, and *prayer* as individual experience. It must all be individual experience or it is not the kind of experience we have decided to call religious—the experience of conscious relations and attitudes to God, the experience of moral meaning and worth. Only when the individual worships is he a part of the worshiping congregation.

The Elements of Worship—Prayer. Let us turn our attention to some of the features of public worship, and the most important of these is prayer. In view of some things which have just been urged it is plain

that we cannot make much distinction in function (or value) between public prayer and private prayer. In both, the individual worshiper approaches God. But there are some structural differences which must be noted. Bearing in mind that the end of public worship is to stimulate the religious feeling and thought of the worshiper, let us ask what are the form and purpose of public prayer. As to the form little need be said. It consists of (1) audible prayer (said or sung) by a leader while the other worshipers listen; (2) audible prayer (said or sung) by all in concert, under which conditions a prescribed form or ritual must be employed; (3) combination of these; (4) silent prayer by each worshiper, who is conscious that he is surrounded by others who also are likewise engaged, this latter factor alone making it "public."

As to the purpose of public prayer the following considerations may be offered:

First, it should be a collective expression of the worshipers' devotional feelings and a voicing of their adoration, gratitude, and petition. This is the more obvious end, and if it is public prayer without ritual, certain requirements and limitations are laid upon the leader or person officiating. Thus he must enter into the fellowship of spiritual need with the rest of the congregation. All thought of himself must disappear, all attempts at fine language and literary embellishment. But not only should it voice the feelings of the worshipers in an expression of the great common emotions and needs, but it should also lead them in their thought and feeling by the suggestion of worthy and appropriate objects of petition.

Secondly, important as these aims are, they are not enough to insure real prayer on the part of the congregation. It is to be feared that the prevailing conception among most worshipers in the non-ritualistic churches is that when the minister leads in prayer they do all that is required by the occasion when they assume an attitude of reverence and listen respectfully. The minister is praying and his prayer becomes their prayer by the indorsement of presence and attitude. But this makes the members of the congregation in reality hardly more than interested and more or less sympathetic auditors. It is to be feared that congregations of worshipers are for part of the time at least only audiences. The only way that public prayer can fulfill its highest function is to stimulate prayer on the part of the worshiper. The most important end of public prayer is, therefore, to create an atmosphere in which it will be easy for the individual worshiper to pray. Here is a quotation from a short article by the author of this book and published a while ago in a religious journal, entitled, "When the Minister Prays":

"I have found myself wishing (in the kindest sort of way) that the minister would not shout or speak very loudly when he prays, because it prevents me from taking my attention away from him. If he is colloquial in phrase and rather businesslike in manner, I have to listen to every word and this also interferes seriously with my ability to forget him and pray with him.

"One Sunday sometime ago I was worshiping in a church—not my own. It was a simple but a very beautiful service. When the minister rose to pray he

stood for a moment in reverent silence with face uplifted. It was a quiet summons to us in the pews to join him. Then he began to pray, in a voice quiet in tone and rich in its suggestion of feeling. I listened intently for a few moments then. . . . Presently the soft tones of the choir response brought me back into consciousness of my surroundings. While the minister prayed I had been praying too."

Prayer as an Individual Experience. For convenience in discussion, prayer may be considered as public prayer and private prayer though, as we have seen, there is no important functional difference between them. All real prayer is "private" in the sense that it is an experience of the inner life, and in its essential nature all experience is the experience of an individual subject. This does not in any way minimize the necessarily social character of experience. In Christianity, religion has received the social emphasis to a degree unknown in any other religion. The founder of Christianity taught his followers to say *"Our* Father." Nevertheless, the ultimate values sought in any approach to God are to be realized through individual conduct and character. We need, therefore, in seeking a more thorough consideration of prayer to think of it always as an individual experience.

Prayer may be approached from the *objective* and from the *subjective* points of view. In the former we raise the question of the power of prayer to bring about changes in the world of objective reality; in the latter it is considered as a source of mental control available for the one who prays. To affirm that natural forces may be influenced and changed by

prayer is either to make prayer essentially a form of physical energy or else is to suppose that prayer can divert divine activity from its regular and ordinary ways of manifesting itself. Religious belief may accept such a thing as possible under some conditions. But it is belief for which scientific justification cannot be offered. Such a turning aside of the regular manifestations of natural force would have to be classed as a supernatural event—and for such events we find no place in scientific psychology, as we have already seen. The only way that psychology can allow that the order of events in the world of objective reality can be affected by prayer is through the affecting of personal agencies, and these may bring about changes in the order of objective fact. Thus a military commander like General Foch who believes in the power of prayer, may pray earnestly before he starts to plan a battle. He may pray for insight and wisdom to plan and direct wisely. As a result of the prayer he may be steadied and given a clearness of comprehension and a confidence which he might not otherwise possess. This consequence of his prayer may result in an outcome for the battle different from that which would have happened had the leader not been steadied and encouraged. But granting all this, let us ask whether psychological analysis will give us ground to think of prayer as a means of influencing other persons—say at a distance. If the persons to be influenced are near by, it is evident that subjective effects in us may put us in shape to influence them directly. But we are often asked to pray for persons at a distance, missionaries, etc. What effect, for example, could the prayers of

a group of college students in Ohio have upon the outcome of the discussions at a great missionary conference in Europe or China? Here, again, we have to say that psychology can offer very little. The power of one mind to influence or affect another mind or other minds at a distance is believed in by many intelligent persons. There is a growing tendency to consider that what is called telepathy is not altogether a vagary. Well-authenticated facts are rather too common to be explained always as interesting or surprising coincidences. But the data are vague and as yet unmanageable scientifically. At present psychology must confess its inability to deal with these facts while not dogmatically denying the possibility of some sort of telepathic influence. So far as psychological analysis is concerned, we shall have to decline to deal with objective answers to prayer. We turn then to a discussion of prayer as a subjective power more specifically as affording *power of mental control.*

Many lose faith in prayer because they find themselves unable to justify beliefs about it which are inherited and traditional. Prayer can, indeed, do wonders; it can "remove mountains," as Christ said with Oriental hyperbole. But such expressions when taken not too literally but for their spiritual significance simply mean that prayer has the power to enable us to overcome obstacles which are so great as to appear quite insurmountable. Clearer insight into the real nature of prayer is needed. This, together with the practice of prayer, will generally restore faith in it. Let us address ourselves to the question, What has psychology to suggest by way of

answers to such questions as the following? How does prayer bring about changes in the *experience* of the individual? In what sense is prayer an effective source of control over the thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and resulting acts?

One important consideration must be borne in mind. Though we find no place in our discussion for prayer as a means directly of affecting and changing the forces of the physical universe, and though we say that the effects of prayer are primarily upon ourselves when we pray—that is, subjective—nevertheless we must not allow this word "subjective" to mean or even imply that the forces through which we are affected are merely the forces or resources of our own organism. The most fundamental question which can be asked concerning prayer is not whether its effects are "objective" or "subjective," but whether through prayer we find ourselves with a confidence that results have been modified. That because we prayed, not only were our feelings and attitudes changed, but the outcome in that series of facts we call *our* experience, was different than it might otherwise have been. When a person believes that all prayer can do is to increase confidence in one's self, but that there really can be no augmenting of moral strength, no actual increase of insight, it is liable to dawn upon that person that, after all, praying is "giving himself a kind of mental treatment." If he knows the principles of autosuggestion, he perceives that prayer is only a form of that process. Very soon such a person finds prayer differing in no respect from counseling and meditating with oneself. Though prayer be addressed *pro forma* to God, in

what sense are the divine resources available? One may pray, "O God, help me to help myself now—to use to their full all my resources of courage and insight. Help me to do the right thing now." Is the prayer really answered unless help actually is forthcoming; that is, unless certain spiritual forces are released which would not have been available without the appeal to the higher source? Suppose we say that what God does is simply to help us to use our own resources in a more effective way. Nevertheless, the situation remains unchanged. Granted that autosuggestion will quiet and steady one, the practical problem remains how long a person who believes that prayer is merely suggestive treatment and that it has no power to affect results and outcomes will, nay, *can* continue the treatment in the absence of faith in available resources beyond his own.

But the fact is that while no doubt many cease to pray, or continue it from habit as an appropriate convention, there are and always have been very many who continue to pray and who confidently insist that they receive a clear augmenting of their own moral strength, courage and spiritual insight. Now, this is a fact with which the psychologist in religion is supposed to deal, but can he deal with it adequately so long as a traditional empirical method shuts off all reference to divine agency in human experience? The facts may seem plain. A man prayed and, according to his own testimony, received a distinct augmenting of his courage, insight, and moral strength. It is evident that unless the man who prayed believed that God would respond these subsequent conditions would not have ensued. But they

did ensue, and the subject of the experience attributes them to a source of strength beyond himself, while the observing psychologist may insist that the sources of strength were all the time within the man but not made available until he prayed. But even the analyzing psychologist must acknowledge that it was the man's belief in God and confidence that God would respond which released the additional resources and made them available. Without this belief and confidence the prayer would not have been offered. Atheism does not pray any more than it worships in praise. "He that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him." Belief in God and confidence in God's availability are the indispensable condition of all prayer.

First let us notice that Prayer may exist at various mental levels. (1) As a kind of instinctive reaction. In grave danger or emergencies men cry for help. It is natural, spontaneous, and instinctive. And being instinctive it does not have to be learned. This was not the sort of prayer the disciples had seen when they said to Christ, "Lord, teach us to pray." (2) Prayer may exist as habit. With many the act of praying is merely a habit of asking for the regular and customary things needed. A prayer habit of this sort does not lead to the prayer of control, indeed, it tends to make the prayer of control impossible. (3) On the higher voluntary or consciously directed level prayer may be characterized as a religious exercise through which we are enabled to take certain definite attitudes, and to bring feeling and thought under definite control. Tendencies to dis-

organize are checked, and organization of the self quietly and firmly about certain centers of thought tends to relieve strain, and increase insight, thus greatly promoting the movements of effective adaptation which follow. Let us seek further the facts; they come out of religious experience. They are that prayer results in burdens being made lighter or removed, worry quieted; and care loses its irritating and annoying qualities. Then, too, positively, there comes an increasing of strength, new realizations, insight, fresh courage to go on, etc. These are facts. How shall we account for them? Perhaps an attempt to explain them psychologically will suggest how they may be realized. And a psychological explanation, while it is in terms of what is natural as distinguished from what is supernatural, in no way denies divine agency. For we have learned, I hope, by this time to think of the natural and familiar as expressing divine power and purpose quite as truly as the unfamiliar sequences which we call supernatural.

What, then, are the conditions which enable us to increase our control at will over the spiritual forces of our life? When burden, depression, discouragement interfere with the free functioning of our whole self, what shall be done to remove these obstructing conditions? When we find ourselves in need of greatly increased power to forgive, or extend sympathy, or requiring more courage or clearer insight, what shall be done to make additional resources available? Can we enter into the experience of prayer and through this experience gain the needed reenforcement or control? The testimony of countless persons would be in the affirmative.

Conditions of Entering into Prayer. First. It is found that reducing sensory and motor activity to the minimum helps at the outset. "When thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut the door." . . . "Be still! and know that I am God." The reason is evident, for, as already suggested, "approaching God" is mental, and the first requisite is a centering of attention upon God. This will be accomplished only as other objects which might crowd in and bid for attention are so far as possible shut out. But avoiding sensory stimuli is no easy matter under ordinary circumstances. We can close our eyes and so shut out sights. But with most of us there is so much noise going on about, especially in the city, that silence is difficult. When worshipers are bowed in silent prayer the sounds of the street burst intrusively in. There is, however, another kind of stillness, a quietness of mood, which helps to reduce reaction to stimulus and make prayer effectual and increases our spiritual resources and control.

There come times when the most direct pathways to power lie in the decrease and even discontinuance of all conscious effort. Power through strenuous effort? Yes, that is often the way. But power also through quietness—not an empty inactivity but a directed and attentive quietness. It can be accomplished in these modern days with all their rush and hustle. It is not easy, for there are always so many things which need to be done. But we must guard ourselves against the inability to let ourselves go—to discontinue conscious effort when the need comes. For to keep unrelentingly at it when there ought to

be a relief of the strain insures fatigue and depression. But to "enter into one's closet and shut the door" is the first requisite if prayer is to bring increased resources of spirit.

Secondly. This quietness may often demand that we be alone with ourselves. This is meditation. It has long been enjoined as a spiritual discipline in devotional literature. It is necessary if one would find strength and nourishment for the inner life. But, like the silence which generally makes it possible, it is not easy. The prevailing emphasis to-day in religion is on social relationships, social programs. The heart of Christian discipleship is often set forth as service of others. This is perfectly true. But how is the self which serves and guides social enterprises to find its *own* strength? How is religious experience, which is always an individual matter, to be sustained in an age of socialized religion? The answer is that to be still now and again with ourselves and with God will give us the strength and inspiration to keep on the task of serving with undiminished enthusiasms. For there is nothing like the seasons of quiet with ourselves *and with God* to sustain our resources and to enable us to see things in their true value.

Prayer, then, is thinking things over with ourselves and with God. Without God in the experience we might have meditation but not prayer. The very thought of God's presence and love may be steadying. The patient in the hospital lies waiting his turn to go to the operating room. It is a hard experience, as anyone knows who has been through it. But let him keep saying quietly to himself: "I have done the best

I know. I am in His hands. He is with me now, and He loves and cares"—and the result is very real. In like manner a difficult situation may become clearer as we think the whole thing over with the underlying thought that God is with us. And just as being in the presence of a friend whom we deeply respect influences us, so our feelings and thoughts are modified by the realization that God is with us. In God's presence we feel a strong tendency to think only such thoughts as we believe God would have us think. And to be often consciously in his presence through the exercise of prayer greatly helps in establishing worthy desires and pure and unselfish purposes. There is no surer means of control than to stop in silence long enough to realize that we are always in God's immediate presence. In this "practicing of the presence of God" thoughts which are weakening and feelings which are unworthy tend to drop away. Communion with God supplies the most powerful incentives to try to realize the best that is in us.

Thirdly. A certain passiveness. In prayer our minds are made highly suggestible and brought under the direct influence of the loftiest and most inspiring concept which the human mind can form or hold. This is the concept of God as a Divine Father, that is a God who is perfect in power and in wisdom and who loves. We think of ourselves as linked up with God and therefore as able to avail ourselves of his infinite resources. This confidence has its source in the assurances often expressed in Scripture—that great record of lofty spiritual experiences. The so-called "promises" of God of which there is so much in devotional literature are the yearnings which have

been richly realized again and again by those who have sought God's presence—the saints and believers of every age. These statements of the spiritual confidence of others when verified, as they may be in our own experience, become centers of fresh confidence and strength, enabling us to lay hold of the sources of spiritual power.

In thus enabling us to find fresh levels of power prayer tends in some degree to detach us from the conditions which are imposed upon us by the circumstances over which we have no control. There are times when a certain insulation from surroundings means a triumph in or over circumstances. Annoyances may thus lose much of their power to irritate. Perplexities remain, but we are not baffled and discouraged. A life without prayer remains constantly tied down to earth and the slave of conditions. Surroundings are all-influential—they really dictate to the spirit. There are some contacts with life that are destructive to our highest ideals. These must be in some way neutralized. Prayer can prevent us from being victimized by life's exigencies and accidents. It makes it possible to live upon the higher levels, while yet remaining in the midst of conditions which we must face day after day.[2]

It is only through prayer that we can ever come to realize God as the Great Companion of our inner life. Then we begin to share in a strength and joy that are not our own. Paradoxical as it may seem we are able to use sources of power and satisfaction which lie beyond the area of our own consciousness. To

[2] I am indebted to Professor Norman E. Richardson for fruitful suggestions derived from reading an admirable lecture of his on "Prayer as a Form of Mental Control."

learn to rely thus upon this greater source of energy is, after all, the great objective in prayer. At times the control which comes may seem to be through the reserve forces of our mind. But gradually the consciousness of God's companionship and spiritual nearness will lead us to expect a control which otherwise we could never realize. Psychologically, I think we are justified in saying that new psychic forces are made available, in addition to the resources of our own subconsciousness. But even if it be allowed that appeals to God result only in reserve energies from the subconscious mind, there is clear justification even in the psychological attitude for the phrase "answer to prayer." Religiously we do say that God's presence with us means God's power in us.

This sense of God's spiritual nearness gives us a feeling of confidence in the universe—a cosmic sense of security. It strengthens our belief that the forces operating in the world are controlled by a beneficent Power, and that therefore the universe is friendly and we have no cause for dread or fear. When this sense of cosmic security has become our well-established mental habit, we are able to meet hard experiences with a strength of endurance otherwise impossible. Misfortune will test but not completely upset our belief in the divine care—though any doctrine of Providence will have to be taken at rather long range and without too much thought for individual physical welfare. Feeling secure in the universe lends poise and depth to all our judgments of meaning and value. The immediate conditions of life, that is, those close at hand, are recognized as only a part of a far greater Reality—and life is not dependent upon these condi-

tions for its growth and nourishment. The Son of man prayed frequently, and those in close fellowship wondered at his marvelous control and his strength of spirit. And he said to them, "I have meat to eat that ye know not of."

The Elements of Worship—Ritual. What has been suggested as the important purposes of public prayer (page 210) will help to formulate an answer to the question concerning the relative merits of the prescribed prayer as found in religious rituals or the prayer of free expression. From the æsthetic point of view the advantages of the ritual prayers are obvious. In the historic liturgies prayer finds expression in dignified and impressive phraseology. The fact that the language is more formal in structure than common speech has both its advantages and its danger. The advantages are found in its tendency to lift the worshiper out of the ordinary and commonplace moods. The danger is that it will induce formality in attitude. It is this tendency toward an exaltation of form, however, at the expense of spirit and spontaneous feeling which is the constant peril of the liturgical service. And the peril is constant because it inheres in the very nature of the mind. Action often repeated in the same way establishes the habitual type of reaction, and, as habit grows, conscious direction of action inevitably diminishes. It is only therefore as the tendencies to a diminished conscious control are constantly offset by a conscious attention to meanings so that the liturgy serves as the worshiper's own means of expression that the deadening influence of habit can be avoided and attention kept from falling to the lower levels.

But the real power of ritual is not in æsthetic considerations but, rather, in its power to induce cooperation and through suggestion to arouse feeling. Ritual in public worship is more conducive to unified action, and thus the individual worshiper finds it easier to enter into the service and not be merely a sympathetic spectator and auditor. For ritual calls for the active participation by each member of the congregation not only in the singing but in many other features of the service. In the Roman Catholic Church the liturgy is in Latin and is usually intoned in a manner which makes it unintelligible even to one who knows Latin well enough to follow. The prayer book with its English translation enables worshipers to follow if they wish. But even with this obstacle that the service is in a tongue unknown to the worshipers, there is undoubtedly a large participation in the service by the average Catholic congregation. Most of those who (from lack of intelligence or disinclination to effort) fail to follow the service seem nevertheless to be wholly engrossed with private devotions while the mass is going on, repeating with the aid of their beads the prescribed number of "Hail Marys" and Lord's Prayers, thus preserving—in appearance at any rate—a devotional attitude. But it must be confessed that a service of worship conducted in an unknown tongue and with such accessories as gorgeous vestments and burning incense makes its appeal by way of sense stimulation and suggestion, and it calls forth on the whole a more elementary type of response than a service in which the presentation of ideas is more directly aimed at.

In the Protestant Episcopal Churches, especially

those of the "Broad Church" persuasion, ritual worship is probably at its best. And it is agreed by those who have had opportunity to observe and judge that the participation of the average Episcopal congregation in the worship is as high as in any Christian communion. The opinion sometimes held by persons in the nonritualistic churches that ritual inevitably breeds thoughtless and routine worship is not borne out by the facts. On the contrary, ritual seems rather to inspire and sustain devotional feeling. The reason is not hard to find.

Ritual worship tends to fuse the individuals of a congregation into a unified mass and to reduce mental activity to the group-action type. This is accomplished largely through certain arrangements in all ritual services which require all from time to time to sing, make uniform movements, to assume certain postures, or to repeat in concert prescribed formulations. Here is the heart of ritualism, and the secret of its power to secure participation lies in the fact that the principle of dynamogenesis works both ways. Psychology teaches the fundamental principle that every mental state whether ideational or emotional tends to produce some form of motor reaction. Thus movement is the natural result of feeling and imagination. And the reverse is also true. To assume an attitude of reverence is to invite the corresponding emotion. For the posture acts as a stimulus or suggestion, which in the absence of conscious factors which would inhibit, generally brings on the appropriate feeling. To respond to a situation in which many about us are making movements, by ourselves joining in the movements is to induce

more or less completely the feeling of which the movements are a natural expression. Thus the casual visitor at a college game may not have much real interest in either side winning, but if he enters into the occasion by cheering with those who surround him he will find his feeling growing and in the end may discover himself rooting with the greatest enthusiasm. In like manner movements, postures, and concerted expression under a common idea and under the social conditions which make for group action create a situation to which a response is easily called forth; and that response is apt to be of a predominantly emotional character.

Thus the ritual through its power of suggestion tends to merge the individual with the mass of the worshipers, to suppress for the time the more critical judgment processes and to induce appropriate emotional feelings. In this way ritual tends to create an atmosphere in which the individual finds it easy to worship, thus realizing the great end of public worship. That form of public service is most effective which sends the largest number away feeling that they have been in an atmosphere where it was easy to approach God in a fellowship of the spirit. Under these conditions those values which men seek and have a right to expect when they worship will be apt to be realized.

The suggestive and unifying power of group action is not the only factor in ritual which produces enrichment of feeling. There is also the consciousness that in a time-honored liturgy one is linked up with the glorious past of the church. This is what gives the singing of the old chants and the repeating to-

gether of the ancient creeds their power to inspire by arousing a feeling of unity with the past and of solidarity with all Christian believers. This is the "communion of saints," which has always been given a high place as a nourisher of faith. From the point of view of ritualistic value, the fact that the great historic creeds do not adequately formulate present-day belief in all their statements is a matter of secondary consideration. The great creedal symbols of the church grew out of her vital experience, and they throb with the intense conviction of their day. When Christians repeat them to-day they may do so with the realization that through this common expression of faith they are linked up in a spiritual unity with the Christian believers of all the intervening ages since the creed received formulation. This affords an emotional stimulus not to be underestimated. Here also is found the reason why newly formed creeds lack the power of the ancient symbols; their inability to arouse feeling is due to their lack of significant historical associations. However much may be said in favor of revising the ancient creeds from the point of view of values determined by rational judgment, their value as ritual can only be in this manner diminished, if not altogether destroyed. Let us have the adequate statements of present-day belief which may be necessary, but let us keep the ancient creeds for what they are—expressions of the faith of former ages. And let us hope that though the beliefs may change, that faith of which the old creeds are the monuments may remain.

Elements of Worship—Music. We have already referred to the significance of singing hymns as it gives

opportunity for self-expression in worship, and for praise of God which generally takes the form of gratitude and acknowledgment of God's goodness. Here it should be noted that on the side of the music itself as distinguished from the ideas expressed with the music the psychological analysis of religious music is not essentially different from the psychology of music in general. Music makes its appeal to the emotions mainly by way of certain affective reactions and primary instincts. Musical pitches when combined produce affective responses running all the way from consonances which are agreeable to dissonances which are unpleasant. The most disagreeable interval is any tone sounded with another tone in the scale a half interval above or below it. The most agreeable interval is the harmonic fifth. This fact of the psychic quality of certain combinations of tone together with the instinctive satisfaction afforded by rhythm is the foundation for the power music exerts over the emotional feelings. Religious music employs for the most part the slower and less marked and consequently more dignified rhythms while the tonal structures tend to full harmonic chords. The effect is heavier and more solemn as befits the moods of which religious music is generally the expression. It would be possible to go on to considerable length in an investigation of the form side of religious music. But this would carry us into some matters of a more or less technical nature and away from those principles of analysis in which we are primarily interested in the present discussion.

The significance of music in worship is: First, as activity of the subject (as when the subject sings

or plays as an act of worship). Here the activity not only gives a certain emotional satisfaction through self-expression but tends to enrich the feeling through associational connections coming out of the whole mental background. This is why the old hymns which bring back vague memories of one's younger days are so liable to produce emotional feelings when sung by older people. Secondly, as reaction of the subject (as when the subject listens to music as worship). Here the music serves its full purpose only when the text can be followed. A soloist singing a devotional composition, who can make the worshipers hear the words, is contributing far more to the service from the standpoint of worship values than one whose text cannot be understood. In some churches where the worshipful character of the choir music is fully recognized, it is the custom to print the words of the principal anthem on the order of service. In ritualistic churches the music of the ritual service itself is always a musical setting of some of the standard chants of the church—such as the Te Deum, Jubilate Deo, Nunc Dimittis, etc. The words of these are a part of the ritual and so are well known. In the rendering of a sacred cantata or part of an oratorio as worship the best arrangement is always to have the text in the hands of the worshipers so they may follow. Under many conditions this is about the only way in which that part of the service can be saved from degenerating into a mere performance of music. The extent to which music rendered can by trained singers and professional musicians enrich the emotional feelings and inspire a devotional attitude is the measure of its utility and justification

for the purposes of worship. Where music is employed to draw people to the service through the prospect of pleasant entertainment its use is really a matter of advertising. Such use may be perfectly justifiable, but it does not belong in a discussion of the structural elements of worship.

Elements of Worship—Æsthetic Appeal. When we speak of art as an element of worship it must be made clear in what sense the word "art" is used. The art factors are not to be looked for in the worship attitudes, for striving for what one might judge to be artistic value would involve such division of the attention as to impair seriously the attitude to God in which the worship primarily consists. To this extent worship which has not degenerated into a mechanical performance of ritual acts remains uncritical and even largely unconscious of itself. The art appeal must therefore be looked for in the character of the sensory stimuli—the perceptual objects to which the worshiper reacts during the worship. These objects which make an æsthetic appeal are such as arouse certain of the feelings. They are sensory experiences, but they are much more. They call forth the judgment reactions sufficiently to afford the consciousness that the objects in their sensory qualities, form, proportion are pleasing. Thus the subject is conscious of relation with the ideal named beauty. But when we ask concerning the nature of this ideal, psychology can answer only in terms of the type of reaction certain objects call forth. A beautiful object, then, is one which arouses deep affective satisfactions called æsthetic feelings. When examined this definition looks a good deal like

traveling in a circle. But the circle is not the small diameter affair which makes the charge of circle-thinking a genuine logical reproach. In the last analysis all definition is traveling in circles. The size of the circles, however, makes the difference. No one finds fault with the astronomer because his thought travels in circles, nor should they with the thinker whose circles are broad enough in their sweep to include large areas of experience. Beauty defined with the psychologist's emphasis means that which calls forth those complex feelings named "æsthetic." When asked to explain these æsthetic feelings we may resort to such phrases as "emotion of sublimity," "feeling of grandeur," etc. These do seem to imply the very thing to be described and to add little to the meaning. We seem to face the conclusion that beauty is beauty, that is, that the greatest objects of beauty are such that they arouse in us feelings which cannot be adequately defined except in terms of themselves. This power of certain objects to make us happy really means an original capacity of the subject to respond in this fashion.

Certain great objects of nature call forth this response. At a certain stage of its development the human mind begins to react with æsthetic feelings. Training greatly increases this capacity but in its origin it is a part of original human nature. We may note in passing the similarity between æsthetic and religious experiences. While they are not identical, yet for some sensitive and fine-grained persons there is little or no division and feeling passes from one to the other. For such, religion must be beautiful and God may be conceived with the utmost vague-

ness but as the Eternally Beautiful. Beauty thus becomes in itself a kind of religion. It is hardly necessary to point out that such a conception of religion is apt to neglect the conception of God as the ideal of superhuman goodness and to undervalue the great moral values which it is the great function of religion to conserve.

But it is undoubtedly true that the idea of God being the highest ideal must include the ideal of beauty. As religion develops from the lower levels of culture it outgrows fear. The conception of God therefore tends to pass over from the "Awful" to the "Beautiful"; the awe-inspiring qualities of Deity cannot wholly pass, however, without a distinct moral loss to religion. The ethical aspects of the history of the idea of God show the truth of this. To the Greeks their gods were idealized humans and portrayed as beautiful as the sculptors could make them. But the superhuman and transcendent elements were lost in the constant attempt to idealize the human form. On the other hand, some of the divinities of Hinduism, like Kali, for example, are portrayed in what seems to us to be very hideous representations, but this is the result of attempts to preserve and emphasize the super-human nature of divinity. The divinity, being different from human beings, must be pictured as different in some striking way, and the result is inevitably hideous from a more advanced point of view. Beauty, then, is a part of the divine ideal when religion reaches the higher stages of development.

With these considerations in mind we must now return to the main question which has to do with the

function of art in worship. Beautiful objects in the surroundings tend to evoke complex emotional responses of a sort which intensify religious feeling. Feeling is so very important an element in religious experience that anything which increases it is of value in the structure of worship. But we must ask again, What are beautiful objects? We have thus far mentioned only great and inspiring nature objects to which men seem to react with feelings which seem to be elemental and original to human nature. Is this also the way they react to creations of art like a statue or a picture? The answer will have to be that while response to beauty rests upon certain original capacities of human nature, yet response to a work of art depends upon the cultural resources of the subject who sees these things. Power of emotional reaction is in this case clearly acquired and depends in large measure upon what has been learned. This does not always mean technical learning, but it must mean experience of such sort that the works of art can be understood and to some degree appreciated. An art object arouses emotion through its power to call forth memory images and meanings. It is thus in a very true sense a symbol. These memories and meanings are a part of the vast mental background upon which we depend so constantly to give present experience its meaning. The appeal made by objects of art is therefore first to this larger mind of past experience, the normal Subconscious. The power of works of art when used as symbols in worship is therefore the power of suggestion. It is for this reason that too much conscious attention to the details of art objects begins to de-

stroy their value as aids to religious feeling. For another attitude, that of criticism and appreciative judgment begins to creep in which may soon take the place of that less cognitive type of response which lends itself to suggestion and the inducing of the feeling moods. Of course if the object is new, it demands high level attention unfavorable to suggestion. And if it is poorly done and falls below the standard of artistic excellence to which the subject has become accustomed, that fact too will make the emotional responses impossible because the fully conscious processes of judgment valuation will crowd into the center of attention.

We conclude, then, that the function of "art in religion" is to enrich the emotional side of worship, and this is done through the evoking of the deeper and more comprehensive feelings from the unconscious (or the subconscious), that great background of the mind into which a wealth of images, concepts, ideas, and ideals have been poured. This is, of course, figurative language, but we have seen in the discussion of religion and the subconscious what the meaning is. From this it appears that much of art in religion is necessarily a form of symbolism and this leads to the inquiry as to the nature of religious symbolism.

Elements of Worship—Symbols. In closing the discussion of worship it remains to consider some of the factors through which worship is realized. In the broad sense worship is approaching God. The approach is, of course, in thought and feeling since God is not an object of our sensory experience. "No man hath seen God at any time" (1 John 4. 12). But

Jesus said, "The pure in heart shall see God." In the latter passage, "see" must mean some form of apprehension different from mere perception. But for the many, the feeling of reality is extremely difficult in the absence of tangible objects. This is the reason for idolatry, the coarsest and most elementary form of symbolism. It is characteristic of the higher religions that they teach their worshipers to approach God without idol or any representation of the Divine. This was absolutely fundamental in ancient Judaism as expressed in the first law of the Decalog, though the tradition of the bright shekinah points to the difficulty which untrained thought always encounters in realizing the presence of God in the absence of all sensory presentations. In like manner Zoroastrianism taught a lofty conception of the Divine but made fire the symbol of the Divine Presence, and taught worshipers to bow in adoration before the rising sun. Mohammed, following Judaism, forbade all representations of God—indeed, allowed no pictures of any living thing. The mosques and buildings in Mohammedan lands are ornamented only with geometric designs and conventional forms of inanimate objects. In Christianity everything is found from the Greek or Roman Catholic, who bows before the image of a saint, to the old-fashioned Quaker, who turns his back on every kind of symbolic representation and refuses all ritual except that of silence.

Nature of a Religious Symbol. A symbol is a mental image or a perceptual object to which a meaning has come to be attached more comprehensive than that commonly associated with that image or perceptual

object. And by this object whose meaning is thus expanded, emotional feeling is evoked. Thus a flag of certain design may serve simply as a signal having a definitely prescribed meaning as determined by a code. But a flag may be the emblem of a nation, in which case it serves not simply as a sign as that a ship, for example, hails from a certain country, but it is a symbol and as such calls forth on occasion the deepest feelings of affection and loyalty. And the sight of such flag may stimulate to deeds of valor and heroism. In like manner a religious symbol is some physical object such as a statue or picture, a cross or crucifix, a bit of sacramental bread, a time-honored formulation of belief when read or recited, even a name (like "Emmanuel") or a syllable (like "Om" of the Hindu), or some prescribed form of movement. Each of these may have a common meaning determined by the associational connections which the experience of the subject may have included. But beyond this is the religious meaning, that is, the significance of the object in the relations which have been especially established by the system of religious practices under which the individual has been trained. To the devout Christian brought up under certain teachings, the cross is a very sacred emblem and inspires deep emotion. Not so to the Hindu or the countless pagans in Christian lands. The old-fashioned Methodist may sing, "There is a fountain filled with blood, drawn from Emmanuel's veins," etc., with great emotion. Not so the liberal Unitarian who regards the atonement theory expressed in the vivid images of the old hymn with indifference, if not disdain. And as for the Hindu or

the Buddhist, the hymn could have no power over him even after he may have been converted to Christianity, since all his inherited beliefs are against the idea of blood sacrifice as purification.

Thus it appears that the symbol draws its special meaning out of the unconscious content which has been acquired by the experience of the past. It is from the great background region of the mind that the meanings emerge and the feeling is born. This is the explanation of the statement that symbols are the instruments of suggestion. In suggestion certain contents of the subconscious (or the unconscious, if you please) are brought to consciousness. But suggestion takes place only under those conditions in which the usual range of attention is greatly narrowed with the result that inhibitions normally operative are suspended. When this is the situation motor reaction is determined more or less by the situation and not by the will or conscious direction of the subject. Thus it will be seen that the symbol is such by virtue of its power of suggestion, that is to say, its power to revive meanings and to arouse emotion.

But if meanings are to be revived from time to time and brought out of the backgrounds of the mind into present consciousness, they must have been acquired and so be a part of potential memory. This is the reason why symbols have religious meaning only to those who have acquired a range of religious ideas through social contacts and generally through regular religious instruction. The Catholic Church has always stressed its own religious instruction. Without this its ritual would fail to exert the sugges-

tive power intended. All worship through ritual and symbols rests hard upon religious teaching for its power. And the teaching needs not to be true or rational. It needs only to seem to be such to the devotee and to be accepted and believed. Certain premillennialists get what is to them great meaning out of the images and symbolic figures of the book of Revelation. Failing utterly to comprehend the historical setting and apocalyptic significance of the book of Revelation, they follow a theory of inspiration which makes the symbols all refer to the present and future. They have been taught this through continual repetition in their literature. And, reading only the Bible and the premillennial literature, they draw from a mental background filled with these lurid and "prophetic" images. Under the suggestive spell of the vivid and striking imagery they read into the book the narrow theological interpretations which they have learned. The mere recital of the fearsome contents of the vials, or the description of the beast with the seven heads and the ten horns, and a crown on each horn, has the power through suggestion to produce emotional feeling.

The processes of rational judgment are in inverse ratio to the mental processes involved in suggestion. Indeed, suggestion always involves a diminution of judgment. This is illustrated by the naïve statement of Coué, the exponent of the cult of autosuggestion, that "the less intelligent are my best patients"! Had he had a better command of English, he would probably have said the "less intellectual," those whose reactions are naturally less cognitive and critical

and more emotional. On the other hand, it is equally true that the more critical thought processes and judgment attitudes diminish and often neutralize the suggestive power of symbols. There is no doubt that the Roman Catholic doctrine of the actual presence of the body of Christ in the mass when it is firmly believed, gives great suggestive power to the whole service. But to intelligent persons in their thoughtful moods such a doctrine is apt to seem unnecessarily irrational. Protestantism has rationalized the Eucharist sufficiently to make belief in its significance possible to the intelligent. But in the last analysis the power of the greatest symbol of Christianity, the Holy Communion, to arouse profound emotion is in inverse ratio to the deliberateness and critical character of the mood in which the service is approached. Having once settled for thought the question of the rationality of the whole thing, the worshiper must let go his critical moods and allow the rite to bring back the images and meanings. He must "remember the Lord," that is, allow the memory images which will be started by suggestion, to come. He must "see" the Saviour in the upper room on that last night. The ritual, whether it be simple or elaborate, can suggest also the solidarity of all Christian disciples who try to follow their Lord and seek to derive courage and moral strength for living from thinking about him. The thought of the worshiper at the communion table may go back through the ages with a sweep depending, of course, upon his historical knowledge and in the consciousness that he is at the moment united to the Divine Master in affection, and in the

realization that he is one through the ties of a common loyalty with all those who have loved and served that Master. He may experience an intensification of feeling which will be subsequently an inspiration and a moral uplift.

Without the symbol, religious experience would be quite impossible—indeed, this is true of the higher aspects of all experience, for religion has to do fundamentally with transcendent realities. It is not the business of a psychologist in the field of religion to try to validate these, but it is his business to offer an interpretation of all that follows in the way of faith in these realities. The "things that are seen are temporal while the things that are not seen are eternal," to quote the great apostle's words. If, therefore, the "eternal things" are to be real, it must be through those mediating instruments, the symbols —those objects of sense through which the richest treasures of experience are made available.

CHAPTER XI

RELIGIOUS MYSTICISM

THE word "mystical" has been used with such a wide range of meaning and so predominantly in relation to the abnormal, not to say pathological, that it is not in any too good repute with some respectable thinkers. But in spite of this I venture the statement that a certain touch of mysticism is necessary not only to the vitality of religious experience but with many, even to the existence of religious experience. There are without doubt those who, if they spoke frankly of their inner life, would have to say in the words of a friend of mine, "What religious experience I have is simply a dogged fidelity to the ideals which have grown out of my rational thinking. God is, of course, the greatest of these ideals." That this may be the background of a life pure and true and abounding in good works no one would deny. But that there is a type of experience warmer and richer than this is well known by those who have had it.

Nature of Religious Mysticism. The question as to the nature of religious mysticism should be approached by an attempt first of all to note the facts. What type of facts, or, more exactly, what type of convictions and affirmations on the part of religious persons are to be included within the class of experiences named mystical? In the most general sense the mystical type of religious experience is that in which the subject believes he is in immediate touch with the Divine.

The touch may mean a sense of spiritual nearness and hence communion or fellowship, or it may be a conviction growing out of one's experience that divine influences are immediately felt and divine resources are directly available.

In its ruder forms are found those manifestations of primitive emotion which characterize the behavior of the Shaman. Here the devotee usually follows a traditional method of stimulating and working up his feelings until he reaches a mental condition quite abnormal. Then his excited and half-incoherent utterances were believed to be inspired and highly significant. Such were the Pythian priestesses at Delphi. Such also were the early prophets in Israel, those roaming bands of raving enthusiasts of the early days of the monarchy who disappeared as the prophets became real religious teachers and leaders. Such have been and still are the enthusiasts of the Dervish sects in Mohammedanism and the devotees of the Yoga practices in Hinduism.

Less crude and revolting are the Christian mystics who, through self-imposed privations and even sufferings, bring themselves to the physical and mental condition where they affirm a direct and overwhelming consciousness of the Divine Presence. Usually along with the self-discipline, whatever it may be, is joined meditation or contemplation. When contemplation means fixing the attention for prolonged periods upon God, or Christ, especially when the subject is under suppressed emotional tension, it lends itself more or less easily to visions and voices. That these may be of the nature of hallucination is evident. And by hallucination is meant images attended by the reality-

feeling and to which there is nothing in the material surroundings to correspond.

But there is still another type of religious experience, lacking in these more obvious supernatural features, which nevertheless must be classed as mystical. I refer to those experiences where persons believe they (1) have a "sense of God's presence" or "enjoy fellowship with God"; or (2) where they attribute to divine agency some events or outcomes in their own lives. This divine agency is thought of in more or less natural fashion, as when a young man said, "I did not want to devote myself to the ministry at all, but God gave me a definite call and I felt I must obey." Here the person recognized that he was obeying a strong conviction of his own but which grew in his mind because of the direct influence of God. At this higher level mystical religious experience rests upon the implication of the possibility of direct personal influence of God (and in Christianity of Christ) upon human persons. As we are interested primarily in the forms of religious experience found in Christianity, it will be in order to point out that the New Testament records of Christ a remarkable power of personal influence. There were those upon whom Christ exerted so powerful an influence that like the Galilæan brothers, or Matthew, they were willing to leave their business and become his disciples. Others like Zacchæus, the woman at the well, or the dying thief found in personal contact with him new capacities for responding to righteousness and truth. And the records of early Christian experience are quite conclusive that this power of Christ to exert a strong personal influence upon those

who loved him did not cease with his death. In the writings of John and Paul we find a distinct mysticism, that is, a conviction and clear affirmation that Christ was "with them" and "in them" and through his strength and fellowship with them new powers and insights were gained. Much of the earliest Christian teaching was in this sense mystical rather than rational. It used such ideas as the spiritual unity of Christ with the believer, the indwelling "Spirit of Christ," "Christ in me," great augmenting of personal resources "through him who strengtheneth me." Here are the high levels of mystical experience.

Mysticism, therefore, is a type of experience in which the characteristic feature is *immediacy.* In philosophy it has been applied to certain ways of approaching the problem of truth and knowledge. That there is an element of immediacy in all apprehension of the truth every experienced thinker well knows, but the term "mysticism" has been reserved for such systems as distinctly recognize feeling and sometimes give it the preference over the beaten pathways to truth which formal rational reflection and traditional logic have marked out. In art and its philosophy æsthetics, the approved way to reality is through *immediate apprehension.* Beauty is the supreme ideal in art, and Beauty is grasped and appreciated through the immediate processes of mind. Here again the predominant mental activity seems to be feeling rather than logic or reason. A golden sunset is beautiful in its own right, and its beauty must be *immediately* apprehended. To attempt to convince an onlooker by argument that the play of gorgeous

colors in the western sky is beautiful or to *explain* why the sunset is beautiful is to miss the nature of beauty and to fail to understand how beauty is apprehended. In religion this same element of immediacy remains predominant. Mysticism does not rely upon logical arguments for the existence of God but professes to know God because responses are received from him, and because his spiritual nearness becomes a matter of immediate consciousness.

Can Mystical Experience Be Analyzed? In religious experience of the mystical sort the worshiper is conscious of God. The immediateness of apprehension and the certainty of response which the worshiper affirms indicate that the personality of God is taken at full value as a practically realized truth, not simply as a necessary concept in a rational thought-system. Indeed, personality finds its fullest meaning in the capacity for fellowship, for here is where self-consciousness and self-control come to their finest flower. But can this high form of personal consciousness be investigated with the tools of a psychological analysis? The right of analysis to deal with this type of experience has often been called into question. Mystical experiences, we are told, are of such nature that they cannot be described in the ordinary formulas of analysis nor interpreted from the outside. James speaks of "ineffability" and "noetic quality" as the two most characteristic qualities of mystical experience. Ineffability refers to the quality affirmed by many of the mystics that their experiences cannot be adequately described in words. "No one can make clear to another who has never had a certain feeling, in what the quality or worth of it consists. One must

have musical ears to know the value of a symphony; one must have been in love oneself to understand a lover's state of mind."[1] The "noetic" quality refers to the knowledge-like certainty these experiences bring with them. Mystics have shown practical agreement in insisting that their consciousness of God is not mediated through ideas, but is direct. Consequently, many of them have protested that no analysis or interpretation by those who have not themselves known the experience is of value. There doubtless is some element of truth in this contention, but unless these experiences are to be regarded as entirely out of relation to the rest of experience, there must be in them certain elements of universality, or at least the "common-to-many" quality which makes it possible to apply to them some principles of analysis and interpretation. And nothing can prevent the demand that mystical experiences, like all others, shall be judged and evaluated ultimately on the basis of their moral worth. Besides, there have been mystics like Augustine who have not hesitated to analyze and interpret in writing of their own experiences. We conclude, then, that the claim sometimes urged that the reason has no jurisdiction over mystical experiences cannot be allowed. Certain facts can be gained through analysis, as in the case of other experiences which we have tried to analyze. I believe, however, that our most fruitful analysis and most adequate interpretations come from those who, besides being well equipped to analyze, have themselves *known* in their own experience something of mystical certainty.

[1] James: *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 380.

Psychological Treatment of Mysticism. The psychological approach to religious mysticism assumes a certain continuity and identity in all mystical experience, whether in ancient Hebrew prophet, Brahman ascetic, Mohammedan Sufi, or Christian believer. That a certain continuity does appear when the analysis emphasizes structure must be acknowledged. From this point of view there is, as Coe maintains,[2] "an unbroken continuity from the low forms of shamanism to the heights of religious rapture." But analysis which stresses function where function must mean value, discloses significant differences as well as identities—and the differences show up as new inserts —really new elements in the experience series as the development proceeds from the low to the higher level. "Low" and "high" refer, as we shall see presently, to relative moral worth. The traditional treatment of mysticism in psychology of religion has been confined almost wholly to the more extraordinary and extreme forms of the experience. In the customary analysis the usual procedure has been to apply a few formulas to the various types of mystical experience with about the same outcome in each case. The heightened neural tension and variously manifested emotion are duly noted, together with the agencies employed for inducing the mystical states. The reason for this attention exclusively to the more unusual and extreme forms of mysticism is the same as in the treatment of conversion—the extraordinary experience affords possibility of more striking analysis and seems to stand in greater need of explanation. But just as it is the few and not the many who are

[2] Coe: *Psychology of Religion*, p. 265, fol.

converted in the crisis fashion, so it is the few who have had and still have the extraordinary forms of mystical experience. When we say "the mystics" we mean those who have had extreme forms of religious experience. Such names as Paul, John, Francis of Assisi, Theresa, John of the Cross, Bernard of Clairvaux come to mind. But ecstasy and visions are not all there is to mystical experience. There are mystics in the church to-day—in great numbers. Indeed, the worship of the church, I believe, could not long remain a thing of vital value without those to whom the presence of God is at times a real experience. With these considerations in mind let us turn to a simple analysis.

When we ask concerning the sources of the rude primitive mysticism of the Shamanistic sort, the facts and their relation are soon plain. Intoxication or the narcotic effects of drugs are the causes of the physical condition which induces the abnormal mental states. Where this is not the case the methods used are those which we now clearly recognize as autohypnosis. Hypnosis and the suppression of various complexes enables us to understand much in the mental states of the mystic who passes from prolonged contemplation to the happiness of ecstasy. Here, as in the ruder shamanistic forms, the mystical experience reveals a distinct type of temperament—the "psychic" or "psychopathic"—and also a favoring situation for that type of response.

But the simpler type of mysticism, where one has the conviction that he enters into some kind of fellowship with God and becomes conscious of God's presence and love, does not seem to require either a

psychopathic temperament or a special favoring environment, since men and women of all sorts and in all conditions and circumstances have held firmly to it. It is this latter form of experience to which I propose to confine the bulk of the discussion. Shamanistic and psychic mysticism have been fully treated by psychologists and when one learns something of the theories of the subconscious and the formulas of psychoanalysis, it is not hard to explain the more abnormal types of experience, at least to our own satisfaction. The simpler and higher type, while it shows some features here and there which might justify the rather sweeping classifications which psychologists are wont to make, nevertheless justifies the denial that psychopathic temperament or special conditions are the necessary presuppositions for an adequate analysis and interpretation.

Let us take now the experience of a religious man who believes profoundly in God, who is trying honestly to love and serve God, and who is convinced that at certain times and places in his life God was with him and gave him help to face crises and to perform difficult tasks. So far as the "conscious of the Divine Presence" is concerned, when the experience is occurring, that would be manifested through a heightening of emotional feeling. Now, we can understand how such heightened feeling takes place when one stands in the presence of physical objects which have power to stimulate it. Thus one speaks of having had an overwhelming sense of the divine power and Presence when he gazed for the first time at Niagara from beneath the falls, or at the sunrise from an Alpine mountain peak. The psalmist looked up into the

glory of a Syrian night and felt that "the heavens declare the glory of God." Here it is evident that the whole situation calls forth a highly emotionalized response. And this response is at once linked up associationally with the content of a more fully developed idea of God. He is a God of infinite power, hence a magnificent exhibition of power in nature not only calls forth admiration and awe but it evokes also those complex emotional sentiments which our training has led us habitually to feel in connection with the greatest idea of our mental life—the idea of God.

But what shall be said in explanation of those experiences where no extraordinary physical stimulus of an external sort is present? Doubtless we shall need to affirm the presence of some stimulus, for the "stimulus-reaction" formula is quite fundamental to our thinking in the field of psychology. Let us keep in mind as typical the case of the man who believes profoundly in God, who has prayed earnestly for help, and is thoroughly convinced that strength and courage came in such measure that his own resources were supplemented by strength beyond his own—that God increased his strength. Now, if psychology of religion deals with religious experience, analyzing not only in terms of structure but of value and meaning, some answer ought to be possible to the question whether God is a factor in the experience or not. Thus far the answer has been (by implication) No. Behaviorists will not allow that the self is a factor, to say nothing of God.

Now, we are assured that it is not the task of the psychologist in religion to deal with the causes be-

hind experience. We must be content to analyze mental states and processes, abjuring all causal formulas. But functionalism is not content to do this but constantly invokes nerve processes as explanations of mental states. And it is just as true that a psychology of persons which tries to deal with Christian experience of the sort we are discussing cannot remain content to ignore the causal formulas either. And the reason has been pointed out before. Analysis which nets an outcome of any value for understanding religious experience must include more than a dissecting out of the structural elements. It must include a recognition of meanings and values. And the meaning and value of a simple normal mystical experience such as we are considering depends upon the way the experience is related to a Reality beyond itself. Psychology has never been content to shut itself up to purely subjective aspects of mental experience. Psychology in explaining perception does not concern itself with validating a world of real objects from which the stimuli come. But it certainly does not refuse to assume the existence of such a world. To deny the possibility of divine agency reduces religious experience to various forms of auto and group suggestion, with nothing more to be said because to say anything more would be to bring in the "transcendent," or the superorganic. To shut out the transcendent and then go ahead with an analysis is openly or by implication to reduce religious experience (and, indeed, all experience of a higher sort) to a function of the organism. We take the position that we may affirm God as a factor in religious experience, just as we affirm a world of real

things in perception, leaving to the philosophy of religion the important task of expounding and validating the full content of the idea of God. Any psychology of religion does indeed have its limitations, but they will not be of such a character as to shut it up to a mere analysis in terms of organic process and function.

Returning now to the question, Did the man who prayed and said he was greatly strengthened receive anything from outside himself, his own resources? How shall we know just what his resources are? Do they not vary from time to time? After he prayed may they not have increased? If so, did the prayer increase them; that is, did *he* increase them as he prayed? This leads us to the answers which may be given as to how the man was helped: First, the help was essentially organic. As the prayer progressed there was an intensification of the emotions. This made greater effort possible, seeming to increase strength, for it is a familiar fact that emotions react upon organism, increasing muscular effort. This is due to certain glands pouring their secretions into the blood in excess of that secreted under the usual quiet mental condition. This enables muscles to contract with unusual power. But does the increased gland activity produce (equals cause) the emotion or is the emotion productive of the increased gland activity? Is not contact of person with person in ordinary human relations often accompanied by heightened emotion, as when an athlete "does his best" because of the presence and encouraging applause of the spectators; or the musician who "excels himself" or the speaker who "rises to the occasion" in the face of a

friendly audience? Does not this seem to mean that contact of personality with personality in some way favors the conditions which tend to augment one's capacities? This may be through the drawing out of powers which otherwise would remain unrevealed. But are capacities which remain latent and unrevealed really "ours"?[3] This brings us to the second answer as to how the man was helped when he prayed.

Secondly, he helped himself, but being a religious man, he devoutedly believed that it was God who helped him. If we were to ask him about it, he would tell us he did not help himself, for he could not; that he prayed when he felt himself quite at the end of his own strength and as he prayed there came a strange, almost wonderful increase in his fortitude and courage of spirit which brought him through the severe experience. Shall we take his own belief that the increased resources were not his own? Had we not better seek the explanation in some obscure organic processes not yet well understood like those of the subconscious? But here, again, we face the difficulty we have met before. If the "subconscious" is only the more obscure parts of the nervous system—the autonomic, perhaps—we are not much better off. For all the objections we found to considering the cerebro-spinal nervous system a cause of mental process, applies to the autonomic or to any view of the subconscious which makes it essentially organic. But if the subconscious be the subattentive part of the con-

[3] We must think steadily enough to see that we cannot assign the heightened nerve tension as the cause of increased power unless we recognize that it is only an immediate cause which itself needs to be explained. Nor can we assign gland activity, in unusual measure, at the particular time.

sciousness of the self, we are not much better off. For granted that there may be resources "potential" or "latent" lying beneath the conscious life, how are they brought into play and made available at just the time when they were so sorely needed? Volition cannot explain it, for volition is a highly conscious process and has no jurisdiction, we are assured, over the subconscious. The situation is not better when we try to conceive the subconscious in the popular "dual personality" formulas or in the theory of latent libido, or suppressed complexes of various sorts.

But there is a third answer possible. It is the answer which seems most natural and illuminating to religious faith. It is the answer the man who prayed and received help usually insists on giving. God helped! Now I realize it is a serious matter to talk like this in psychology of religion! One certainly ought to think carefully before he ventures to bring God into psychological discussions of religious experience! Our contention is that when one really does think carefully and goes the whole way of thinking, he will find it difficult *not* to bring God in, when a really religious experience (not merely an organic reaction) is under discussion.

This, then, is the third answer, namely, to leave the way open for thought to pass beyond the boundaries of a traditional psychological analysis and say that God is the source of those heightened emotions and deepened insights which are the characteristic features of the divine help men believe they receive in religious experience. Evidence for this? None except such as is offered for the "fact" of the subconscious or the polarity of the electron—it explains the

facts well. Here is faith, to be sure, but all religious experience is in the end faith.[4]

Summing up, let us suggest that when one prays and then has an experience of "God's nearness" or "God's help," in the absence of sensory stimuli, the stimuli for the heightened emotions are centrally aroused, that is from within the organism. The biologist might urge right here that some gland was functioning abnormally, hence the great emotional uplift. But why did the gland or any other parts of the organism (whose activity was the immediate occasion of the heightened emotion) function unusually, producing at that time deep emotional feeling? And the answer could be that the cause of such functioning was mental, not organic. For it is quite as true that mind has the power to affect organism, as that organism affects mind. One must at this point choose between making the functioning of organism an adequate cause or resting in the conviction that the cause is "transcendent"—where transcendent means beyond the sphere of sense experience and organic reaction. And if the source of the organic process be looked for in ideas or other content of consciousness or in will, the subject of the experience will deny that he had such conscious experiences, and he is the court of last resort on the contents of his own consciousness. This seems to throw us back on the subconscious with

[4] The objection may be made that we here pass beyond the domain of psychology. It is true that the traditional limits of method in psychology of religion would confine us to an analysis of mental states and processes, yet it is doubtful when psychology deals with religious experience whether it should remain content merely to do this. The reason has been pointed out before. Analysis which is to increase understanding of religious experience must include something more than a dissecting out of structural elements. It should include a recognition of meanings. This is the sense of the word "function" in psychology of religion. And the meaning and value of an experience depends upon the way the subject believes the experience corresponds to or rests upon an objective reality. God, in whom the subject of a religious experience believes, must be real when the subject makes the evaluation. We leave to philosophy of religion the task of validating the idea of God and its content.

little chance to find an adequate source of the increased resources at the time since to think of possible resources latent in the subconscious is by no means to explain actual resources in experience.

Mystical Elements in Prayer. Prayer attains its full value only when it becomes a mystical experience. We often pray from habit and from a sense of duty. There is not apt to be much consciousness of the presence and spiritual nearness of God in such prayer. Then, again, we feel our poverty and follow the impulse to ask God for things we need. We may also wish to express feelings of gratitude. On the whole, the conditions under which we often pray are much like those under which we send a telegram. We have confidence there is someone at the other end of the line, or we should not send the message at all. We may even believe that some kind of a response will be forthcoming. Without responses we would not *continue* the sending of messages. But there is no particular consciousness of the reality or nearness of him to whom with due propriety we address our prayers.

But with some there come these other experiences when we enter most deeply into the experience of prayer. We not only believe that God exists but have a confidence that he is spiritually near us—with us. On subsequent analysis the experience does seem to be one of predominantly emotional character. The "uplift" was clearly intense feeling. But after the experience is over (and this is the important matter), we find that something has remained—some fresh insight, courage or comfort, some new way of directing our energy for worthy ends. The "uplift" as mere

emotional reaction is gone, but we are conscious of being left on a distinctly higher level than we were before we prayed.

Without something like this, I am afraid the belief of some in the reality of religious experiences would be sooner or later undermined by rational thinking. We are mystics to a certain degree when we have had an experience like that, and believe in its reality because we know that it has meaning and value. I suppose that, properly speaking, mystics are those to whom such experiences come not once or twice a year or a lifetime but with frequency. Be that as it may, some of us know that one such experience is like a green oasis in the desert—it gives the traveler refreshment and strength for many miles of weary sand.

Meaning of Normal Experience. We have used the words "normal" and "abnormal." Probably some distinction in their meaning would make for clearness. It is undoubtedly fallacious to take normal to mean "average" (or "usual") and abnormal to mean "unusual." An *unusual* experience (in the sense of not being common) may still be quite normal. A normal experience is one which, while it may be common to relatively few (as compared with the great mass of men) yet preserves social and moral value. In other words, so long as the experience does not interfere with a person's meeting the regular relations of life, as relative, neighbor, friend, citizen, etc., so long as it does not incapacitate a person from fulfilling his common social obligations, the experience is normal. An abnormal person departs from standards to the degree that his value as a member of the social order

is distinctly diminished. Thus, if a man's mystical experiences incapacitate him for his daily task, make him neglect or forget his social obligations, or his daily business, destroy his abilities as leader, thinker, etc., we may be sure his experiences are abnormal.

Is There a Mystic Sense or Faculty? A study of mystical experiences of the highly emotionalized type—ecstasy, visions, orison, etc., will probably lead to the conclusion that these extraordinary experiences are the result of individual temperament and social inheritance. But it may be asked whether the experience of immediate consciousness of God is for the few —one here and there, or is it in some measure possible to all? If so, under what circumstances is it possible or probable? In other words, what conditions are favorable to the mystical experience and what tends to prevent it?

The older writers on mysticism used to affirm a special mystical "sense" or "faculty." It is hardly necessary to say that modern psychology cannot allow this. With the end of the old style "faculty psychology," explaining mental facts by referring them to special powers of the soul, became obsolete. But, shall we say, then, that mystical experiences are possible to all? The data from testimony seem to point to the conclusion that even if mystical experience is *possible* to all, it is not attained by all. This question of the possibility of these experiences, and the conditions under which they are realized, will be answered as we go on to inquire concerning the nature of mystical insight and the tests of validity.

Mysticism as Explained by Social Psychology. In attempting to explain mystical experience, the social

psychologist may urge that through long generations of social inheritance men have come to believe in the possibility of a direct apprehension of the Divine. Along with this there has also been handed down a body of doctrine corresponding to this belief, and a system of discipline more or less elaborate by which mystical experiences could be produced.

That mystical experience depends upon social inheritance, and that there is a discipline the observance of which makes mystical experiences far more probable is not to be denied. But what social psychology urges is very far from being an adequate explanation of mysticism—either its origin or its continuation—while the mystic certainty and the value of his experience are not touched at all by the sociological explanation.

There are countless thousands who believe very firmly that prayers are answered. They will tell us that responses have come from God when they have prayed. How, now, account *not for the formation of the habit* but for its continuance by men and women who live on a high moral and spiritual level, except by the fact that these believed that they continued to receive responses from God when they prayed? Do men continue to believe in things which experience proves in the long run to have no value? Do men continue to obey customs and keep up habits which they come to think are not worth while? The history of ethics answers this question. For we find that customs and habits which fail to find practical justification tend to drop away. While it may have its exceptions this is a recognized principle in moral evolution. Even though custom begins on the pre-

moral plane of social imitation and group compulsion, the time comes when a particular custom, if it be a matter of importance, must be justified by the growing judgment of the individual, or the custom does not usually survive. And this justification is not always a process of rational reflection, but is often the "broader logic of experience"—the emerging of practical values. We conclude, then, that the social-psychological formulas do not account for prayer and other mystical experiences.

Mysticism and Anæsthesia. But there is another alleged source of mystical experience which must be noted briefly. It is the explanation sometimes offered by the physiologist and depends upon the well-recognized power of certain drugs to stimulate nerve processes with what appears to be at the time a wonderful augmenting, not only of exalted feeling but of mental insight. Certain powerful narcotic and anæsthetic preparations such as hasheesh, nitrous oxide, etc., are said to bring on with some persons experiences of a mystical sort. James, in *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* says that when nitrous oxide is mixed with an appropriate quantity of air and inhaled "depth beyond depth of truth seems revealed to the inhaler." But why has nitrous oxide not figured in religious and educational efforts, as it has in dentistry? Professor James says of nitrous oxide "it stimulates the mystic consciousness to an extraordinary degree." If this is true—"mystical consciousness stimulated," "depths of truth revealed"—why not have cylinders of this wonderful gas on hand at evangelistic campaigns, or say at church conventions, where an increase of insight might not be out of

place! Why is it that the anæsthetic revelation has not become established as an aid to moral insight and persisted as the habit of prayer has done? Why have not the devotees of narcotics become recognized as leaders in thought? Why? Professor James himself gives the reason. The great convictions of truth which the nitrous oxide trance may afford begin to fade away as soon as the subject commences to come to, and return again to the world of normal conscious relations.

Now, if that were the case with the insight men say they gain through prayer, how long would prayer survive? Not long, for it would never have become deep rooted at all. It is just because a genuine mystical experience does *not* evaporate and leave nothing behind, that mystical experience persists, and becomes a very important aspect of religious experience.

Meaning and Implications of Immediateness. In mystical experience what is it that is immediate? The first answer which comes is, "It is the mystic consciousness of God." But what is the form of this consciousness? Is it knowledge? Or is it belief? We have already seen that while logic may make a considerable difference between knowledge and belief, psychology cannot make such difference. Psychologically it is all a matter of the degree of certainty. For one whose mental habits are altogether those of logical process such certainty as is gained comes through rational thought. Here the forms and formulas of logic are authoritative, and we may at times believe that they alone are authoritative. This is the rationalistic mood. When it becomes habitual it is

the rationalistic temperament. It is the dominating mental process with those who seek certainty in science, philosophy, and certain types of theology.

But there are seekers after truth and reality besides those whose quest is scientific. And it is a fact that these also affirm that they attain the heights of certainty. The thoroughgoing rationalist may wonder how the poet can be certain about anything. He may doubt the certainty of the artist and lover of beauty. In short, the disciples of induction and deduction may deny by implication or direct affirmation that certainty can exist in the experience of anyone who does not employ their formulas of rational analysis and synthesis. They may speak of "intuition" with impatience or of "poetic insight" with a patronizing smile.

But, in spite of the doubtings of those whose mental habits are wholly of the rationalized type, it would seem to be an indefensible dogmatism to say that there is only one path to the heights of certainty. Of course there is the regular route which leads through description, classification, analysis, and synthesis and explanation (which in the end is only classification). This is the main road—the highway of rational thinking. It is a good road, surveyed, graded and safeguarded by the masters of logic from Aristotle to John Stuart Mill. Many there be who climb by this road to the heights of certainty, from which they hope the whole landscape of truth may be clearly discerned. But when the heights of rational certainty are reached after much arduous climbing it is discovered that the view is far less extensive than was anticipated. While some truth seems clearly spread out

before the mind's vision, other truths—the truths for which men have always been most eager, are not discerned. Here some degree of mathematical certainty is gained; here also much truth concerning the universe and the world of inorganic existence and organic life—vast areas rich and splendid. But sooner or later we discover that certainty regarding God, and a world of spiritual values, certainty regarding the greatest matters of life and destiny is not gained on the heights reached by the road of rational thinking.

But from the days of Plato on, the master thinkers have been telling us of another road not so broad or well graded. It leads to other heights of certainty. It has been traveled by many, and by all classes. Here are the prophets and seers, the poets and creative artists, the lovers of their fellow men and of God. Here also are the adventurers and pioneers in science, many of whom have made the greatest discoveries. Philosophers too who have explored the logical heights and are disappointed have turned their vision beyond. And here have gone up that great company of those in every age who have hungered for God and sought his fellowship.

And now, leaving our figurative speech, let us remind ourselves that there are two aspects of the knowing process. And this really means, as we shall see, two kinds of rationality. And the knowing process here must mean the process of gaining assurance and certainty about the world of reality.

First, there is certainty coming from insight of a direct and immediate kind.

Second, there is certainty, mediated through ideas

—ideas are symbols summing up in their meanings broad areas of past experience. This is, I think, not only the order of their importance, but also the order of their temporal sequence in the unfolding of experience.

One morning in August years ago I saw the sunrise from an Alpine peak thirteen thousand feet up. We had climbed the mountain the day before and spent the night in a little building on the summit in order to have that hour's experience. The play of colors on the snow-clad peaks and ranges, the iridescent pearly light on the clouds and fogbanks as they rose out of the valleys, the indescribable glory of it, made it one of the great experiences of a lifetime. I came down the mountain with the conviction that I had had a fresh revelation of the Eternal.

Intense emotional reactions, you suggest. Yes, but do you think you can *explain* my experience? How will you do it, with ideas and concepts from your *old* experience? Do you think you can *know* my experience on that never-to-be-forgotten morning? I am quite sure I cannot convey to you any of the certainties which were mine. If I were to try, what could I use? Only words, the names or labels of ideas. I should have to try to give you a knowledge mediated through ideas, which in this case is clearly impossible. All I could hope to do would be so to stimulate your imagination and feeling in order that some experience *you had had* like mine could be in a measure reinstated. But no ideas or symbols of the real, used in a verbal description, could arouse an old experience of yours and give you any knowledge of *my* experience, unless you too had come directly and immedi-

ately into touch with Eternal Beauty. If you had never had any such experience, you could only wonder what it might be like; you could not really *know*.

It is quite true that when we travel the mental highway known as rational analysis and synthesis for a long time, we are apt to think there is no other way to certainty. Then the more direct approach to reality becomes increasingly difficult and sometimes almost impossible. Predominating moods when long continued become temperament. This is doubtless why there is such a lack of understanding of the poets and artists on the part of men whose approach to truth is scientific. The student of science (and of philosophy too) may well-nigh incapacitate himself for clear and vivid imagery and for rich and intense emotional feeling by a too exclusive devotion to rational analysis. The tendency is without doubt toward an inverse ratio between the immediate revelations which come from reactions of the whole personality and the more delayed outcomes of rational thinking with its instruments of analysis and critical judgment. But while this inverse ratio is usual, it is by no means inevitable. For when a balance is struck between rational reflection and feeling with ample endowment on both sides, the result is an experience of reality far more rich and satisfying than could come by way of the rational process.

All that has been said in regard to the immediate certainties in experience, as we seek to know reality through the appreciation of beauty, is equally to the point when we consider the hunger of the human self to know God. And in answer to the age-long question, How can we know God? religious mysticism an-

swers, *We know God as we learn to love God and trust God.*

The Sense of God's Presence. It is difficult to hold that the experience of immediate consciousness of God, so universally affirmed by the mystics, can be in any way *perceptive.* For in spite of the belief of some realists in a kind of core, or substratum, of reality which is supposed to lie back of the sense qualities of things and in some way affect our sensibilities, neither psychology, theory of knowledge, nor sound metaphysics can justify such an idea. It is at best an hypothetical construction of a very "unreal" sort considering it is made in the interests of realism. If we are going to have super-empirical reality, let us go the rest of the way and make the reality genuinely spiritual and personal. We shall not, then, need sensory data of any sort as the basis for the "consciousness of presence." All we shall need is the belief that God can in some way make his presence felt. Experience must decide how we shall best think of this, for there is no reason to exclude even affection of sensibilities if the data were verifiable. Any theory of the affection of senses by supersensuous reality, however, will have the greatest difficulty in maintaining itself, in the face of all that psychology has discovered concerning the nature of illusion and hallucination. It will be hard, I believe, for the student of psychology to believe that God makes his presence known by way of any sensory reactions. But we do not have to think in terms of sensory reaction. All we need to do is to feel satisfied that in some way the whole of the conscious self, under certain conditions, may respond to supersensory influences. I

realize that any theory here leans hard upon the transcendent, and in just that degree may be pronounced "unscientific." But this should not dismay us, for, after all, it is just as unscientific to affirm the existence of God as a real Being of transcendent power and goodness. Yet how is religious experience ever to sustain itself without such affirmation? Here we face the dilemma of "scientific religion" and the embarrassments of a scientific treatment of religious experience.

The immediate consciousness of Truth and Reality has been known by various names and phrases. In philosophy it is known as intuition, in religion it is called Faith, the "Inner Light," the Higher Reason, the "Vision of the Soul," etc. It is a type of experience with which some psychologists to-day confess they are wholly unable to deal. It postulates a realm of the spirit, it speaks of a "light which has not shone on sea or land." Like empiricism, its appeal is always to experience, but experience means far more than data from the sensory processes. Mysticism therefore cannot do what some have foolishly demanded that it do, submit itself to laboratory tests. But for all that, mysticism must acknowledge reason in its proper place.

One who has had a mystical experience may say: "The feelings of certainty which come to me at times when I seek the presence of God are stronger than the feelings of certainty which come as the result of my rational reflection upon the nature of God, and the grounds in reason for his existence. For me, therefore, the direct consciousness of God and the responses I believe I receive from God are by that

much superior to reason's findings. I know that *logically* truth is gained through ideas and the consciousness of their relation; but for me there is an awareness of God which comes without the necessary mediation of ideas." This is the experience not of a few choice spirits here and there, but of a great many men and women who have learned to love and trust God. And these are not those whose religious experience is extraordinary with visions and ecstasies, but whose faith in God is simple but profound.

Immediateness and Reason. In spite of the protests of some mystics, mystical experience needs the steadying power of reason. For without reason there is nothing by which we can form judgments of valuation. The judgment is a very fundamental and elementary factor of all experience, and the demand for some kind of a standard of worth cannot be avoided. There is a good deal in mystical literature which amounts to a sharp antithesis between insight and reason. One prominent defender of immediate insight assures us that to demand rational consistency and continuity in experience is to bow before the idols of intellect to which the true mystic has ceased to do homage. It is not our affair, we are told, to inquire how one experience harmonizes with one that has preceded it. We should live "moment by moment" free from the "dead hand of the past." Each spiritual experience, we are told, is a whole. When we live in a present which is freed from the domination of the past—then, and then only, do we begin to live an "eternal life, for each moment then becomes a part not merely of time but of eternity." If the soul would live always in the immediate consciousness of God,

we must cease striving to make our present logically consistent with our past. The plan of the whole is with God, not with us. We are to "trust and obey"; "moment by moment we are kept in his love"; "moment by moment we have power from above." This doctrine has been taken in strict literalness by some. They have said that when messages from God bid us do what might seem inconsistent with right and duty as we have hitherto understood them, the doctrine of immediacy in the divine guidance of conduct bids us go right on *in faith,* for faith, they urge, does not need to ask the way of reason.

There has been a considerable literature of a semi-devotional character in which this conception of immediacy in religious experience has been commended to those who would live on the higher levels of Christian discipleship. Christ has been set forth as the example. He never argued nor reasoned, but seems always to have acted by the light which came from an immediate consciousness of God.

But what is this? The student of philosophy recognizes it in all its pious dress as a form of absolutism, in which the moral freedom of the finite agent is ignored and personality violated. Character is not built in that way. Reason in the form of the moral judgment cannot be given up in favor of some supposed direct insight immediately and divinely inspired, without a sacrifice of all that ethics has won and holds of priceless value. To do this is to dismember the personal self, which, when normal and complete, always includes reason. To turn the back upon reason in the interests of a supposedly higher insight of the soul is quite the same as to turn the back on

feeling, demanding as some have, that all be determined by the laws of logic. Against this the mystic enters a protest, and the protest is justified. But the ignoring of reason is no whit less one-sided.

Then, too, this idea of an immediate divine guidance which needs no word of reason reduces conduct to a deterministic plane. Conduct supposed to be dictated by the Divine Will may be in reality dictated from a very different source. Here, as in all absolutist conceptions, we have a view which tends to make God the author of a great deal of unwisdom, not to say positive imbecility. The "trust-and-obey" formula may develop into a demand that one surrender the last vestige of his moral freedom. It must have been in an evangelistic meeting where doctrine of this sort had been preached that a young man who had come to the altar was told he must give himself up wholly to God's direction. He was assured he must have no will of his own, only God's will—he must do without a murmur whatever God told him to do. At last the victory came and he rose with others to add his testimony, which was that he was ready to do anything God told him to—*provided it was honorable!* In this unlooked-for reservation he was simply refusing to surrender his power of moral judgment.

It is hard to account for such a one-sided view as this repudiating of the moral judgment. It has probably arisen as a protest against an officious and arrogant rationalism. The history of mysticism shows that whenever theological dogmatism threatened the spiritual life of the church, there have arisen those who in their opposition to the formulations of intellect have seemed to reject reason altogether. But

nevertheless it is reason which stands between a mysticism which lends warmth and vitality to religion, and an extravagance of mystical feeling which will lead religion into the morasses of fanaticism. As Mrs. Herman well says in an excellent discussion of this point, "A deintellectualized mysticism is not merely powerless to influence the world's thought; it is also spiritually depleted. As in the gospel story, the reasoning mind and the burning heart go together; and a mysticism which lacks intellectual virility will sooner or later be smitten with spiritual impotence."[5]

Immediate Experience Involves the Whole Self. There is, as we have seen, an element of immediacy in all experience, not only in that which we call mystical. And religious experience, in which God is not only an object of thought but also an object of worship and love, involves the feelings to a large degree. The times when religious experience comes thus to its full possibilities are, in the phrase of Hocking, the "moments of greater mental integrity than usual." In other words, the experience involves not simply what philosophers have called the intellect but also the feelings, that is, the whole self. We have seen how consciousness of beauty is not the result of rational processes of thought but of an immediate consciousness. The deeper apprehensions of truth are often of the same sort. What is called "intuition" seems to involve a large measure of this feeling-consciousness. And yet, no valuation of the feeling of the moment is possible except as reason asserts itself in the formation of subsequent judgments. Thus, while experience as an organized whole is woven out of

[5] Herman: *The Meaning and Value of Mysticism*, p. 266.

particular experiences whose most striking characteristic is their immediacy, nevertheless the warp must be there in the continuous supporting threads of a rational connection. These particular experiences which seem so direct, immediate, and convincing are in themselves timeless; that is, they are not, when they occur, recognized as following other experiences which preceded them, nor as being succeeded by subsequent experiences. Time is a fundamental rational principle in accordance with which we relate our experiences in a series or sequence. This relating though unconscious is a rational process. Immediate experiences are timeless, but they cannot remain so, for self-consciousness means the organization into a rational unity of our whole conscious life. Continuity and coherence are therefore necessary if any particular mental occurrence is to find a place in the whole, and be recognized as real. Unless one is to live merely from moment to moment, supported on a sea of feeling, and letting the existing emotion satisfy and be all, there must be a relating of the present with the past. Thus the underlying rational principles by which all thought is governed are absolutely necessary to fix the passing experience, even though it be immediate, with the stamp of a permanent value, and to give it a place in the connected whole of experience. To deny the authority of reason in the supposed interests of immediacy is to reduce spiritual experience to the low level of living by mere feeling from "moment to moment." Even the misguided exponents of this false immediacy do not do this, for if they did they would vacate moral judgment and render their actions also immediate. There have been those who

in the name of mystical religious experience have claimed for their uncontrolled acts the immediate inspiration and even control of God. It is no longer they who act but God who acts through them. This, of course, is to reduce all to extravagance and fanaticism. It is really to make God the author, in the name of immediacy, of acts of utter folly, not to mention countless crimes against justice and mercy. We conclude, then, that *the first test of the validity of a mystical experience is whether it involves not one part of the personality but the whole person.* In the last analysis *holiness* means *wholeness* and that preaching of holiness or spirituality which deliberately discounts and disregards reason as a human device while at the same time it exalts feeling as divine is pernicious and dangerous.

Mysticism and the Reality-Feeling. The second test of the validity of a mystical experience is found in its *power to leave us with the conviction that we have been face to face with Reality.* How shall we determine whether an experience does this? There is not much to be suggested by way of rational procedure. It either does it or it does not do it. There is in this test itself an element of immediacy just as there is in the assurances of our personal identity through various strange or startling experiences. Those who have faced the problem of knowledge know how futile are the tests of sense experience to give us assurances of reality when once doubt has crept in. Seeing may be believing to the man of the street, but to the critical thinker seeing is not regarded as a reliable revealer of reality. For there are far too many cases where appearance and reality turn out to be altogether dif-

ferent matters. Naïve or uncritical realism soon breaks down under critical tests. It will not do as a philosophy at all.

Nevertheless, all knowledge of the world about us *begins* in sense experience, and this beginning is in the last analysis immediate. We accept the data of sense at face value and trust them. In cases where we suspect we are deceived we apply tests. One of the most common tests is a consensus. We ask others to give us their *immediate* presentations that we may compare with ours. Wherever certainty is established and we say we know, it is either *immediately,* or on the basis of some immediate experiences. The very immediateness of the experience, in the absence of reasons for not accepting the presentations, brings us assurances that we are apprehending reality. When, now, in addition to this we are able to add a consensus of certainty among *many* who have had similar experiences we have reenforced our conviction that we apprehended reality. But something is needed beyond this, and this brings us to

Mystical Experience as Tested by Moral Value. While the assurances pointed out thus far bring satisfaction, yet the element of universality is not as convincing as we might wish. There is indeed a universal element in mystical experience as has been shown. It is the "common to many" factor which saves mysticism from the reproach of a pure individualism. But is there not a factor more convincingly universal and objective? There undoubtedly is. Philosophy knows of but one final and enduring test of reality and that is value—value on the plane of the moral. And moral means the social, thus saving the values from any

reference merely to the meeting of satisfactions or needs of the individual subject.

If, now, in addition to the conviction that one's immediate experience reveals reality, and to the fortifying of this conviction by the knowledge that countless others have found the same assurance is added the fact that this assurance is the source of moral strength to the subject of the experience resulting in unselfish and helpful living among fellow men, have we not greatly strengthened the grounds for belief that our immediate experiences reveal reality? This makes the *moral outcome* of spiritual experiences the final test of their validity. This test reveals the chronic weakness of much that has passed for high-grade mysticism. To be "caught up into the seventh heaven" and to have nothing to show for it when one comes down again is an experience without marks which enable others to recognize its value. It avails nothing that the mystic may protest that his experience has been enjoyable. From the Christian point of view spiritual worth can mean nothing less than moral worth. The Mount of Transfiguration is a good place to be but a poor place to stay. Even the temporary shacks which Peter foolishly proposed to build are too permanent. After the glow of the vision has faded, the only test of reality is to be found in the added willingness and strength which the vision has brought, enabling us to minister to those in need at the foot of the hill.

In the life of Jesus Christ we find this test of moral worth constantly met. Jesus was a mystic. His whole life was pervaded by a sense of close spiritual unity with God. He needed often to go to the hilltop

in the early morning hour or at evening to be alone. He was a man of prayer. At the baptism, and on the Mount of Transfiguration he heard the voice of God. There is very little of the element of visions and voices so common in mysticism later on in Christianity. Jesus seems remarkably well balanced mentally. But his insight was nothing if not immediate. He never argues his points. Of illustration and analogy there is a perfect wealth in his teaching but almost no reasoning. His will was so merged into the will of God, and his love for God was so perfect, that John, the disciple best fitted to give an intimate and spiritual interpretation of Jesus, speaks of Jesus' relation to God, in phrases which seem to imply personal identity. "My meat is to do the will of him that sent me and to finish (not *my* work but) *his* work." "I and my Father are *one*." "The words that I speak unto you I speak not of myself: but the Father abiding in me doeth his works." Here I believe is a completeness (if not a uniqueness in the relation of Jesus to God). Be that as it may, no one who ever walked this earth lived so immediately in the consciousness of God as did Jesus. And yet all this wealth of inner spiritual life was not for himself. He sought God in the silent places to gain that marvelous moral strength which made him the great Servant of his fellow men. "The Son of man," he said, "came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give himself."

CHAPTER XII

FAITH IN THE CONTINUATION OF PERSONAL LIFE

Confidence in the continuation of personal life after death is a matter of faith. That is, it is a confidence which is gained only by venturing beyond the point where belief seems fully justified by cogent reasoning based upon facts. Faith implies an element of will, for this venture is our own affair. We do not have to make it. We are not compelled to go beyond the point where our assurances rest upon proof. If we do, it is because we choose to. There are certain matters to which we *must* give assent. In the physics laboratory, for example, we soon see that heat expands metals. The proof not only makes it easy for us to see this but compels assent. But we are not compelled to respond with joy to the glories of an Alpine sunset, nor to feel confidence in a friend, nor to trust God. We may, if we choose, remain within those limits where our confidence is secured by demonstrations. But if we do, we shall have to take the consequences, which are that confidence can be ours only within narrow limits.

Some may think this venture which secures the assurances of faith is confined to religion. But this is not the case. Faith plays a large part in all our thinking—even scientific thinking of the more advanced sort. It is the spirit of adventure—the willingness to

go forward in trust in all enterprises of life. While not depending upon the more formal rational processes, faith is essentially rational in nature. It is not a "leap in the dark." It is a venture where there is every reason to venture. On the thought side, faith is always to be distinguished from credulity. Where belief remains because reason fails to do its work we have superstition, which means the survival of early and crude beliefs in an age where the tests of experience and the dictates of reason ought to make such beliefs no longer tenable. Most people do not believe in haunted houses, though everyone did two or three generations ago. We find no place for such belief to-day, since it is worse than useless and fails to harmonize with our well-established beliefs. It has been outgrown and laid aside.

There are those who tell us this is the case with belief in life after death. While they may not call it a superstition, they do call it a survival from a theological age, and a survival for which the current scientific thinking finds no place. But this is true also of belief in God. That too finds little place in scientific thinking. And notwithstanding some pretentious attempts to "reduce religion to a scientific basis" and to formulate the "religion of science" the fact still remains that religion rests upon a foundation of faith in Reality which lies quite beyond powers of scientific thinking to prove or verify. It is only as men willingly venture beyond that which senses assure or evidence guarantees that they become really religious and gain some of the confidences of faith. The purpose of this final chapter is to point out some considerations which will help to make the

survival of conscious mind, or personality, credible to serious thought. These considerations are implications of the personal conception of life which has been advocated in these pages. They are not proofs of personal survival. They are, however, considerations which ought to carry weight with those for whom the case is not prejudged by the acceptance of a psychology which seeks to interpret the mental life by analyzing and explaining the behavior of organisms—a psychology which, while professing, of course, allegiance to no philosophy, really contains implications decidedly materialistic.

That there had been a distinct decline in belief in immortality during the past generation up to the World War is shown by every attempt to secure statistical data. Professor Leuba's figures indicate that among college students and well-trained professional men the belief in immortality wanes.[1] Many of those who receive the belief as social inheritance lose it during their college days. The lowest percentage of these who hold to the belief is found, according to results of Leuba' s questionnaire, among psychologists. The belief among biologists also shows a low level.

It is assumed that clergymen all believe in personal immortality, and there is no way of checking up here, for in all probability data which represent the actual facts could not be secured. But the fact remains that a large number of men in theological seminaries have studied psychology with a predominantly biological standpoint where consciousness is "explained" in terms of physiological process. If the seminary is

[1] See Leuba: *Belief in God and Immortality.*

modern in its points of view and methods, the type of theology taught stresses social values. The kingdom of God means social justice. Its great values are for the life that now is. This is good, and only as it should be. But the "apocalyptic" note in the message of the ancient prophets with the forward look of faith, so characteristic of great religious leaders, is often absent. Sermons on life beyond death, heaven, hell, and human destiny are preached only by fundamentalists, and a few old-fashioned evangelists, both of whom reiterate the formulas of a theology now pretty well discarded in the circles of scholarship.

The reasons for all this are not hard to find. They are no doubt such as the following: (1) Life has become safer and more enjoyable, thanks to scientific advance. (2) There has been a steady decline in belief founded simply upon authority. (3) The modern historical view of the Bible has had its effect in making biblical theology obsolete, and the critical interpretations of the "eschatological passages" have shown that there is no definite and consistent doctrine of immortality in the New Testament. (4) The inability to construct in mental images a form of the life beyond death which is attractive and reasonably free of difficulties for thought. (5) The way many psychologists to-day deny the existence of the soul and profess to explain consciousness as a function of organic process. (6) The prevailing tendency in many circles to think in terms of society and the social groups has resulted in a corresponding undervaluation of the individual. (7) Last, the fact that immortality occupies so small a place in the thought of many to-day tends to decrease its reality and loosen

our hold upon it. For the feeling of reality depends upon attention. That which is crowded out of our thinking inevitably ceases to seem of value. Other reasons might be given, but these are doubtless the main sources of weakened belief even among religious persons. With many, belief in immortality has not been discarded outright but has been, as it were, laid upon the shelf to be taken down again (provided it is still there and we can reach it) in some hour of special need later on. What can a psychology, which views religious experience as personal, suggest which will aid us in a high appreciation of the greatest values of personal experience—so high an appreciation indeed that the thought that death ends personal life and annihilates these values will become increasingly difficult? This is a worth-while question and one to which we shall try to find some answer in this final study.

Attitudes Toward Death. There are two ways in which a person can enjoy life and remain happy, even though his fellows are dying around him every day. One is through the protective impulse which refuses to permit thoughts of death to remain. The other is through faith in personal survival and the continuation of life after death. Any careful student of human life will agree that we need both of these ways of keeping happy. Let us look a little more closely at each of them; first, the protective feeling which tends to keep the thoughts and images of death away. Instinctively we will not allow our attention to remain upon the thought of our own death or that of those nearest and dearest to us. How long will you permit yourself to create images of your own death-

bed or fancy yourself standing and reading the inscription on your own tombstone? Certainly not very long. We banish such images promptly, and it is well that we do. Only thus can life go on wholesomely and work be performed effectively, and social relations sustained with cheerfulness enough to make one a reasonably agreeable associate.

A form of this banishment is seen in the transfigured images of a poet like Maeterlinck, expressed with fine euphemisms. The poet (with an insight into the eternal reaches of truth which is doubtless far greater than that of the plodding psychological investigator) transcends ordinary desires and feelings. The poetic attitude toward death simply abolishes it by refusing to call it by the common names and to think of it in the usual way. It is "triumph" and "coronation"! "There is no death." The feeling may so control the imagery that inner vision borders on ecstasy. And just as ecstasy in religious mysticism sometimes produces sensory anæsthesia, so with the poet-mystic, fear disappears because the object of fear is gone. Happy is he who can catch something of the emotional uplift of the poet-mystic, especially if the uplift saves him from the secret domination of a persistent fear—the fear of death. From fear of death we must be delivered in one way or another. For most men it is fortunately easy. For where reason and instinct work together it is not difficult to keep out images which would beget a weakening fear.

But for many thoughtful men, especially after they pass the prime of life, there comes the time when, even though skies are still clear and days happy, this banishment of death from our consciousness is

no longer possible. They find themselves saying silently, "Yes, this cannot go on many years longer. Some day I too shall face what every man faces sooner or later." Or it may be that death breaks rudely into the inner circle of fellowship, claiming a dear one and leaving wounds which time can never wholly heal. Or the shadow falls across our own pathway as we realize that disease has laid its hand upon us. Is there something beside the negative deliverance of diverted attention? Countless thousands of those who have borne the name of Christ have said there is. In word, and more often by silent testimony of brave living, they have said that for that day the confidences of religious faith are a source of strength. They steady the spirit and give courage where otherwise fear would weaken and desolate. For the investigator in the field of religious experience, the fact stands forth that for countless thousands, faith has been the source of courage to go forward and bear bravely. And when this faith is analyzed it is found to contain confidence in the love and sympathy and goodness of God and a positive though not always clearly defined belief concerning the continuation of life after death.

Estimating its worth in terms of its power to comfort and strengthen men, faith in the continuation of personal life is certainly one of life's greatest values. True, we do not always feel the need of this value. In youth or in good health the protective impulse which banishes death from the mind is generally sufficient. But in the quiet moments when we see unusually far, in serious illness, in the hour when one very dear is taken, in catastrophe or in advancing age,

faith in the continuation of life looms large for those who have gained it. As the years pass, this faith may find a place as one of the deep currents of life, not always felt on the surface of experience but exerting its pervading influence profoundly upon life's outlooks.

Psychological Meaning of Immortality. We shall use the word "immortality" in subsequent discussion. It would be well therefore to set forth in the more exact phrases of psychology the meaning commonly associated in religious circles with the word "immortality." Etymologically, it means immunity from death, but commonly the meaning is that the "soul," or conscious part of our existence, does not die when the body does. Thus death is a physical event and concerns the physical organism, but it does not involve the soul, which lives on. This is the common religious belief in its simplest terms. Further elaboration concerning the conditions under which the soul lives on becomes theology or speculative philosophy. In the thought-forms of psychology, immortality means a continuation of consciousness and of that organization of experience around the conscious center named the self.[2] Organization of experience in self-consciousness requires that there be experience to organize, and here we meet at once the first of a number of rather formidable difficulties which emerge as soon

[2] There are three views of the human self: (1) It is a part of the Divine Spirit, or an emanation therefrom. This is the prevailing view in Oriental religions and in Platonism. (2) That it is divinely created at some point in time. This is the doctrine of the "soul" in Christian theology. (3.) That the self is a conscious center about which all experience is organized, and that it develops under the social conditions of human life. This last is the psychological view and does not deny divine creation. The conception of the self advocated in these studies is not that of the transcendent ego of traditional idealism but, rather, of a mental or spiritual existence which develops with the organic life and in the social relations of human society, and, on the higher levels of human experience, tends to a control of the body rather than to a domination by the body.

as we inquire concerning the nature of experience in a life beyond death, and concerning the conditions under which the self can continue to feel and image and remember and act. It must be confessed that at present we cannot hope to throw much light upon these serious difficulties which beset every attempt to think of the nature and conditions of experience in another life. To seasoned thinkers, the attempt to solve such problems seems almost hopeless, for experience can never transcend itself without sacrificing the feeling of reality. To think of a future life with the images necessary to give definiteness is but to make that life a more or less unreal and partial counterpart of this; while to avoid the images and seek a construction in concepts is to part with what little reality feeling the image conserved, and to render the thought so vague and abstract that a life so conceived seems hardly desirable. This is the trouble with such phrases as "Heaven is not a place but a state." They do, indeed, avoid crude anthropomorphism, but the meaning approaches zero. The difficulty is not unlike that encountered when we inquire concerning the content of the idea of God. The religious value of the conception of God is best preserved by thinking of God as our Divine Father, as Jesus taught men to do. This is casting the Divine in a human mold, to be sure, but it has to be done if the idea of God is to preserve any emotional warmth and so any religious value. An impersonal Cosmos or Absolute, while it may be a concept of broad usefulness for metaphysics, has little if any religious worth. We have had occasion to note this in discussing faith in God. In like manner we shall have to think of experience as

taking place under the fundamentally essential conditions which make it possible in our present existence. This will mean that the objects of our experience will always be in space relations and events in experience will occur in that sequence we know as temporal.[3] Without space as a fundamental form of experience we can hardly conceive the principle of contiguity nor those other principles of mental connection called the laws of association. These are fundamental to memory as we know it, and the indispensable element in memory is recognition which involves the principles of likeness and difference.

Thus when we embark on the attempt to conceive even vaguely what experience may be like in a world beyond death, we find ourselves compelled to think that its principles and laws are essentially those of experience in the present existence. And I believe we shall have to say the same thing concerning elementary factors of social experience like the instinctive feelings and emotions. Those directly connected with the physical organism, such as fear, anger, and sex feeling will find no place, since they depend, we are assured, upon the functioning of certain organs and glands in the body. But the higher social emotions such as admiration, reverence, gratitude, and the higher social sentiments like friendship and love we cannot obliterate without making the conditions of experience such that it is difficult to see how personal life can go on. Of course this is "psychological anthropomorphism," but we make these suggestions

[3] The doctrine of the relativity of motion in space, and the conception of the fourth dimension of space as time, does not change the fact that if we are to think of experience at all, in another world, it will have to be under those principles or conditions fundamental to our experience here and now.

simply to point out that if we are going to think of experience at all in a life beyond, it will have to be under essentially the same fundamental conditions which we have found to be necessary to mental life on the personal plane in this world. In other words, experience *wherever we conceive it* must be held together by memory and preserve the essentially social character of our present life. Beyond this, attempts at detailed thinking are apt to be unprofitable and even embarrassing.

New Testament Conceptions of Life After Death. It is a fact not out of place to note that it was among the earliest followers of Jesus Christ that the conception of life after death came to its highest expression. The earliest Christian records emphasize two cardinal points in this connection: First, a continuation of the personal self is both implied and definitely taught. Secondly, life beyond death is associated with moral character.

The Gospels relate with considerable detail occurrences which took place after the death of Jesus where the disciples met him, recognized him, talked and ate with him. One account goes even so far as to allege that he called their attention to the fact that he had flesh and bones (Luke 24. 39). Thomas is represented as touching his wounds (John 20. 27). It is notable that in the earliest records there is none of this. Paul distinctly refuses to think of "flesh and blood" in connection with the glorified life of Christ and says that "flesh and blood doth not inherit the kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." The farther we get away from the days of Christ the greater becomes the tendency to interpret the "resur-

rection life" in terms of the physical and material. This is explained, I think, by the wish to conserve the reality of the risen Jesus in the thought of people whose only reality was materiality. That we should find crudity of interpretation in the Gospels—the most pronounced crudity being in the latest Gospel—is only what might be expected. The Gospels were written from thirty-five to fifty years after the events they record by men who had not been among the original followers of Jesus. And in the resurrection stories their great purpose was to make very clear the fact that death had wrought no real change in Jesus. He was the same. They consciously emphasize his personal identity by striving to demonstrate a *physical* continuity. But anyone who reads the records carefully discerns that they also indicate a mental identity of Jesus before and after his death. His affections and personal attachments and interests seem unchanged by death. With all the difficulties raised by the strange statements concerning Jesus' body, we are on firmer ground when we note the personal continuity. Jesus himself was the same.

Spiritual Body. Paul's Greek converts at Corinth were troubled by the extreme difficulty of thinking of disembodied existence. He writes them in the first Corinthian letter concerning the "spiritual" body. This means, of course, that the apostle who was a master thinker found himself unable to conceive of personal life without body of some kind. And we, with all our modern psychological analysis of conscious life, are even less able than Paul. How much of personality itself would be left if we take away all those properties and characteristics which depend

upon the physical organism—the form, the features, the eyes, the smile, the touch of the hand, individuality of movement? It is this personality which makes the loss so great when death robs us of those we love. We long for

> ". . . the touch of a vanished hand,
> And the sound of a voice that is still."

How we could even identify our friends becomes a hard problem. This difficulty is not the technical one of how a mind dependent upon a nervous system and end organs can know and be known. It simply grows out of the very intimate way personality is linked up with individuality in bodily form and activity. This certainly accounts for Paul's spiritual body. This apparent dependence of spirit upon a body of some kind suggests a serious problem in connection with belief in the continuation of personal existence. This problem we must now face.

Consciousness and the Nervous System. Psychology teaches that experience begins on the plane of sensation and the sensory processes furnish the raw material out of which all knowledge of the world about us is woven. It has often been asked whether we can think of conscious experience as possible without the nine or ten senses. These senses involve, of course, the end organs and the brain with the vast and intricate network of neural connections throughout the body. Without the physical organism thus equipped with a nervous system to react to the surrounding world, it has been urged, we cannot think of conscious experience as possible at all. We are told

that since we nowhere find consciousness without a nervous system therefore consciousness is produced by the nervous system.

Now, it is doubtless true that we cannot think of behavior, or adjustive activity of organisms without a nervous system. Experimental observation has demonstrated the dependence of muscular contraction upon the continuity of the motor nerves which end in the muscles. But does this carry with it the sweeping generalization that all consciousness depends upon a nervous system? There is very good reason to deny that it does. Let us note the more obvious facts from biology. The simplest animal organisms, the protozoans, have no nervous system, yet the substance of which their bodies is composed exhibits not only power of movement but sensitiveness and appears to be capable of transmitting energy. The cœlenterates, those low invertebrates which begin to have an internal digestive cavity and tract, are the first to show centralization of sensitiveness. In the annulates, organisms like worms, we find the rudimentary beginnings of a brain. From this point upward the degree of sensitiveness and control of movement bear a constant ratio to the degree of elaboration which the nervous system has undergone. On all the levels of life where the biologist can trace development in organic structure we find no exception to the rule that all adjustive movement of organisms depends upon coordinations in the brain and spinal cord.

But when we inquire concerning certain higher phrases of consciousness in human life, the above formula of adjustive movements in terms of neural

reaction does not furnish much light. Let us take a familiar fact as example. I see coming toward me the form and face of an esteemed friend. In terms of physics we may easily state what is taking place. There are light rays of a certain distribution in space. Their differences in color depend, the physicist assures us, upon different frequencies of vibration in the ether. These differentiated forms of energy make possible the projection of a certain image on the retinas of my eyes. In the retinal cells known as the rods and cones there takes place a mysterious transformation of energy of the physical universe into energy of the organism. No image or light vibrations of any sort pass to the brain, only a form of energy called "nerve current." It is energy of the nervous system, and we call it current because it seems to run through the nerves as electricity does through wires. But is this nerve energy really energy as we understand it in physics? Is it subject to that broad generalization known as the law of the conservation of energy? Presumably it is. But the ether waves travel more than seven times around the globe in a second of time while this mystery named nerve current travels from one hundred and fifty to three hundred feet per second, its variation depending, it is believed, upon the varying resistances at the synapses, or points of transit, from one nerve cell to another.

On the sight of my friend, then, nerve currents from retinal cells find their way to the back part of the cerebral cortex. But as to what happens there we are quite in the dark. And now constructions of the imagination begin, as they always do when facts of observation fail. And they begin in science quite as

readily as they do in philosophy. Indeed, science has a far richer assortment of these products of the constructive imagination than philosophy ever had. Here come the atoms and electrons, the ions, the colloids, the vitamines and a swarm of these children of the scientific imagination. This is the supernaturalism of modern science without which many facts would be left pretty high and dry so far as explanation is concerned. In the matter we are discussing, namely, the arrival of nerve current at the optical areas on the occipital cortex of the brain, explanation follows in terms of the "modification of molecular structure in the brain cells." When this modification takes place sensation follows. To call this explanation is little short of naïve. We are not objecting to this, but only urging that we ought not to forget that, however familiar we become with the formulas which profess to explain consciousness in terms of neural excitation, "neurograms," or "registrations in the nerve cells," they are in no sense facts of observation. Their "reality" will be determined by their utility in explaining facts which baffle us when we try to understand them.

But psychology gives us the rest of the analysis of the experience of meeting the friend. The object approaching is sensed not simply as an object but as a beloved friend. Recognition takes place, after which follow the smile and the grasp of the hand. And now where is there anything convincing concerning a nerve process which is the counterpart of recognition? Or of judgment, or of the consciousness of rational relations generally, or of desire which has outgrown physical impulse and been transformed

into a longing for love and sympathy, or of will which may drive one along a course of action by motives from which instinct would rebel? Are we ready to allow that human experience can be appraised and interpreted in terms of organic instinct? Shall we say that love is fundamentally sex passion, and that friendship at bottom is gregariousness, or the instinctive satisfaction of being with the "herd"? What formulas of nerve reaction enable us to understand and explain sympathy, gratitude, loyalty, moral courage, and satisfaction in the service of others? It is when psychology, which has entered all fields of thought, seeks to analyze and interpret human experience as personal relations in the social realm, that the insufficiency and poverty of the formulations in terms of neural process become most apparent. And yet a psychology of organisms has really nothing else to offer. It is from this point of view that the assumption that our conscious life is the product of or is to be explained by the nervous system is open to the gravest objection.

Because formulas of nerve process have seemed to account for the lower and simpler aspects of experience such as reflexes and instincts, some psychologists are pushing resolutely on with these same neural formulas professing to explain recognition and consciousness of meaning and of rational relation with "restimulation of old neural tracts," "neural overflow," and theories of "drainage." Now, when explanation, scientific or otherwise, consists merely in putting two sets of images or concepts together, it ought to be possible to take either as cause and the other as effect unless adequate reason can be shown

why this cannot be done. Why, it may be asked, should neural process always be taken as cause and mind as effect? If some facts point to the conclusion that nerve process is the producer of conscious mind, are there not other facts which point quite as directly to the conclusion that the subject which is conscious —the self—may produce neural process? As a matter of fact, neither of these can be proved, and the really scientific position is to affirm neither, either explicitly or by implication. But if we may make inferences, it should be noted in passing that there are about as many facts which lend themselves to one interpretation as to the other. This is being recognized to-day as it was not a few years ago. We shall return to this a little later on.

The point I wish to urge here is that if it be true that certain ranges of facts in human experience can be better explained by the use of the concept self, there is as good reason logically for using the self as there is for calling in explanation through "neurograms," "overflow nerve current," and "neural drainage." For, surely, so far as their superempirical character is concerned, all are in the same class. They are all "transcendent," and their transcendency differs only in this, that the neurograms which recognize and are conscious of meaning seem to be physically transcendent (and so more easily classed as natural), while the self which recognizes and is conscious of meaning and relations seems to be a psychical transcendent, and so not so easily included within the category of things considered natural. In the last analysis, however, we choose here between one set of concepts or the other. And our choice all through

these studies has been in favor of the self, since the self affords, as we believe, a far more adequate and satisfactory explanation of human experience in its social and moral aspects. Others may think differently, believing that the neural processes really account for consciousness and go on shuffling the organic formulas in an attempt to understand the more advanced forms of the mental life and human experience on the plane of the moral.

We offer this much in the way of a final justification of our belief in the self, for if anything survives the death of the organism it must be a self, and unless there is a self to survive there is no use in any discussions of immortality. Let the old formula "No psychosis without neurosis" be taken seriously as true of the entire mental life, and there is nothing further worth saying about personal survival among the psychologists at least, and when the matter of immortality comes up a motion to adjourn would always be in order.

But far from needing to offer apologies for a psychology of persons, we have found again and again that human experience in its ethical and religious aspects cannot be dealt with in an adequate way without recognition of the developing self which governs, modifies, and even makes over the life of instinct in accordance with growing ideals. It is not where psychology grows out of biology but where it meets ethics that we find room for the conviction *that not only does the organism condition the self, but the self conditions the life of the organism; and this conditioning and ultimate control of organism by self, rather than the domination of self by organism, be-*

comes more and more marked as we pass from the level of instinct to the levels of a moralized experience.

We come into this world with the capacity to develop selfhood in experience. Whether or not a human life remains largely upon the plane of control by the organism will depend upon conditions which cannot be discussed here, for such discussion belongs in the field of social ethics and theology. We must be content to note that in proportion as the experience of a human being rises to the level of control through moral ideas, in that proportion he gains a degree of emancipation from the domination of the physical organism. That this emancipation cannot be more than partial is quite evident, for under the conditions of our present existence attempts to ignore the life of the organism after the manner of the ascetic are not the way to a self-discipline with high moral worth as the experience of humanity in various religious systems demonstrates. But that there is a level of living above the domination of instinct is evident to one who seeks to understand the whole of human experience, and that the call of the Founder of Christianity is to such living is perfectly evident to one who takes the records of his life and teachings seriously. That a human being, a personal self who has striven for spiritual values, in and with the organism but not dominated by it, should survive the organism is a conviction of faith which a psychology of selves as distinguished from a psychology of organisms may well strengthen.

But before we ask concerning the suggestions which psychology may make toward strengthening

the hope of immortality there are two questions to which some answer ought to be found. They are: First, What is the meaning or content of the immortal hope from the Christian point of view? Second, Has psychic research produced any results which strengthen the grounds of the immortal hope?

The Immortal Hope From the Christian Point of View. We have already noted the reasons why immortality must mean the continuation of experience; and experience must mean the organization of the content of the mental life around that center of consciousness and source of activity we call the self. There are reasons also for thinking that this organization of consciousness into experience must always take place under essentially the same principles of rational relation as we find it takes place under the conditions of our present existence. These reasons are simply that experience will not mean anything when we try to think of it in any other way. This has been attempted, but meaning always begins to slip and disappear. Thus, in Oriental thought, especially that of Hinduism, the "soul" is regarded as eternal and living on in successive incarnations. But there are no continuous threads of consciousness. Karma, or the law of cause and effect in relation to human activity, alone remains. That individual stream of consciousness which means to us the life of the individual self is regarded as an evil. Nirvana, or Eastern "salvation," with all its shades of meaning, generally signifies release from the confines of individual experience and freedom from the conditions of living. When these conditions are those which involve suffering and unhappiness, we can conceive their removal. But

when they involve the breaking of all those strands of memory, recognition, and rational connection through which consciousness holds together, we can only say that meaning has taken its departure. This is true also of all those statements of finite experience merging into Absolute experience where subject and object coalesce in one transcendent unity. This means nothing at all, for thought cast in psychological molds and little or nothing even for philosophical speculation. And yet we are assured that Nirvana is not annihilation! It is only "the release of Life from the limitations of living."

Almost as devoid of meaning are those suggestions of the continuity of a self "essence" or "substance" (substance means nothing material, of course) in which a certain kind of Western philosophy has appropriated and made over Eastern ideas. Thus some have supposed there can be a survival of this self substance with no continuation of that stream of consciousness called the self.[4] But when such continuity is interpreted in the terms of Ethics, staggering difficulties appear, while to psychological thinking meaning is gone.

Another suggestion often made is that all the immortality we ought to expect is found in the enduring nature of what the individual self has accomplished. An immortality of achievement and of influence, we are told, is all we can ask for. Now, whatever may be the merit of such suggestions, the fact remains that those who cherish faith in a life beyond do not think of it in this wise but as a veritable continuation of individual conscious experience. This

[4] See McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 127ff.

has been the case in all religions which developed a doctrine of a future life, even including India.[5] And this is the only conception which, it seems to me, psychology has any business to discuss. At any rate, it is the only conception of immortality which comes out of and can satisfy those deep desires of our human nature evidenced by the spontaneous expressions of humanity in many ages and literatures.

No, immortality must mean a survival of the personal self, and this in turn must mean a continuation of that particular stream of consciousness which I call my experience and which you call yours. Even if the same physical organism could survive but be taken over by another conscious being as its medium of expression, there would be an end of the former *person*. For, important as it undoubtedly is in our human life, the physical body is not the crucial matter in the continuation of personal existence. Another stream of memories with their associational connections and recognitions would be quite another organized experience and therefore quite another person. In spite of the way the world beyond death has been pictured as entirely different from this world, the fact remains that, so far as psychological thinking can go, we cannot acquire a new world. Our real and only world is the one in which we have lived—it is the world of our past experiences which have been bound together by the threads of memory. Gone are most of these experiences so far as the content of pres-

[5] For in this land where organized religion has been dominated for ages by a highly speculative philosophy, salvation has meant deliverance from rebirth, and (for the philosophical) union with Brahman, the impersonal, eternal spirit of the universe, in which the human self loses all identity. But this latter specification of Hindu theology never gained favor with the common man. He clung to the old Vedic doctrine of a heaven to which the spirits of men go when released from the round of rebirths.

ent consciousness is concerned, but strangely subject to recall when the right association is made, and then they stand recreated in the eternal present—the present in which we always live.

Second. Has psychic research produced any results which strengthen the grounds for the immortal hope?

We must distinguish between Spiritualism, which is a quasi-religious cult, and psychic research. Spiritualism has presented facts of mediumship, such as trance states with various automatisms as evidence not only of conscious life after death but also of communication with the departed. Psychic research, while its objects have been much the same, has commanded far greater respect. This is because the methods in psychic research have been scientific and to a considerable degree objective. Those who have conducted the tests and carried on experiments have generally been persons well trained in the natural sciences and in physiology and psychology. A society has existed for more than thirty years in Great Britain with its headquarters in London for the purpose of investigating with scientific thoroughness all kinds of psychic phenomena. This society has had a large membership and its presidents have been men of world-wide reputation as scientists, psychologists, and philosophers—such as Professor Henry Sidgwick of Oxford, Robert Crookes, Oliver Lodge, Lord Haldane, Doctor Schiller of Oxford, and a number of others. The reports of investigations by approved committees have been published for many years and now number over fifty volumes. There has been an American branch of the S. P. R. (as it is called for

short) which has conducted some notable investigations in this country. The founder and first president of this movement was Dr. Frederic F. M. Myer, who published after several years of investigation his large two-volume work entitled *Personality: and its Survival of Bodily Death.* This work, issued about twenty years ago, is characterized by a scientific spirit. Even though Myer's interpretations cannot always be accepted, and a more fully developed psychology makes some of his discussion seem questionable, yet a range of facts is presented, many of which have as yet found no explanation.

In the meantime two related movements within psychology itself have arisen which have shifted the emphasis and offer new explanations of the facts of abnormal psychology. These movements are the biological psychology or "behaviorism," and the methods of analysis and interpretation originated by Freud and by Jung. Behaviorism has been of great service in keeping human psychology close to the organism. But that it has gone to extremes and thus rendered itself helpless to deal with important aspects of experience is now agreed among an increasing number of psychologists. The formulas of the Freudian analysis are also extreme (in some cases almost to the point of being absurd), but that they rest upon important truths we are beginning to realize. When we shall have come nearer the truth in regard to the value of behaviorism and have established a sure foundation for psychoanalysis, some of the problems with which the psychologists of a generation ago wrestled may be again taken up with greater promise of substantial results.

In the meantime it must be confessed that beyond the growing conviction that some occurrences generally classed under the term "telepathy" have been established as facts (though we are as yet far from explaining them) very little has remained as assured results of the years of patient work carried on by the Society of Psychic Research. Does not this point to the conclusion that, after all, the expectation that the continuation of life after death will be established as scientific fact through the methods of empirical investigation is an unwarranted hope? This is the growing conviction of many. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that a new interest can be developed in the careful investigation of "psychic" facts with the growing knowledge which an advancing psychology can furnish. We may not "demonstrate immortality" but we may learn much which will justify the psychologist in accepting the self as a necessary foundation concept for his thinking, and using that concept with the conviction that it corresponds to a real existence in human life—an existence without which our vastly complicated and growing human experience must remain largely unexplained.

We must turn now to the main question with which this chapter is concerned, which is, *Has psychological thinking any suggestions which may strengthen faith in the continuation of personal life?* There are two considerations which, I think, are worth our attention. And around these the remainder of our discussion will center.

First. The control of mind over organic process, which is increasingly evident at certain levels of human experience, points to the growing independence

of mind and to the possibility of the self surviving the organism.

Second. The capacity of the self to organize experience increasingly in terms of the higher social values (as contrasted with mere organic needs) points to the possibility of the self surviving the organism.

Let us consider the first of these. The last decade or two has witnessed the recognition of a range of facts which indicate a real influence of mind upon the bodily processes. These facts have long been known to some degree, but a traditional dogmatism among scientists prevented scientific acknowledgment.

For a long time "mind cure" was treated with contempt by the current scientific thought. But psychology has insisted upon taking "mind cure" and "faith cure" and "mesmerism" seriously, with the result that psychotherapy, or cure through the bringing about of favorable mental states by suggestion, is now scientifically recognized as the best treatment in certain kinds of disease. There are diseases like neurasthenia, where the physical condition of extreme weariness and weakness is now regarded by physicians as secondary or the result of the primary conditions which are mental. Grief, severe disappointment, anxiety over business, fear, not simple instinctive fear, but the reasoned fear of consequences —these and many other mental states have been found to exert a powerful influence upon the functions of the body. The cure of those physical disorders which have resulted from mental states clearly lies in the changing of the mental state, not in the use of drugs and chemicals.

But more significant is the way in which mind as it develops, acquires an increasing control of the organism. At first, movement is reflex and instinctive. The "set" of the nervous system at birth governs the capacity for movement. But with the passage of the years this is reversed and more or less of real power of initiative is developed. In the higher forms, this power of initiative is genuinely creative. The engineer sits quietly on the hill and sees the dam which shall draw from the river its mighty stores of energy. And in a few months or years, what he saw in mental vision stands in concrete before him. He has commanded not only his own organism but the energy of many others and his mind's creation is material fact. This is but typical of a great range of facts which point to a genuine creative power in mind or self.

In that active aspect of consciousness named Will, we see most clearly the capacity of a well developed self to assert independence of environment and even of the physical organism. The usual analysis of volition offered from a behavioristic or a traditionally functional standpoint is good as far as it goes, but it fails to take account of factors which are clearly a part of human experience at its higher levels. I refer to the way the self can act from transformed desires. Psychologists with good reason seem to have wished to give the old theological, philosophical debate concerning determinism and the freedom of the will a wide berth. But psychology, having freed itself from the domination of philosophy, and ethics from that of traditional theology, there would seem to be no reason why the problem of voluntary action should not be

taken up afresh with the freedom which science always demands to face *all* the facts.

There is no space for a full discussion of volition here. We are interested primarily in the question whether there are considerations which point to the possibility of conscious life apart from the physical organism. I must therefore briefly summarize, giving conclusions rather than more fully elaborated arguments. In acts of the will we have the outstanding instances of control of organism by mind. This control runs all the way from a modification of instinctive and habitual reactions, or the conscious suspension of reflexes to the full autonomy of the self. An example of this latter would be such an act as that of a steamboat captain who though surrounded with flames, sticks to his post in order to beach his vessel (this has happened a number of times), or when heroic men on the ill-fated Titanic helped others into the boats and quietly decided to go down with the ship.[6]

When conscious control by the self is analyzed, it is found to mean the capacity to modify the disposition or direction of nerve energy. This modification usually means inhibiting the flow of energy in the direction which would produce the more elementary movements of instinct or habit and directing it toward the realization of the idea or ideas chosen as the end. This choosing of ideas as ends of organized action is what is usually meant by purpose. Behaviorism either ignores purpose or rejects it as metaphysical, while the traditional functionalism has

[6] Acts of this sort were not infrequent during the World War, sometimes under conditions of excitement which may have impaired the full volitional character of the acts, sometimes under conditions which point to the fullest conscious control.

explained choice and purpose as the motor aspects of attention of interest. There are in the last analysis only two sorts of explanation of all movement of living beings: (1) the mechanical, and (2) the purposive. Biology has always been very chary of all concepts implying purpose. The reason is simply that such concepts are unmanageable with the formulas of mechanistic explanation to which biology has been so largely committed. But it has become evident that to fail to explain certain facts of human experience on the mechanistic basis and then to refuse to allow concepts which promise some explanation because these concepts are "metaphysical" is somewhat high-handed. Certain biologists who were also not only good technicians in their field but good thinkers have recognized this, with the result that the explanation formulas have been broadened and Vitalism in biology takes issue with Mechanism.

In a similar fashion is the idea of purpose being made respectable in psychology even among those who formerly rejected it as a metaphysical concept. It is seen with increasing clearness that we cannot describe human conduct so as to make it intelligible without these "metaphysical" concepts which behaviorism so positively rejects. But in accepting the concept of purpose for use in his field, the psychologist has modified it. It is no longer the old "fiat" purpose, for purposes have their sufficient antecedents. Choice (or conscious selection if you please) is probably the most outstanding mark of the developing self, and experience tends to make the basis of choices more permanent. Thus the character of the more fixed purposes is the character of the self. Pur-

poses depend upon experience. A self cannot act in independence of his past, nor can the self create energy of the organism. But in an act of will the self may dominate the organism, and may modify or change environment, thus to a degree controlling stimulus. This paves the way for a modification of the desires and in the end for a transformation of motives. On the level of organic reaction, the motives spring out of the desires and the desires find their basis in the instincts. That is to say, the elementary desires of an organic life grow out of the cravings and tendencies to action which are a part of our original nature. These are usually imperious.

But, as already noted, it is the work of moral education to teach the growing person control. That this control is generally only partial and imperfect is perfectly evident as we realize how much of untamed instinct is manifested in human life. But when education really does its work well, control of the organism may reach the point where desire on the plane of instinct ceases to be the strongest motive and other and higher motives which are stronger take the place of the more primitive impulses to action. This is what is meant by the transformation of motives. Something like this seems quite necessary to explain the strivings of men to gain victory over what they think of as their "lower nature." The loyalties of religion are, I believe, needed to carry this transformation of motives and resulting control of the life to its highest points. When that point is reached in human experience, when a person can will some noble act of self-sacrifice—giving himself in devotion to a great cause, even laying down his life for another—then

control from the organism is reduced to its lowest terms and control by the self is at its fullest. *When, now, we consider the way in which human life becomes moralized and the self gains emancipation from the domination of the body, does it not make it easier to believe in the possibility of a life of the self without organic conditions as we know them in this life?*

But we must proceed to our second consideration, which is that the capacity of the self to organize experience increasingly in terms of the higher social values points to the possibility of the self surviving the physical organism.

The facts which seem significant are soon cited. Their interpretation, as considerations pointing to the possibility of personal survival, will be a matter of opinion. Here, as elsewhere, when no proof is possible, rational belief and religious faith will depend much upon one's prevailing points of view and habitual moods. These will determine how heavily weighted the preponderance seems either for or against the survival of self-consciousness. We are, of course, doing nothing more than point out points of view concerning human experience on its highest levels which may seem suggestive to rational belief and strengthening to religious faith.

And first of all there is the valuation of personality which characterizes every adequate interpretation of human experience. Here appears a man's appraisal of himself and of other selves. We have seen how religious experience necessitates not only a God who is of use, but a God who is of transcendent worth in himself. Only thus does worship outgrow its low level of action from the motive of good things ex-

pected. In like manner in Christianity, where religious experience is found at its best there is a corresponding valuation of humanity for its own sake. Christ taught his followers to think of their fellow men as of supreme worth. Thus the highest value in human life, personality, and the highest ideal of the human mind, God, are linked together in well-developed religious thought. We attribute personality to God not as a limitation but because it is the least inadequate conception possible for the Divine. To try to think of God as impersonal is to conceive the Divine in terms less than the highest aspects of human existence which we know in our human relations. Now, faith that personal consciousness outlasts the physical organism is from one point of view simply our confidence that the highest value of our human existence, namely, our own conscious selfhood, is a permanent value. But it may be objected that this is a confidence which has its basis in feeling and hence is without proper authority. And the answer must be that the confidence does find its basis largely in feeling, but that this neither denies its essentially rational character nor does it deprive it of authority.[1] It is to be noted that this assurance which comes from recognizing the supreme worth of the human spirit links up faith in immortality indissolubly with faith in God.

But recognition of human selfhood as the supreme value carries with it the valuation of other persons. For it is only out of contact with other selves that our own selfhood emerges and develops. The fact of fellowship is basic to all our experience. For life at its

[1] Concerning the authority of feeling as well as reason see the preceding chapter.

best is woven, not out of food getting and self-preservation and sex and play, but out of those emotions and attitudes and sentiments named admiration, reverence, gratitude, sympathy, friendship, and love. And fellowship, emerging from the merely instinctive satisfaction of being together, grows until it becomes those strong loyalties which lift human social relations far above the level of animal life. These loyalties are not merely intensifications of personal attachment but involve also an acknowledgment of the great ethical values like justice and righteousness which are fundamental to the social order. Justice as an impersonal ideal is worthless; indeed, there is no such thing, for justice is always the quality of our feeling and the character of our conduct toward another. Thus our conviction of the permanent worth of these great social values of our human experience, as we discover that worth in social relations, makes it difficult to believe that in the death of the physical organism there comes the final end of all the values which life with our fellow men has enabled us to realize.

Friendship intensified and emotionally enriched becomes moral love. The family is doubtless the social institution where love grows to its finest flower. Here, again, the beginning is clearly on the plane of the organism. Sex love is instinctive and its impulses are strong, but marriage finds but a poor consummation in mere sex relations. If out of the organic there do not begin to grow those more permanent attachments which root themselves in the valuation of persons for what they are, not for what they do or afford, there remains nothing permanent in marriage, as the lam-

entably widespread prevalence of divorce testifies. The highest ideals of ethics and religion demand a modifying of the sex instinct. This always means control with the well-being of another paramount. And when the passing of the years brings the diminishing of the urge of instinct, love may become enriched by the spiritual deposits of a lengthening comradeship. The tendency is away from domination by the impulses of the organism and may be toward a fuller realization of the richer values of personal fellowship. It is a long way from a selfish sex love to the experience of that dying man, who looking up at his wife, whispered "In thy face, my beloved, I have seen the Eternal."

Out of the life of social relations with our fellow men grow not only the emotions and sentiments which so greatly enrich experience, but our ideals also. These are veritable creations of the personal self. We are conscious of something in us which never allows us for any length of time to be content with our attainment. There is a "divine discontent" which prevents it. The few years we live here are not enough. As the ideals we form and cherish for the service of others in the ministry of truth and beauty and happiness grow far beyond our capacity to attain, we find it difficult not to believe that life itself is commensurate in opportunity to these aspirations which grow in every earnest spirit.

And when we turn to the social ideal, in the light of which so many are seeking to serve to-day, are we content to work for those aims which have to do with physical comfort alone? The social ideal must indeed look to well-fed, well-clothed and well-housed com-

munities of people who work efficiently and in reasonable happiness and contentment. But is that all? Some may think that is enough, but the depressing fact is always forcing itself into notice that even these desirable conditions enrich life but partially and for a short time at best. The greatest Servant of his fellow men who ever lived summed up the underlying purposes of his life when he said, "I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly!" This more abundant life means more than an equitable distribution of this world's goods—more than enough of food and raiment. The same Servant of Humanity whose mission was the more abundant life of his fellows also declared that "a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth." And he asked, "Is not the life more than the meat?"

And may we not think that a life which has been developed and enriched through service of others will still find opportunity to serve? Is it not increasingly difficult to believe that a personality which has been tempered through long experience in serving until it has become like a fine tool is laid aside forever by the death of the organism? It is true that a great leader or teacher continues to exert influence after he is gone. The work of every life in which there has been building with substantial materials endures as a heritage for the beneficiaries who come after. But the view that one survives only in his work, while it recognizes the value of the beneficiaries, fails to reckon with the enduring worth of the benefactors themselves.

Finally, we should recognize that faith in immor-

tality is a resultant of other faith. Its strength depends upon the confidence one has found in the reality and permanent worth of personal life. And this faith in turn rests back upon faith in God. In the last analysis our faith in the continuation of personal life beyond death is not in the nature of a great conclusion from keen and comprehensive thinking so much as it is an achievement in high and worthy living. It follows from character more than from able reasoning. It is thus not so much an item of our creed as a growing conviction in our experience. For some of us have learned that assurance of the continuity of life and of the permanence of its great values is far easier when we are living the kind of life that is worthy of being continued beyond death. Trivial living, selfish living, and life in bondage to the imperious demands of the organism cause the fires of the immortal hope to burn low and die out. But when life has become rich in love, it does not seem so much more wonderful that we shall live than that we do live.

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